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Foreword 
Water rationing has become pervasive in Australian cities in recent years. This is 
only partly due to low rainfall. An important contributor has been inadequate 
institutional arrangements for the management of our urban water resources. 
In contrast to developments in rural areas, there is effectively no market for water in 
Australia’s cities. The charging regimes of monopoly utilities reflect production 
costs, but not the scarcity value of water. Instead, restrictions are placed on 
particular water uses and these impose substantial hidden costs on many 
households. The lack of price signals to guide demand and supply also compounds 
the difficulties of making efficient investment decisions, including about alternative 
sources of water.  
This study arises from the Commission’s broader research program on 
environmental and resource issues of importance to the community. It identifies 
challenges confronting urban water management and canvasses potential areas for 
reform. It also explores how urban water markets might work in practice. The issues 
are complex and no definitive answers are provided. However, the directions for 
reform seem clear. The potential gains are sufficient to warrant, as a matter of 
priority, a comprehensive public review to assess options and inform the 
community about what is at stake.  
Research for this study was undertaken in the Environmental and Resource 
Economics Branch under the guidance of Commissioner Neil Byron. The 
Commission is grateful for the assistance it received from many organisations and 
individuals, both in gathering information and reviewing the analysis.  
 
Gary Banks AO 
Chairman 
 
March 2008 
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Glossary 
Aquifer A layer beneath the surface of the ground which stores and 
allows water to move through it, and from which water can 
be extracted.  
Bulk water Water supplied by a water provider to another water 
provider. 
Entitlement An entitlement to exclusive access to water in each irrigation 
season (seasonal allocation), specified in volumetric terms 
or as a share of a specified consumptive pool. 
Environmental flow A water regime provided within a river, wetland or estuary 
to improve or maintain ecosystems where there are 
competing water uses and where flows are regulated.  
Gigalitre Equal to one thousand megalitres.  
Groundwater Water occurring under the ground in aquifers.  
Inclining block 
tariff 
A charging structure with successively increasing charges 
for each block of the commodity purchased. 
Inflows In the context of water accounting, the volume of water that 
flows into the storage. 
Irrigation district A reticulation network supplying water to irrigators 
managed by companies, trusts, statutory authorities and 
quasimunicipal authorities.  
Kilolitre Equal to one cubic metre or thousand litres. 
Long-run marginal 
cost 
The expected cost of bringing forward an extra unit of 
supply in the long term, including the associated capital 
expenditure for infrastructure. 
Megalitre Equal to 1000 cubic metres or one thousand kilolitres.  
Scarcity-based 
water charge 
A charge that reflects the value of water in alternative uses 
during periods of water shortage. 
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Seasonal allocation Specific volume of water allocated to a water entitlement in 
a given season. Sometimes referred to as a water allocation, 
a water determination or a seasonal assignment. 
Short-run marginal 
cost 
The cost of providing an additional unit of supply to meet 
demand in the short term, reflecting the highest value use to 
which a commodity can be put in periods of shortage. 
Stormwater Rainfall that is collected after it has run off urban surfaces. 
Third-party effect A third-party effect (or externality) arises whenever the 
production or use of a good or service affects parties other 
than those involved in the transaction and these effects are 
not fully reflected in the prices paid or received by the first 
two parties. 
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Key points 
• There is no effective market for urban water. Governments (operating as planners, 
suppliers, distributors and retailers) make supply investments and manage available 
water with only limited knowledge about the value that users place on the resource.  
• Charging regimes now recover operating costs and a return on assets but do not 
reflect the scarcity of water in times of shortage. Instead, demand is managed by 
overriding the preferences of urban consumers through restrictions on water uses. 
– The annual cost to households of restrictions would amount to billions of dollars. 
• For the past two decades, and in contrast to earlier years, most governments 
avoided investments to augment supply. More recently, they have embarked on a 
range of projects including desalination, recycling and some links to rural supplies. 
– Efficient water supply decision-making needs to be based on cost–benefit 
frameworks that assess the relative merits of the various augmentation options in 
ways that better address climate-related uncertainty and which can adapt to 
improved understanding of future needs and supply options.  
• Policies that restrict interaction between water used by rural and urban sectors limit 
opportunities for inter-sectoral trade. This distorts water use and infrastructure 
investment decisions. 
• Monopoly provision of urban water impedes opportunities to develop alternative 
supply sources. Reform has been confined to governance arrangements rather than 
the structural changes necessary to achieve more efficient outcomes.  
• A well-functioning urban water market could provide more timely investment signals, 
a wider range of innovative supply options, greater choice of products and options for 
water users and more efficient use of nationwide water resources. This is attainable 
without compromising equity, health, safety or environmental objectives. 
– Equity concerns can be addressed effectively by targeted policy instruments. 
• The direction, if not the end point, for reform seems clear. The potential gains are 
sufficient to warrant a comprehensive public review to determine the extent to which 
a more market-oriented focus could be pursued and to alert the community to the 
tradeoffs. Key areas that warrant investigation include an assessment of the costs 
and benefits of: 
– allowing a greater role for prices to signal water scarcity and to allocate resources 
– removing the artificial impediments to rural-urban water trading 
– removing barriers to competition in the supply and retailing of urban water. 
• Transaction and adjustment costs need to be assessed in conjunction with how best 
to sequence incremental or co-ordinated reforms.  
Existing inter-jurisdictional arrangements such as the National Water Initiative could be 
modified to progress a more ambitious and coordinated reform agenda.  
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Overview 
Water is used for a myriad of purposes across households, agriculture and industry 
(figure 1). It also helps to maintain ecosystems and provide environmental amenity.  
Most of Australia’s capital cities and other urban centres have suffered severe water 
restrictions as an extended period of low rainfall has curtailed runoff into water storages. 
Limited supplies must be allocated across uses and users, and governments have chosen to 
do this through restrictions rather than through prices. In 2005, around 80 per cent of city 
dwellers were subject to long-term water use restrictions. 
The failure to provide urban residents with water that many would have willingly paid for 
is not just a consequence of low rainfall, it also reflects policy choices. It is widely 
observed that urban centres are not well served by institutional arrangements for water 
(box 1). While institutions cannot make it rain, they are responsible for aligning long-term 
supply and demand, and managing periodic scarcity. 
Figure 1 Where does our water go?  
Water Supply 
11%
Elec., Gas, Manuf. 
& Mining 7%
Other 6%
Agriculture 
65%
Households 
11%
Water use (2004-05)
Other 2%Local Gov't Parks 
& Fire Fighting 5%
System Losses 
8%
Industrial & 
Comm. 
23%
Domestic 
62%
Urban water consumption (2000-
01)  
a  Includes sewerage and drainage services. 
Sources: ABS, Water Account Australia 2004-05, Cat. no. 4610.0; WSAA (2005). 
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Box 1 Calls for urban water reform 
The Australian Conservation Foundation 
Historically water has been disproportionately priced in all sectors (agricultural, urban and 
industrial). ACF advocates a pricing system that reflects its true value and that water 
management authorities accelerate and strengthen water reforms by balancing principles of 
user pays and the removal of water subsidies with the need for access to an affordable 
water supply for all Australians. (ACF 2008) 
The Business Council of Australia  
Australia’s water problems are a direct result of a poorly planned and managed water 
system that has conspired to turn a sufficient supply of water at the source to scarcity for 
end-users. … there is no long-term shortage of water in Australia, just as there is no 
shortage of any other good or service we consume. Instead, the perceived shortages are 
due to artificial limits on supply to our cities … (BCA 2006, pp. 1-10)  
National Water Commission 
… structural reform in the [urban water] sector has generally not kept pace with that in 
similar sectors such as gas, electricity or transport. (NWC 2007, p. 21) 
The Secretary to the Treasury 
Unsurprisingly, if a commodity is effectively being given away, then demand will exceed 
supply and we can have no confidence that what supply there is will be directed to its use of 
highest value-added. So it is with water. Major cities are experiencing water restrictions of 
one kind or another. Quantitative rationing is incontrovertible proof of the absence of an 
efficient market. (Henry 2005, p. 10)  
 
The urban water challenge — better management, not scarcity  
Australia is the driest continent in terms of average precipitation, yet one of the most 
water-abundant in rainfall per person. Its water supply challenge is not one of scarcity per 
se, but of managing water resources given the variance between where and when it rains 
and where and when water is required. 
To account for variations in rainfall, dams servicing major urban populations feature large 
storage capacities relative to consumption. As the current stock of dams has become less 
resilient to variations in rainfall, periodic scarcity has been addressed by temporarily 
rationing water until rains arrive. For much of this decade, however, restrictions on most 
urban residents’ water use have been enduring. 
Getting augmentation decisions right is difficult and it would be fortuitous if investment 
decisions always matched well with rainfall patterns. Nevertheless, during the past two 
decades, large scale urban water augmentation has essentially been in abeyance (apart from 
in Perth). Some jurisdictions have even invoked ‘policy bans’ on particular forms of 
augmentation. 
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Faced with dwindling water reserves, governments have recently commenced or 
announced major new investments in desalination, recycling, rural-urban pipelines and 
water grids. This has prompted many to question the reliability of analyses undertaken to 
assess the merits of different supply options, including how some contractual arrangements 
will operate — for instance, whether desalination plants will operate if dams are spilling. 
These new commitments will need to be integrated into institutional arrangements that may 
not readily accommodate them. How, for instance, should user charges be set when water 
is obtained from multiple sources with widely different cost structures?  
There are also concerns that climatic changes are exposing weaknesses in the adaptive 
capabilities of planning systems that have relied on historical rainfall records. These 
concerns highlight the importance of robust cost–benefit frameworks to assess appropriate 
augmentation options in ways that better address uncertainty. 
In addition to reservations about the capacity of the current institutional framework to 
manage periodic shortages and long-term water security, there are longstanding concerns 
about the efficiency of urban water services. Nationally, water policy and institutions treat 
urban and rural water as functionally separate. Within this constraint, urban water 
provision is centralised with government acting as planner, regulator, wholesaler, 
distributor and retailer.  
Urban water provision is highly centralised 
The urban water sector has little in common with ‘private’ goods and services. The supply 
chain from water storage through to delivery and waste removal is the domain of 
government monopolies. Charges are determined administratively and vary little in 
response to whether storages are overflowing or running dry.  
That urban water is provided in this way may reflect its intrinsic characteristics, history 
and attitudes. Water and wastewater distribution networks exhibit natural monopoly traits. 
Urban water has a high transportation cost relative to its value, its availability can be both 
variable and uncertain, and it has a competing use in environmental flows. The public good 
aspects of safe drinking water and its essentiality for life are also raised as rationales for 
government provision.  
Do such characteristics mean that all facets of the urban water sector must be centralised 
under state control, and if so, to what extent? Further research is required to answer such 
questions definitively. However, the supply and consumption of urban water appears to 
have features in common with other (private) services with natural monopoly transmission 
infrastructure, such as telecommunications, electricity and gas. These latter services feature 
variable price, security and service offerings. 
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Some important reforms to the urban water sector including cost recovery and 
volume-based charging frameworks were achieved in the 1980s and 1990s. Since then, 
progress has slowed as the inter-jurisdictional agenda has shifted to rural water reform. 
These earlier initiatives, however, provide the foundation on which further initiatives could 
be introduced.  
Prescriptive restrictions generate substantial hidden costs for users 
In times of water shortage, supplies are conserved by restricting particular water uses (e.g. 
outdoor watering). Such prescriptive rationing denies households the opportunity to choose 
how to use and conserve water in ways they value most. Before the introduction of water 
restrictions early this decade, household water use nationally was roughly split equally 
between internal and external uses (figure 2).  
Figure 2 Water use in Australian households pre- and post restrictions 
Bathroom 
20%
Toilet 15%
Laundry 13%
Kitchen 8%
2000-01
Outdoors 
39%
2004-05
Outdoors 
44%
 
Sources: WSAA (2005); PC estimates. 
If there were an urban water market, householders confronting higher charges during 
droughts might opt to re-allocate their water use — for example, by reducing indoor use in 
order to preserve gardens or protect homes from the structural damage that can arise from 
drying soils. As restrictions on use eliminate such choice, householders must respond in 
other ways — replace or remove gardens, invest in water tanks, or shift water, often by 
bucket, from allowed indoor uses to proscribed outdoor uses.  
These actions have costs (box 2). For example, there are costs in householders holding 
hoses at inconvenient times for prolonged periods. And household water storage, which is 
increasingly being resorted to, is an expensive augmentation option. For instance, a 
common 2000 litre household rainwater tank costing around $1500, holds around $3 worth 
of water at current mains water prices.  
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Box 2 The hidden costs for households are high 
The costs of water restrictions are many and varied. They include: structural damage to 
buildings; deterioration of lawns and gardens; purchasing new watering systems; time 
spent on labour-intensive methods of watering; injuries from carrying ‘greywater’ in 
buckets and the emergence of ‘water rage’ with neighbours checking the water use of 
others in ways they would not contemplate for other services, such as phone use. 
Estimating the costs of water restrictions is difficult and various methodologies have 
been employed:  
• For Sydney, Grafton and Ward (2007) estimated the cost per household in 2005 at 
about $150 above the cost of achieving the same level of water use with higher 
water charges. This estimate ignores the disutility costs of time spent using 
labour-intensive watering methods. 
• For Perth, Brennan, Tapsuwan and Ingram (2007) valued the cost of time spent 
holding hoses. Assuming a value for ‘greenness’ and imputing costs based on mean 
wages, they estimated that the annual costs per household of water restrictions 
range from $67 for restrictions that allow watering twice a week using sprinklers to 
$870 when sprinkler bans are operating.  
• For Canberra, Hensher, Shore and Train (2006) used estimates of households’ 
willingness to pay to avoid water restrictions. To have stage 1 or 2 restrictions rather 
than stage 3, 4 or 5 restrictions, respondents expressed a willingness to pay an 
average amount of $109, $130, and $268 per year, respectively.   
 
Approximately 80 per cent of Australia’s households are subject to water restrictions. 
Applying the estimate of $150 per household for the cost of restrictions in Sydney in 2005, 
the national cost would be around $900 million. The Sydney estimate excluded many costs 
(e.g. installing watering systems, time spent watering gardens in permitted labour-intensive 
ways, and the deterioration in gardens and lawns). Since the excluded costs likely far 
exceed the costs included in the estimate, the annual cost of the water restrictions to 
Australian households is probably a multi-billion dollar figure.  
The costs extend beyond households. Water restrictions have necessitated reductions in 
output from water-dependent, coal-fired electricity generators exacerbating lower 
hydro-generation output due to water shortages. These influences have led to higher 
wholesale electricity prices flowing through to businesses. The visual amenity of cities’ 
open spaces has been impacted adversely and the viability of many community sports and 
recreational facilities compromised.  
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Markets could provide valuable information 
With centralised planning approaches governments must rely on subjective determinations 
complicated by multiple and potentially conflicting objectives — planning, service 
delivery, regulation and water use education.  
Markets could reveal information about costs, prices and valuations that would better equip 
water providers to make decisions about when new investment should proceed and the 
costs and benefits of different forms of augmentation. Assessing the relative costs and 
benefits of augmentation options without such market intelligence is daunting. A decision 
to introduce a high-cost desalination plant, for example, would reduce supply uncertainty 
by providing water independent of rainfall, but raise the prospect of users having to pay for 
excess capacity in normal times.  
In principle, an urban water market could allow users to reveal their water security 
preferences. Some users, particularly businesses may be willing to pay a premium for more 
secure water, whereas others might prefer more frequent restrictions along with lower 
overall supply charges in most years. In essence, water users could have a role in managing 
their own risk of facing restrictions.  
With current arrangements, little is known about how users value forgone consumption and 
time/inconvenience costs. Scarcity-based pricing could reveal the value of water to the 
community. Investment decisions then could take account of the community’s valuation of 
the benefits (costs) of more (less) water availability relative to the costs of supply 
augmentation.  
There are concerns about equity impacts  
Many have questioned the appropriateness of allowing urban water prices to reflect 
scarcity because of the prospect that prices could rise for a vital essential for life during 
episodes of water shortage. Yet markets are almost universally accepted as superior to 
centralised planning strictures for the production and distribution of other necessities, 
including food and energy. Prices for many basic food products frequently rise and fall in 
response to changing supply conditions. 
That said, because clean drinking water and well-functioning sanitation need to be 
available to all citizens — and governments are seen as answerable for this — concerns 
about access to water cannot be treated lightly. Preliminary analysis, however, raises 
doubts about whether significant equity issues would arise from treating water more like 
other goods and services.  
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Expenditure on urban water and sewerage accounts for a small proportion of households’ 
budgets. For example, low-income households spend on average less than one dollar per 
day on these services. As a proportion of their gross household expenditure, this equates to 
between 0.2 per cent (Tasmania) to 1.4 per cent (ACT). Furthermore, given that all capital 
cities have both fixed access and volumetric charges, an increase of say, 10 per cent in the 
volumetric component would increase water bills by less than that, even less if households 
responded by reducing their water use.  
But water restrictions are also inequitable  
The implicit assumption that non-price restrictions must be fairer than price-based 
alternatives is open to challenge. It would be surprising if an instrument as indiscriminate 
as restrictions on water uses did not have its own inequities. For instance, some might 
consider it unfair that prescriptive restrictions mean that: 
• the damage from dead gardens tends to afflict outer areas more than, usually wealthier, 
inner city locales 
• children are banned from playing under sprinklers — most acutely felt in generally less 
wealthy areas with limited access to swimming pools or the sea 
• households that economise indoors but have large gardens with flowers, fruit trees and 
vegetable plots experience very high costs, whereas households of the same 
composition that are heavy indoor users, but have native vegetation or minimal 
gardens, may be scarcely affected 
• less wealthy residents are less able to avail themselves of relatively high cost options 
(e.g bores, rainwater tanks and commercial supplies) to mitigate the damaging effects 
of restrictions.  
Nevertheless, if the effect of higher water prices on low-income households were 
considered untenable, there would be scope to use targeted measures to offset those effects 
while retaining the beneficial incentives from efficient prices. The options include direct 
measures (e.g. provision of a fixed quantum of low-priced ‘essential’ water to all 
households) and indirect measures (e.g. tax-welfare arrangements).  
Current arrangements rate poorly on efficiency grounds 
Urban water systems should meet safely the requirements of all users and should source 
water, and dispose of waste water, in an environmentally sustainable way. The centralised 
approach has generally delivered on these objectives but at considerable cost to households 
and businesses during dry periods.  
Indicators of the inefficiency of urban water provision include:  
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• the seeming failure of supply augmentation decisions to achieve timely and least 
(expected) cost balancing of supply and demand 
• the lack of innovative supply options, product choice and options for water users 
• the lack of a relationship between the price of water and its scarcity  
• the inability of water users to use water in ways that are most valuable to them  
• the artificial separation of water resources into rural and urban sectors that remove 
opportunities for inter-sectoral trade from uses where its value is lower to uses 
(including environmental purposes) where its value is higher 
Pursuing health, social and environmental goals in economically efficient ways would 
improve resource use, productivity and, ultimately, living standards.  
There is scope for less centralised urban water systems 
Although many accept that there are significant problems within the urban water sector, 
views differ on the best way forward. In particular, there is debate about whether 
meaningful changes are feasible under standing institutional arrangements or whether more 
substantial structural change is needed.  
In this context, it needs to be recognised that, for reasons outlined above, a competitive 
urban water market currently does not exist anywhere in the world. In contrast to other 
infrastructure services, there is little research and case study material on how an urban 
water market might work in practice. That said, as one commentator observed, addressing 
the requisite market design issues is hardly ‘rocket science’. 
Given the starting point of monopoly services provided by governments which also set the 
rules of conduct, the potential reform canvas is vast (figure 3). The possibilities may, or 
may not be, mutually exclusive. Some could be introduced incrementally, others would be 
better approached as a package. Sequencing could be critical for some measures, less so for 
others. Some could involve substantial transitional and adjustment costs (e.g. structural 
separation of water monopoly businesses), others may not (e.g. simplifying block tariff 
charging structures).  
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Figure 3 A potential reform menu 
 
 
 
Pricing Cost-
recovery 
focus with 
non-price 
restrictions 
to reflect 
scarcity 
Improve 
block tariff 
structures 
Reflect 
scarcity in 
prices 
Competition 
between suppliers 
and retailers 
Rural-
urban 
trade 
Artificial 
separation of 
rural and 
urban water 
supplies. 
Barriers to 
rural-urban 
trade (in 
connected 
systems). 
Trade between 
rural and urban 
water utilities
Trade between 
utilities and 
major users 
Fully integrated 
market with 
household level trade 
Structures 
and 
institutions 
Vertically 
integrated 
monopoly 
Strengthen 
corporatisation and 
commercialisation  
Contracting 
and 
outsourcing  
Structural 
separation 
Private 
ownership and 
competition 
Centralised 
model 
Fully competitive 
urban water market 
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While a detailed review of priorities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of urban 
water provision is needed, areas that identify themselves as worthy of detailed examination 
include: 
• the absence of scarcity-based pricing in the demand management armoury 
• regulatory impediments to inter-sectoral trade between urban and rural water 
• the barriers to entry in integrated urban water monopoly structures.  
There is scope to improve pricing  
At present, urban water utilities operate administered pricing systems that aim to ensure 
cost recovery. To do so, utilities adopt a range of different fixed and volumetric charging 
structures with multiple tiers and varying approaches to estimating system costs.  
Some progress could be made by simplifying block tariff structures. A more significant 
reform would be to introduce a form of scarcity-based pricing to ration demand. For 
example, prices could increase as dam levels fell and the threat to water security increased. 
During a long drought prices might increase gradually over several years and then drop 
during a season or two of high rainfall.  
As noted, potential impacts on low income households could be dealt with via an 
allocation of ‘essential’ water sufficient to meet basic needs and charged at a low price. 
Additional water for discretionary use would be subject to scarcity-based pricing during 
periods of water shortage. Such a change could allow water to be managed in a way that 
was more closely aligned with community preferences, and improve signals about when to 
invest in new water supplies.  
The efficacy of using prices, rather than restrictions, to manage demand would obviously 
depend on how users respond to price changes. Some contend, for instance, that demand 
for water is not particularly responsive to changes in its price. However, recent studies 
suggest that even modest price changes could have a significant effect on consumption. 
Moreover, users are likely to adopt longer-term strategies to reduce consumption (e.g. 
shifting to more drought resistant gardens) leading to a stronger response over time. 
Of course, a shift from managing demand by imposing restrictions towards scarcity-based 
pricing would pose challenges. For example, constraints such as single metering for 
multiple tenancies may need to be addressed.  
Ultimately, it is possible to envisage a competitive urban water market (with appropriate 
regulation of monopoly elements of the supply chain) involving many retailers and 
wholesalers with different price-service-security offerings. Efficient prices would emerge 
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and, as with other markets, exchange mechanisms might evolve — for example, spot prices 
or a central pool like the arrangements for the eastern electricity market.  
Efficiency gains attained through competitive markets could even lead to lower water 
prices than would otherwise prevail with continuation of current arrangements. In 
particular, the likelihood of excessive costs from poor investment decisions being borne by 
users and taxpayers could be reduced.  
Were a fully decentralised market contemplated, it would best evolve gradually, preceded 
by reforms of administered pricing.  
Rural-urban water trading would offer access to low-cost water  
Agriculture is responsible for 60–70 per cent of total water consumption and households 
around 10 per cent (figure 1). Integration of rural and urban water therefore provides 
opportunities for supply augmentation for some cities. Where water transfers are physically 
and economically feasible, even small diversions from rural use could make major (and 
relatively low-cost) contributions to urban supplementation. Such transfers could defer or 
obviate the need for major investment in supply augmentation. 
Rural-urban water trades could be temporary or permanent. Opportunities arise for urban 
water transfers through: 
• water markets — e.g. voluntary trades 
• regulation — e.g. mandated allocations for specific uses or locations 
• indirect purchases — e.g. water saving investments with the gains shared between the 
rural (source) and urban (recipient) sectors.  
Markets will often be the most efficient and equitable mode of exchange because they 
involve voluntary and mutually-beneficial transactions. For example, urban water users 
facing water scarcity may be willing to pay more for a unit of water than the return primary 
producers can earn on that water.  
There may, however, be trade-offs between involving as wide a range of buyers and sellers 
as possible to capture gains from trade and the workability of rural-urban water trading. An 
intermediate level of integration involving large urban and rural water users would 
probably capture much of the available gains from trade (figure 4). Periodic supply 
contracts could facilitate rural-urban transfers and avoid the transactions costs associated 
with a formal urban water entitlement system. 
The most economically feasible opportunities appear to be in Adelaide, Melbourne and 
Canberra, and other regional urban centres close to major irrigation districts.  
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Figure 4 Intermediate integration  
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Notwithstanding that rural-urban water trading could benefit both buyers and sellers, there 
are likely to be social and regional concerns revolving around matters such as stranded 
irrigation assets and the potential impact on small rural communities. 
Structural and institutional reform could provide significant benefits 
Compared to other utility sectors (e.g. electricity, gas, telecommunications and some 
modes of transport) that have undergone structural transformations, the urban water sector 
has changed little. Most major urban water utilities remain vertically-integrated 
government monopolies. There is some private sector involvement through contracted 
capital works and ancillary services and franchising arrangements, but no direct 
competition.  
Modest reforms keeping existing structures intact include further commercialisation and 
governance reforms — dividend payout policies could be more commercially based and 
water utilities given greater autonomy in making investment decisions. 
Private involvement could be expanded through greater use, and innovative forms, of 
competitive procurement. Centralised procurement typically involves specific projects (e.g. 
a desalination facility) or services (e.g. maintenance). An outcomes-based approach, 
however, has merit. Rather than specify a particular technology to provide additional 
water, an alternative would be to tender for a volume of water. This would enable different 
proposals to be ranked, and in the absence of any policy bans, least-cost augmentation 
options selected — whether from a dam, aquifer, changes to catchment management, 
desalination, recycling, stormwater harvest or purchase of a rural water entitlement 
(figure 5).  
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Figure 5 Options for new water supplies 
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The third party access provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1975 offer a means to 
facilitate competition in urban water services by providing new entrants with an ability to 
access essential distribution infrastructure. Access regimes have been used to unlock 
monopoly infrastructure elsewhere, but have been used little for urban water provision or 
wastewater services. This is not surprising given low prices (in times of scarcity) and the 
risk associated with entering a market dominated by vertically-integrated 
government-owned water utilities. 
Competitive entry could be encouraged by instituting discrete and cost reflective charging 
between the constituent components of water monopolies, rather than just recovering 
overall system-wide costs. Armed with transparent information about discrete costs — in 
particular the actual costs of using network infrastructure — potential entrants could more 
readily identify areas where existing or new services could be delivered more efficiently. 
More ambitious reform could involve upstream and downstream activities being 
structurally separated from monopoly distribution functions as occurred with energy 
market reforms. 
Sovereign risk would need to be addressed  
For water investments there is uncertainty about variability in rainfall and runoff. In this 
environment, it is vital that uncertainty is not exacerbated unduly if private investment is to 
be encouraged. It is important that government policy be consistent with competition 
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policy principles such as competitive neutrality and ensuring the separation of policy, 
regulatory and commercial functions.  
The provision of extensive public grants for water infrastructure investments has the 
potential to deter private investment. Moreover, it is very likely that government grants and 
subsidies already conflict with the stated objective of full cost recovery for urban water 
provision.  
Ideally, policy initiatives should be ranked according to a consistent benchmark such as the 
cost per kilolitre of augmentation or water savings. For example, the cost of supplying dam 
water is around $0.15–$3 per kilolitre compared to costs of up to $9 per kilolitre for 
rainwater tanks. Indeed, one rebate scheme for water efficient dishwashers is estimated to 
have saved water at a cost of over $30 per kilolitre. Such benchmarks should not be the 
only decision criteria — reliability, flexibility and optimising a portfolio of supply options 
are also important — but they add to transparency and provide a safeguard against 
well-meaning, but inefficient, expenditures and subsidies.  
The potential gains from urban water reform are worth pursuing 
Prices revealed in well-functioning and integrated water markets would provide a 
coordinating role to achieve an efficient allocation of water. Building on the cost recovery 
paradigm to ascribe a scarcity value to water resources would allow costs, prices and user 
values to play a more influential role in guiding consumption and investment decisions in 
the urban water sector.  
Allowing water prices to reflect both costs and scarcity would provide more timely 
investment signals to suppliers. This would help avoid the ‘feast or famine’ approach to 
augmentation investments. It would also provide signals to private sector investors about 
water investment choices such as building a desalination plant, recycling water and 
investing in water saving technology.  
The monopoly provision of water and the limited recourse to third party access to 
distribution infrastructure contributes to systemic inertia — until sufficient (non-price) 
pressure is brought to force an augmentation decision. Removing barriers to competitive 
entry could stimulate competition in bulk water provision, retailing and wastewater 
recycling and foster continuing innovation and new service offerings. 
Market prices would reduce the need for temporary restrictions to become enduring. Water 
use would be ‘democratised’:  
• users could make their own informed decisions about water use — households and 
industry could make efficient decisions about micro-solutions (e.g on-site recycling and 
household greywater reuse systems) 
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• suppliers and users could negotiate their water price-service-security offerings — 
common practice in other services such as telecommunications and insurance.  
There are therefore strong in-principle arguments to support the contention that the 
community’s water use and security needs could be met more efficiently than is the case 
under the current centralised approach.  
The direction for reform, if not the end point, seems clear  
There is now widespread support for the view that the centralised urban water model is 
neither economically efficient, nor effective in achieving an appropriate balance in supply 
and demand over time.  
However, understanding the degree to which a more market-oriented approach could be 
pursued in practice would require further analysis. For example:  
• Would a competitive market provide the most appropriate degree of water security, or 
would governments need to retain responsibility for setting overall requirements? 
• How should any ‘above normal’ revenues that accrued from scarcity pricing be treated? 
• At what point would structural reforms for smaller urban systems not be worth 
pursuing? 
Given the limited experience with variations from the centralised urban water model in 
Australia and internationally, it is difficult to envisage anything other than an iterative 
approach. Abrupt or large-scale changes could generate excessive transactions, 
implementation and adjustment costs.  
Substantially more analysis is required to provide a clear picture of the urban, rural and 
economy-wide impacts of various options. Australia is a world leader in rural water 
reform, but resides with the international field in urban water reform. There is little 
experience to draw on. And our urban water sector lags other infrastructure sectors in 
simulation modelling, market design and cost–benefit assessments.  
In addition, competition, while potentially benefiting many, would impose costs on those 
who have gained from the current restricted market. There are also challenging political 
and regional issues related to movements of water and finances between urban and rural 
areas. Any distributional implications and adjustment costs need to be taken into account. 
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The challenge for policy makers 
Urban centres have varying geographic and hydrological features. Desalination might 
prove a more cost-effective option for coastal cities, whereas rural-urban water trading and 
recycling may be especially relevant for inland centres.  
A flexible framework to guide reform has much to commend it. Pursuing reform under a 
national umbrella is likely to expedite outcomes — especially if linked to rewards and 
sanctions. This underlines the importance of inter-jurisdictional structures, such as the 
Council of Australian Government’s National Water Initiative, to reignite momentum to 
build on earlier urban water initiatives.  
The reform agenda would be most effectively advanced through a comprehensive public 
review to assess the extent to which more market-oriented arrangements could be pursued 
and to quantify the gains on offer. The review would need to address commonly held 
concerns and misconceptions and elaborate on the costs and benefits of any trade-offs that 
might be made. A better public understanding of urban water issues would assist in 
moderating some of the historical, cultural, attitudinal and political impasses to reform.  
Among other matters, such a review should assess and provide guidance on:  
• how best to engender robust and transparent assessments of various supply integration 
and augmentation options, with lower-cost options drawn on first 
• the practical implications of using water prices, rather than just restrictions on use, to 
better signal system costs and the value to users of greater water security 
• the impacts of removing the artificial barriers between rural and urban water integration 
so that a connected water market could emerge 
• structural reforms and pro-competitive regulation to encourage competition into the 
urban water infrastructure supply chain  
• minimising the distortions and efficiency losses that may arise from government 
subsidies directed at particular solutions. 
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1 Setting the scene 
 
Key points 
• While some reforms of the urban water sector were achieved in the 1980s and 
1990s, progress has been slow in recent years as the reform focus has shifted to 
rural water. 
• Deficiencies in urban water systems have become more apparent during a period of 
drought and uncertainty over future water availability. This has led to calls for 
substantial reform from a wide range of stakeholders and analysts. 
• Some of the key issues relate to policy objectives, allocation of water between uses, 
supply augmentation decisions, innovation and dynamic efficiency.   
 
1.1 Introduction 
Drought conditions in many areas of Australia over the past several years, combined with 
the prospect that future climatic conditions may diverge from historic trends in ways that 
lower water availability, has led to renewed community, government and academic interest 
in the reform of the urban water sector. Large-scale investments in new water 
infrastructure are planned and there is debate about the decision-making processes 
employed, the technologies chosen and the implementation strategies planned. In the 
meantime, water demand is being managed through a variety of means, including water 
restrictions, and some have suggested that prices should play a greater role. Low and 
uncertain supplies have also heightened interest in how water is allocated across 
household, industrial, agricultural and environmental uses.  
The aim of this paper is to identify the main problems and challenges facing the urban 
water sector and to assess available reform options. Reform options considered include 
changes within the existing institutional arrangements and more fundamental structural 
reform, including the introduction of greater competition in water markets. While the paper 
argues that there is a strong case for change, the objective is not to lay out a blueprint for 
reform. One reason is that circumstances vary across Australia and the best option for one 
urban centre may not suit another. More fundamentally, water policy is complex and 
further detailed research, involving extensive stakeholder consultation and empirical 
analysis, would be needed to produce a comprehensive reform agenda.  
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This chapter starts with some background information on the urban water sector. This is 
followed by a brief overview of past reforms in the sector, and a compilation of views of 
stakeholders and analysts on deficiencies of the current arrangements and the need for 
further reform. Finally, the key issues for reform are identified, which are addressed in 
subsequent chapters. 
1.2 An overview of urban water systems 
An overall perspective on water use in Australia is given in figure 1.1, which shows that 
around two-thirds of water extracted in Australia is used in agriculture. That is six times 
national household water use. Within the urban sector, domestic use accounts for more 
than 60 per cent of water consumption, while industrial and commercial use accounts for 
almost one-quarter. 
Figure 1.1 Snapshot of water use 
Water Supply 
11%
Elec., Gas, Manuf. 
& Mining 7%
Other 6%
Agriculture 
65%
Households 
11%
Water use (2004-05)
Other 2%Local Gov't Parks 
& Fire Fighting 5%
System Losses 
8%
Industrial & 
Comm. 
23%
Domestic 
62%
Urban water consumption (2000-
01)  
a  Includes sewerage and drainage services. 
Sources: ABS (2006); WSAA (2005). 
Most urban centres in Australia rely mainly on water from dams. Among capital cities, the 
exceptions are Perth (which obtains most of its supplies from groundwater and also has a 
desalination plant) and Hobart (which sources around 60 per cent of its water from the 
Derwent River (Hobart Water 2007)). On average Adelaide obtains most of its water from 
dams; however, in dry years most comes from the River Murray (SA Water 2008). 
The dams supplying many Australian cities have large water storage capacities compared 
with overseas cities. The main reason for this is the comparatively high degree of 
variability in rainfall and runoff in most catchments supplying urban dams in this country. 
This variability creates management challenges that are compounded by the fact that low 
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rainfall tends to increase demand for water for gardens. In dry periods it is common for 
annual inflows into dams to be less than annual urban water use. 
Table 1.1 Capital city water storage capacity 
 
 
City Dam storage capacity 
Annual consumption
2005-06 
Supply when full (based 
on 2005-06 rate of 
consumption)
 megalitres megalitres years
Sydney 2 584 300 528 260 4.9
Melbourne 1 173 000 444 365 4.0
Brisbane & SE Qlda 1 930 350 298 132 6.5
Perth 688 000 244 158 2.8
Adelaide 168 979 163 577 1.0
Hobart 11 000 38 150 0.3
Canberra 207 400 56 823 3.7
Darwin 265 000 34 521 7.7
a Includes Little Nerang and Hinze Dams, as these, in addition to Wivenhoe, Somerset and North Pine supply 
water to the Gold Coast. The latter three dams also supply Ipswich and Logan City and a number of other 
local government areas. 
Source: WSAA and NWC (2007). 
The water storage capacities of the most dam-dependent capitals range from around four 
years (Canberra and Melbourne) to nearly eight years (Darwin) in terms of their 2005-06 
consumption (table 1.1). Despite this, in all of these cities apart from Darwin, supplies 
have proven to be inadequate to prudently allow unrestricted access to water (at prevailing 
water charges) in recent years. Adelaide and Perth, which rely somewhat less on dam 
water, have also heavily restricted water use.  
The traditional problem of year-to-year variation in rainfall and consequently, inflows to 
urban water storages, has been exacerbated by a downward trend in rainfall across much of 
southern Australia in recent decades. In south-west Australia, yearly inflow into Perth’s 
dams from 1911 to 1974 averaged 338 gigalitres, from 1975 to 1996 inflow averaged 
177 gigalitres, and from 1997 to 2005 it was 114 gigalitres (CSIRO 2007). As figure 1.2 
shows, the reduction in inflows to Perth’s dams since the mid-1970s has been much larger 
than the reduction in rainfall. This general relationship between rainfall and inflows into 
dams is normal and is due to evaporation and retention of water in soil. The relationship 
can be affected by the management of land and vegetation. For example, building on-farm 
water storages reduces inflows, whereas thinning forests increases inflows. 
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Figure 1.2 Variation of rainfall and streamflow in south-west Australia 
Percentage change from long-term average 
 
Source: CSIRO (2007, p. 21). 
Eastern Australia has also become dryer since the 1950s. Since 1997 much of southern and 
central Victoria has experienced the driest ten-year period on record (CSIRO 2007). 
Annual inflow into Melbourne’s four main dams is shown in figure 1.3. As in south-west 
Australia, inflow into Victoria’s dams has fallen proportionately more than rainfall.  
   
 SETTING THE SCENE 5
 
Figure 1.3 Inflow into Melbourne’s four major harvesting reservoirs 
(Upper Yarra, Thomson, Maroondah, O’Shannassy) 
 
Source: Melbourne Water (2007). 
Urban water systems comprise various components, including water harvesting, storage, 
treatment, distribution, retailing, as well as wastewater removal and treatment. With the 
advent of new technologies, such as desalination, potable water manufacture is now also 
part of water systems in some places. This paper covers all of these; however, emphasis is 
given to the supply of water, rather than the removal of wastewater. 
The entities responsible for the various components of urban water systems are 
overwhelmingly owned by governments (some are statutory authorities, others are owned 
by local councils). In some cases a single water business undertakes all water supply 
activities — for example Western Australia’s Water Corporation. In other cases there is a 
degree of disaggregation — for example Melbourne has one bulk water supplier 
(Melbourne Water) and three water retailers (each servicing a defined geographic area). 
Later chapters provide further information on institutional arrangements. 
 
1.3 Past reform 
In the era from European settlement through to the 1980s, Australia’s urban water systems 
were progressively expanded to meet the needs of a growing and increasingly affluent 
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population, the primary objective being to provide safe and reliable water supplies. 
Reforms to the sector were initiated in the early 1980s in response to concerns about 
efficiency and environmental impacts (PC 2005a). The reform effort was coordinated at 
the national level in 1994, when the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed to 
implement a framework to achieve an efficient and sustainable water industry (COAG 
1994). This framework was drawn more closely into the microeconomic reform process in 
1995, when COAG linked jurisdictional implementation of the agreed water reforms to the 
National Competition Policy (NCP) and associated NCP payments to States and Territories 
(NCC 2003). 
The 1994 framework covered both the rural and urban water sectors. In relation to the 
latter, the Commission (PC 2005a, p. 27) found: 
… the reform initiatives that were required of the urban sector are, for the most part, 
well advanced, with the widespread introduction of a consumption-based component in 
charges to help discourage overuse and implementation of financial cost recovery by 
service providers to ensure better signals for new investment. Various institutional 
reforms have also been implemented to increase the commercial disciplines on, and the 
accountability of, those entities delivering water and sewerage services, with most 
jurisdictions having corporatised their urban water authorities. In South Australia, the 
management of the water supply has been contracted out to private sector operators. 
More recently, COAG developed the National Water Initiative (NWI), which was agreed 
to by all but two COAG member governments in 2004. Subsequently, the Tasmanian 
Government signed the agreement in 2005 and the WA Government in 2006. Although it 
addresses urban water, the focus of the NWI is on the rural water sector and initiatives 
requiring cooperation between governments. The NWI outcomes and actions relating 
specifically to urban water reform are outlined in box 1.1.  
The actions for urban water included in the NWI are generally limited in scope and do not 
amount to a comprehensive reform agenda. A reason for this is suggested in a recent 
statement by the Chairman of the National Water Commission (NWC), that when the NWI 
was signed in 2004 ‘urban water was a footnote. The big issues then were rural water and 
environmental water’ (Wahlquist 2007). 
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Box 1.1 National Water Initiative: urban water reform 
Outcome 
90. The Parties agree that the outcome for urban water reform is to: 
i) provide healthy, safe and reliable water supplies 
ii) increase water use efficiency in domestic and commercial settings 
iii) encourage the re-use and recycling of wastewater where cost effective 
iv) facilitate water trading between and within the urban and rural sectors 
v) encourage innovation in water supply sourcing, treatment, storage and discharge 
vi) achieve improved pricing for metropolitan water [consistent with earlier paragraphs]. 
Actions 
Demand Management 
91. States and Territories agree to undertake the following actions in regard to demand 
management by 2006: 
i) legislation to implement the Water Efficiency Labelling Scheme (WELS) to be in place in 
all jurisdictions and regulator undertaking compliance activity by 2005, including mandatory 
labelling and minimum standards for agreed appliances 
ii) develop and implement a ‘Smart Water Mark’ for household gardens, including garden 
irrigation equipment, garden designs and plants 
iii) review the effectiveness of temporary water restrictions and associated public education 
strategies, and assess the scope for extending low level restrictions as standard practice 
iv) prioritise and implement, where cost effective, management responses to water supply 
and discharge system losses including leakage, excess pressure, overflows and other 
maintenance needs. 
Innovation and Capacity Building to Create Water Sensitive Australian Cities 
92. The Parties agree to undertake the following actions in regard to innovation: 
i) develop national health and environmental guidelines for priority elements of water 
sensitive urban designs (initially recycled water and stormwater) by 2005 
ii) develop national guidelines for evaluating options for water sensitive urban developments, 
both in new urban sub-divisions and high rise buildings by 2006 
iii) evaluate existing ‘icon water sensitive urban developments’ to identify gaps in knowledge 
and lessons for future strategically located developments by 2005 
iv) review the institutional and regulatory models for achieving integrated urban water cycle 
planning and management, followed by preparation of best practice guidelines by 2006 
v) review of incentives to stimulate innovation by 2006. 
Source: COAG (2004, pp. 19–20).  
 
In reporting on progress in implementing the NWI, the NWC stated that the NWI actions 
for urban water reform ‘have been overshadowed by the scale of water challenges facing 
Australia’s major cities’ (NWC 2007c, p. 21). These challenges are related to prolonged 
drought in many areas and uncertainty over whether future reductions in rainfall and runoff 
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will occur, either as a result of human-induced climate change or long-term natural 
variation. Significantly, the NWC also found that ‘current NWI actions do not capture the 
extent of work currently being undertaken by individual states to address these challenges’ 
and that the actions by individual States are ‘understandably, often in the nature of an 
emergency response and vary in their strategic focus and reform nature’ (NWC 2007c, 
p. 21). 
In light of its assessment, the NWC recommended a supplementary set of urban water 
actions be developed, to be implemented as additional actions under the NWI. These are 
designed to improve: urban water planning; institutional and market arrangements; and 
onground delivery of water supply and demand management options (NWC 2007c).  
In addition to the NWC, many stakeholders and analysts have identified problems with the 
urban water sector and see the need for substantial reform (box 1.2). This widespread 
perception that reform is needed has provided the motivation for this paper. While the need 
for reform is widely acknowledged, views differ on the way forward. In particular, there is 
debate over whether changes possible within the existing institutional arrangements are 
sufficient, or whether more substantial changes are needed. 
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Box 1.2 Comments on the urban water sector and the need for reform 
The Secretary to the Treasury 
… many water charging regimes in Australia seek only to recover operating costs and a 
return on infrastructure. Typically, the water being supplied is assumed to have no economic 
cost; that is, no scarcity value. Unsurprisingly, if a commodity is effectively being given away, 
then demand will exceed supply and we can have no confidence that what supply there is 
will be directed to its use of highest value-added. So it is with water. Major cities are 
experiencing water restrictions of one kind or another. Quantitative rationing is 
incontrovertible proof of the absence of an efficient market. (Henry 2005, p. 10)  
The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) 
Historically water has been disproportionately priced in all sectors (agricultural, urban and 
industrial). ACF advocates a pricing system that reflects its true value and that water 
management authorities accelerate and strengthen water reforms by balancing principles of 
user pays and the removal of water subsidies with the need for access to an affordable 
water supply for all Australians. (ACF 2008) 
The Business Council of Australia  
Australia’s water problems are a direct result of a poorly planned and managed water 
system that has conspired to turn a sufficient supply of water at the source to scarcity for 
end-users. … there is no long term shortage of water in Australia, just as there is no 
shortage of any other good or service we consume. Instead, the perceived shortages are 
due to artificial limits on supply to our cities … (BCA 2006, pp. 1–10)  
National Water Commission 
(1) … structural reform in the [urban water] sector has generally not kept pace with that in 
similar sectors such as gas, electricity or transport. (NWC 2007c, p. 21) 
(2) [The NWC Chairman] … criticised governments for … implementing ‘policy bans’ — 
positions taken for political reasons, such as the government stance on desalination plants, 
dams and other infrastructure. ‘It is really important that they should all be on the table, they 
should go through a process of analysis, logic and evidence’ he said. (Wahlquist 2007) 
Professor Grafton, Australian National University  
Despite the variability in the supply of water, current water pricing arrangements mean we 
pay exactly the same for water when times are good as bad. But really when water is 
scarce, as it is now, it’s more valuable, and it should be priced as such. (Grafton 2006) 
Professor Quiggin, The University of Queensland 
Current policy regarding rural and urban water use displays a range of inconsistencies. … 
transfers of water from irrigation to other uses outside a given catchment are prohibited in 
many cases. … Trade between irrigation, urban and environmental water use should be 
enhanced, and will not entail substantial contraction of the value of output from irrigated 
agriculture. (Quiggin 2007, p. 45) 
ACIL Tasman (in a report to the Economic Regulation Authority, Western Australia) 
… there is a growing awareness amongst water system planners and utilities of the potential 
for large cost savings, without sacrifice of security, through the development and 
management of more flexible supply and demand management strategies … While 
awareness is growing, translation of this into the formal planning frameworks is still at a 
relatively primitive stage in most jurisdictions. (ACIL Tasman 2007a, p. 13) 
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1.4 Key issues 
Key issues and questions for urban water reform are outlined below, along with a reference 
to the chapter in which they are considered. These issues have been identified drawing on 
the views of various commentators, including those given above, and the Commission’s 
own assessment.  
Policy objectives 
Government water policy generally has a range of objectives, including ones relating to: 
health and safety; security of supply; water use efficiency and/or economic efficiency; 
environmental protection; and equity. Fundamental questions for urban water reform are: 
• What are the appropriate objectives for urban water policy? Is there an overarching 
objective that could be used to better guide policy development? (chapter 2) 
• Are equity and efficiency objectives compatible? (chapter 2) 
Allocation of water between uses 
Water is used for a myriad of purposes by virtually all individuals and firms across all 
sectors of the economy. Water also helps to maintain functioning ecosystems and provide 
environmental amenity. When water that is suitable for these uses is in limited supply 
some means must be found for allocating it across uses and individuals. This raises 
questions such as: 
• Should prices play a greater role in determining the allocation of water? Could this be 
done in a way that did not disadvantage people on low income, or cause other equity 
problems? (chapter 3) 
• How should an appropriate balance between urban and rural water uses and 
environmental flows be achieved? (chapters 3 and 4) 
• Could outcomes for the community be improved by relaxing restrictions on moving 
water from one use to another, such as from agriculture to urban use? (chapter 4) 
Supply augmentation decisions 
State and Territory Governments have announced major new investments to augment the 
supply of urban water, mainly in response to declining water reserves, population growth 
and uncertainty over future dam inflows. A range of augmentation options has been 
implemented or planned, including desalination plants, recycled water projects and 
pipelines to allow transfers from rural to urban areas. 
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Getting augmentation decisions right is very difficult and the stakes are often high. In 
earlier decades there was criticism of overinvestment in the sector, including by the 
Industry Commission, an antecedent organisation of the Productivity Commission (IC 
1992). Common criticisms today are that there has been underinvestment in recent years 
and that the options chosen are not the best ones (Allen Consulting Group 2007, BCA 
2006, Dwyer 2006). While it is unreasonable to expect that investment decisions will 
always match well with subsequent rainfall patterns, the key issue is how to get the 
processes and incentive frameworks right so that the best possible decisions are made in 
the presence of uncertainty over future climate and demand trends. Important questions 
include: 
• Can processes be improved so that all augmentation options are properly considered, 
taking fully into account cost, reliability, scale, implementation time and environmental 
consequences? (chapter 5) 
• What role should demand management (through pricing and/or water restrictions) play 
in dampening the need for augmentation? (chapter 3) 
Innovation and dynamic efficiency 
For many people, innovation and dynamic efficiency may not come readily to mind when 
thinking about the water sector, but they are important for several reasons. First, 
technology is developing rapidly in some areas, such as desalination and water recycling. 
Second, improved strategies are being developed for making investment decisions in the 
face of uncertainty. Third, there is the potential that opening up parts of the sector to 
competition could lead to improvements in productivity and reductions in cost. A key 
issue, therefore, is the extent to which reform can lead to increases in innovation and 
dynamic efficiency. Some important questions are: 
• Are there useful reforms that could be made within the existing institutional 
arrangements to promote innovation and improve dynamic efficiency? (chapter 6) 
• Should more fundamental structural reforms be made, with a greater role given to 
competition and markets, as has occurred in other utility sectors? To what extent should 
the various impediments to a more market-based approach, such as natural monopoly 
characteristics in water supply and equity and environmental considerations, condition 
the approach taken? (chapter 6) 
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2 Objectives and their achievement 
Key points 
• Multiple objectives for urban water systems revolve around economic efficiency, 
equity, water quality, water security, commercial viability and the environment. All of 
these except equity can be encompassed within economic efficiency. 
• Current approaches to promoting equity reduce economic efficiency, yet properly- 
defined equity objectives can be pursued without compromising efficiency.  
– Equity needs to be kept in perspective — spending on water (and sewerage) is 
less than 1.5 per cent of total spending by even the lowest income households. 
• An efficient urban water system requires that:  
– At the margin water is allocated to those users and uses, including environmental 
uses, where its value is highest. 
– Water is sourced and distributed at the lowest possible social cost.  
– Investment to add to water supplies occurs when the value of the extra water and 
water security to users exceeds the social costs of the investment. 
• Restricting use, rather than pricing to ration demand when water is scarce, has been 
pursued in Australia’s cities and towns. While effective in managing urban water 
shortages, restrictions have led to significant costs among which are: 
– preventing users from using water in ways they value most  
– imposing significant time and inconvenience costs on most households 
– inducing many households and other customers to buy water tanks and greywater 
systems (usually high-cost sources of water) to reduce the impact of the 
restrictions.  
• Under current institutional arrangements, supply augmentation has the potential to 
create perverse impacts with high associated costs to the community.  
– Offering customers choice in the water security/water charges mix of their water 
product could enhance economic efficiency and equity in water augmentation.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
What are the appropriate objectives for urban water policy? Existing water policy has a 
range of objectives, including efficiency, water security, public health, environmental 
protection, commercial requirements of publicly-owned water utilities, and equity 
(section 2.2).  
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The consideration of objectives in this chapter is conducted mainly at the level of 
principles, but is also informed by practical realities. Some realities are physical or 
institutional in nature. One example is the competition for ‘natural water’ between urban 
systems and rural and environmental water systems. Another is the potential, already 
realised in Perth and in the construction or planning stages elsewhere, to supplement 
natural water with manufactured (desalinated) water. Urban water, traditionally sourced 
mainly from dedicated natural sources, needs to be considered in relation to the other 
natural water systems and also to the opportunities for the efficient use of manufactured 
water — with the latter including recycled water and treated stormwater as well as 
desalinated water.  
A social reality is the small size of spending on water in household budgets. This has 
implications for the equity consequences of changes in charges for water. 
The remaining sections focus on the achievement of efficiency and equity objectives. This 
is done first for water management in Australia’s large centres in the ‘big dry’ of the past 
decade (section 2.3).  
The final section focuses on the supply side — supplementing urban water, including 
through transfers from the rural sector and by the introduction of manufactured water. The 
supplementation of water supplies currently in train involves non-traditional sources of 
water, and institutional and pricing arrangements that are still in development. It is 
therefore not possible to assess the achievement of economic efficiency and equity for 
water supplementation. Instead, drawing on the discussion of objectives, principles are 
outlined that offer guidance in determining sourcing, pricing, and institutional 
arrangements for new water.  
2.2 Objectives for urban water 
An objective of every urban centre is to have an efficient water system that reliably can 
meet the water requirements of households, businesses and other customers. 
Environmental protection is important in sourcing water and disposing of waste water, as is 
the balancing of urban demands and environmental demands for water when the two are in 
competition. ‘Equity’ or fairness is another important objective in planning and managing 
urban water systems. 
As noted in chapter 1, the COAG National Water Initiative (NWI) of June 2004 agreed that 
the outcomes of urban water reform were to:  
• provide healthy, safe and reliable water supplies 
• increase water use efficiency in domestic and commercial settings 
• encourage the re-use and recycling of wastewater where cost effective 
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• facilitate water trading between and within the urban and rural sectors 
• encourage innovation in water supply sourcing, treatment, storage and discharge 
• achieve improved pricing for metropolitan water (COAG 2004, para. 90). 
The first two agreed outcomes are key objectives of urban water systems. The other 
outcomes are better viewed as means for achieving system objectives.  
Judging by statements and actions by state and territory governments, five key objectives 
in planning and managing urban water systems are: 
• efficiency — physical and economic  
• security of water supply 
• environmental protection  
• commercial viability and a return to government on the investment in the urban water 
system 
• equity.  
The objectives of security of water supply, environmental protection and commercial 
viability can — like the NWI urban water outcome ‘healthy, safe and reliable water 
supplies’ — be encompassed appropriately in the economic efficiency objective. Because 
they are often viewed as separate objectives, however, they are considered separately.  
Efficiency 
Measures of physical efficiency in water systems often focus on the water lost from a 
system (through leakages and evaporation, for example), the volume of water used in 
producing a particular output (such as a tonne of rice or steel), or the amount of water used 
by consumers (for example, household water use in a year). While such measures can point 
to ways to improve urban (and other) water systems, measures of physical efficiency do 
not take into account: the value of water as a resource; the value of the services water 
provides to households, firms and other users; or the costs of saving water1.  
Unrealised opportunities to increase physical efficiency in water use are in themselves no 
more an indicator of economic inefficiency than is throwing out food that deteriorates in 
household storage. Economic efficiency considers all the costs and benefits of an action, 
not just the effects on the physical efficiency of water systems.  
                                                 
1 In considering the limitations of physical measures of efficiency in urban water use for policy 
purposes, criticisms levelled at the use of activity ‘gross margins’ for assessing efficiency in rural 
water use are relevant. See, for example, Douglas, Dwyer and Peterson 2004. 
   
16 TOWARDS URBAN 
WATER REFORM: A 
DISCUSSION PAPER 
 
 
Economic efficiency in urban water systems therefore brings together the demand and 
supply sides of the systems, such that households and other customers are provided with 
the water, water quality and water security that they are willing to pay for.  
It is generally accepted that in most circumstances the valuations assigned to private goods 
and services by individuals also represent their social valuation. That is, although they 
sometimes make mistakes, individuals generally know better than governments and others 
what is most valuable to them, and how much of particular goods and services to buy and 
how to use them.  
In the context of a water shortage necessitating a reduction in water use, this conventional 
view is stated by Harberg (1997): 
… the tastes and preferences of individual customers may vary widely … a particular 
residential customer might prefer never to wash a car in order to provide for a cherished 
garden. Other customers might cheerfully let all landscape die in order to retain longer-
than-average showers. These taste differences are generally of no concern to the water 
provider. (Harberg 1997, p. 45)  
In contrast with the view that ‘the customer’s preferences should determine where he/she 
saves water’, governments have prohibited some uses, restricted others, and left yet others 
unrestricted. Moreover, several governments have introduced permanent restrictions on 
some water uses, implying that, regardless of their marginal value to users and of the level 
of water in storages, such use can never be justified. For example, the Victorian 
Government  (2003, p. 43) said ‘Behaviour such as hosing driveways and footpaths must 
become actions of the past’. 
While the public health and environmental objectives of urban water management involve 
externalities, these can be addressed without departing from the position that water in the 
urban setting is a private good, the efficient allocation of which depends on the preferences 
and marginal valuations of its users. For example, regulatory and/or market approaches can 
be used to achieve desired water quality standards and environmental attributes. 
Economic efficiency of an urban water system increases in the following circumstances: 
• if water is shifted from water users for whom and uses in which its marginal value is 
lower, to users and uses with higher marginal values 
• if lower-cost water supplies replace higher-cost supplies  
• if a city’s water supplies are augmented at a marginal cost per gigalitre that is less than 
customers are willing to pay for the extra water.2  
                                                 
2 Extra water security may be important in determining willingness to pay, even if the addition to 
security is not associated with an increase in water use in normal times. 
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The overall efficiency of water allocation in Australia depends on the relationships 
between the urban, agricultural and environmental water systems. Where physical linkages 
between the three systems exist, or can be developed for a cost less than the benefits, the 
ability to reallocate water continuously between the three systems to equate its marginal 
social value in each is central to achieving national-level efficiency in water use. Regional 
or functional separation of the water systems is as undesirable as isolation of the labour or 
capital markets in a particular region or industry from the rest of the market. An integrated 
market for water in which agricultural, urban and environmental interests trade freely is a 
desirable, and probably essential, requirement for maximising the overall value obtained 
from Australia’s water.  
Security of water supply 
The higher the level of water security a city or town has, the lower is the chance that it will 
need to resort to tough demand management measures — price increases or non-price 
restrictions on water use — in times of water shortage to reduce water use substantially 
below ‘normal’ levels.  
A city’s water security can be increased by investing in infrastructure that adds to available 
water supplies. A variation on infrastructure investment is to arrange options to invest in 
infrastructure in the event that the supply/demand balance for a city’s water warrants that 
— options contracts to buy rural water can also serve this purpose. Water security can also 
be increased by using somewhat higher water prices, or ‘low-level’ non-price water 
restrictions, to reduce water consumption in normal times.  
If a city’s annual water use is increasing as a net result of changes in population, income 
and other factors influencing consumption, its water security will decrease unless sufficient 
additions occur to available supplies — or unless the demand management measures 
applying in normal times are tightened.  
Measuring water security and assessing its desired level is made more difficult if there is 
reason to think that changes are occurring in the long-term pattern of rainfall and water 
runoff. 
Balancing the costs and the benefits of additional security is a complex task (box 2.1). 
Extra security comes at a cost — the cost of water-augmenting infrastructure (which in 
many years may not be needed) and/or of long-term reductions in water consumption.  
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Box 2.1 How much water security is optimal? 
The level of a city’s water security can be assessed as the proportion of years in every 
50 years, say, in which its water use will need to be restricted by substantial increases 
in water prices or by severe non-price restrictions on the basis of expected long-term 
rainfall and runoff patterns. Extra water security can be obtained by investing in 
additional water supply infrastructure or by establishing options to access water — or 
by modest reductions in water use when water is relatively abundant.  
It is not possible, at a cost that water customers would willingly pay, to build an urban 
water system that could be guaranteed always to meet water demand without the need 
for price increases or non-price restrictions to accommodate a relative scarcity of 
water. The precise nature of the tradeoff between the level of water security and 
willingness to pay would vary between customers, but most households and firms 
would choose a level of water security involving some degree of rationing sometimes 
— by raising price above its ‘normal’ level, or by introducing some elements of non-
price restrictions — rather than pay a substantially higher water price every year for a 
‘Rolls Royce’ water supply that always (more realistically, almost always) met their 
demand.  
Expressed differently, a level of investment in water infrastructure that sometimes 
requires resort to a degree of price-or quantity-rationing of water is more economically 
efficient than a level that provides many billion dollars of unused capacity in all but the 
one-in-200 years ultra-dry period. 
The level of water security that an urban population is willing to pay for is likely to 
increase with rising incomes. The cost of providing extra water security tends to fall 
with technological advances (for example, in desalination technology); these act to 
increase the economically efficient level of water security. In contrast, increases in the 
social value assigned to negative environmental impacts from augmenting water 
supplies act to increase the cost of enhanced security, and tend to reduce the 
economically efficient level of security.   
 
Within existing urban water regimes, decisions that impact on water security are 
centralised in the hands of governments and their water utilities. Individual customers can 
influence their own water security at the margin by investing in water tanks and on-site 
water recycling. Government policies of relying mainly on non-price restrictions to reduce 
water use in times of shortage reduce water security for many households, councils, 
sporting clubs and other customers, causing them to invest more in enhancing their own 
water security. If rationing were done instead by scarcity pricing, mains water would be 
available to those willing to pay for it, though the higher prices would make increased 
own-sourcing more cost-effective relative to a situation of lower water prices and no non-
price restrictions.  
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Environmental protection 
Extracting water from streams or groundwater, manufacturing water by recycling or 
desalination, and disposing of waste have effects on the environment — as is the case 
when other human activities are undertaken. It is desirable that the planners and managers 
of urban water systems factor into their decisions the positive and negative effects on the 
value of environmental services experienced by people. Success in achieving the 
environmental objective is enhanced if there are signals and incentives that indicate what is 
environmentally valuable.  
Markets for environmental water, perhaps operated by environmental managers, are one 
way of providing incentives for an efficient balancing of water between environmental, 
urban and other uses. Watson (2003), Freebairn (2003), Bennett (2005) and others have 
pointed to the importance of improved information on the value assigned to different 
water-related environmental public goods in making better decisions on environmental 
water — including decisions guided and facilitated by markets — and in advancing the 
environmental objective. 
Commercial viability and dividend to government 
Since 1994, urban water businesses structured as government trading enterprises (GTEs) 
have been placed on a more commercial basis, often involving corporatisation. The 
Commission has observed that: 
 … governments have sought to give GTEs a greater commercial focus and facilitate 
competitive neutrality by exposing them to capital market disciplines and regulations 
similar to those faced by private sector businesses. (PC 2007, p. 152) 
Urban water businesses are required to recover their full costs, including the capital costs 
of their infrastructure, and to pay dividends to their owner-governments. The GTEs 
providing water services to the mainland state capitals and the ACT paid more than $1 
billion in dividends to their respective governments in 2005-06 (PC 2007, pp. 159–203).  
Freebairn (2008) supports explicit resource rent taxes, with the proceeds going to 
consolidated revenue, in circumstances where the marginal costs of new water are 
substantially above the marginal costs of traditional water. The issue here is not how to 
ration water when demand exceeds supply, but the distribution of the economic rents 
available from lower-cost inframarginal water. Freebairn sees appropriation of those rents 
by governments as desirable for equity as well as economic efficiency.  
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Equity  
The concept of ‘equity’ arises in different contexts in relation to urban water, as it does for 
other areas of public policy. Two dimensions of equity that appear to be important in the 
urban water setting are considered briefly below: 
• the notion of ‘entitlements’ to water 
• the burden of water bills for low-income households.  
Another dimension of equity — equity in the demand management regime — is addressed 
in section 2.3. 
Entitlements to water 
In government statements on urban water policy the idea that all households are entitled to 
a basic allowance of water at a low or zero price sometimes appears — the rationale being 
that water is essential for life. Two points that are relevant in considering that view can be 
noted.  
First, it is unusual for allocations of particular private goods or services — including 
essential items such as food and accommodation — to be provided free of charge to 
everyone, regardless of their means. Through the social security system, however, 
members of the community are ensured a minimum level of income sufficient to purchase 
all ‘essentials of life’.  
Second, provision of a water entitlement to all households at a relatively low variable 
(usage) charge is to a degree achieved at present through the inclining block tariff (IBT) 
structure. In the presence of a fixed (access) charge, which all capital cities have, a modest 
water entitlement at a low or even zero price is consistent with cost recovery and with a 
high level of economic efficiency.3  
Spending on water in relation to household income 
Keeping the size of water bills down for low-income households is an important objective 
of governments. Information on weekly spending per household on water and sewerage in 
2003-04, by household weekly gross income quintile, is available from the ABS 
Household Expenditure Survey (table 2.1).  
                                                 
3 Efficiency is compromised more with increases in the size of the low-price entitlement and 
consequential increases in the proportion of households using less water than their entitlement. 
Increases in that proportion make worse the efficiency-reducing effects of different marginal 
valuations of water across households.  
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Table 2.1 Average weekly expenditure on water and sewerage rates and 
charges by state total weekly household income, 2003-04 
 Gross income quintile All 
households
 1 3 5 
New South Wales    
a) Water and sewerage ($) 3.48 5.12 9.52 6.10
b) as per cent of total expenditure on goods and services (%) 0.80 0.57 0.60 0.65
Victoria    
a) Water and sewerage ($) 5.33 7.84 10.54 7.93
b) as per cent of total expenditure on goods and services (%) 1.28 0.91 0.69 0.89
Queensland    
a) Water and sewerage ($) 2.34 2.47 3.75 2.46
b) as per cent of total expenditure on goods and services (%) 0.59 0.30 0.30 0.30
South Australia    
a) Water and sewerage ($) 3.94 9.11 12.56 8.46
b) as per cent of total expenditure on goods and services (%) 1.08 1.28 0.86 1.04
Western Australia    
a) Water and sewerage ($) 3.93 6.79 9.60 6.62
b) as per cent of total expenditure on goods and services (%) 0.94 0.81 0.66 0.76
Tasmaniaa    
a) Water and sewerage ($) 0.77 1.31 … …
b) as per cent of total expenditure on goods and services (%) 0.19 0.19 … …
Northern Territory    
a) Water and sewerage ($) 3.67 8.32 11.44 7.62
b) as per cent of total expenditure on goods and services (%) 0.74 0.81 0.67 0.73
Australian Capital Territory    
a) Water and sewerage ($) 5.72 6.97 10.88 8.32
b) as per cent of total expenditure on goods and services (%) 1.40 0.63 0.65 0.79
a Entries for some cells for Tasmania were judged unreliable and are not shown. 
Source: ABS, Household Expenditure Survey 2003-2004. Expanded CURF. Canberra. 
For the 20 per cent of households with the lowest gross incomes, average weekly spending 
on water and sewerage ranged from $0.77 in Tasmania to $5.72 in the ACT. As a 
percentage of household gross income, the range was 0.19 per cent in Tasmania to 1.40 per 
cent in the ACT.  
Moreover, given that all capitals have an access charge that in 2005-06 ranged from 21 per 
cent of the average household water bill in Canberra to 51 per cent in Perth (WSAA/NWC 
2007), an increase of say, 10 per cent in the variable component of water charges would be 
expected to increase water bills by significantly less than 10 per cent — even if there was 
no reduction in water use.4 Given that households respond to higher water prices by 
                                                 
4 The figures mentioned relate to water only. In mainland capitals other than Melbourne, sewerage 
charges are entirely of a fixed nature. 
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reducing their water use, the effect of an increase of 10 per cent in the variable charge for 
water on households’ water bills is reduced further. 
The small amount spent on water by low-income households, together with the fact that 
water bills increase proportionately less than increases in volume-related water charges, 
suggests a weak case for avoiding price increases to ration scarce water. Nevertheless, if 
the effects of the required price increases on the welfare of low-income households were 
judged to be socially unacceptable, targeted social welfare measures could be used to offset 
the effects, while retaining the desired incentive effects of the price increases. 
A bottom line on objectives 
Given the emphasis in policy making in Australia on enhancing the efficiency with which 
the economy meets domestic and foreign demand, and given that objectives in the areas of 
water health and quality, security of water supplies, environmental quality and commercial 
viability of water utilities can be factored into economic efficiency, that objective has a 
strong claim to being treated as fundamental.  
That is not to deny the need for urban water systems to rate well on equity or fairness. If, 
however, present urban water policies are rationalised largely on grounds of ‘equity’, the 
costs to the community are likely to be high, as discussed below.  
2.3 Urban water management in the ‘big dry’ 
Notwithstanding the investments in train — amounting to $30 billion over the next five to 
ten years (WSAA 2007) — the enduring use of water restrictions indicates that investment 
in water has not kept pace with the demands of Australia’s cities at recent water prices.  
Marsden Jacob Associates (2006) reported that water capital expenditure per capita in the 
years 2001–2005 was much lower for Adelaide ($115), Brisbane ($146), Melbourne 
($172) and Sydney ($213) than for Perth ($421). It related this to differences between 
cities in climate scenario planning:  
Over the past five years per capita expenditure in Perth, which has incorporated a ‘step-
down’ climate scenario into planning for many years, has been twice or more the level 
of water supply investment in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Adelaide, which have 
not adopted scenario planning approaches or not done so until very recently. (Marsden 
Jacob Associates 2006, p. ii) 
While contemporary judgements that runoff into urban water storages would be higher 
than it has proved to be are important in explaining recent under-investment in urban water 
supplies, opposition to some investment options — including new dams and direct rural-
urban water trade — has also been a significant factor. In the view of one critic of urban 
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water policy ‘[the] real hidden issues in the new urban water “political correctness” are the 
blockade of new supply and arbitrary rationing of existing supply’ (Dwyer 2006, p. 14). In 
similar vein, the Business Council of Australia wrote ‘[governments] have been slow to 
consider the range of options to improve supply and instead have relied on consumers’ 
efforts to reduce demand’ (BCA 2006, p. ii).  
Water supplied by the water utilities in Australia’s mainland capitals in the two years July 
2000–June 2002 (pre-restrictions in capitals other than Perth) and in the two years July 
2004–June 2006 (restrictions in force for the full period in Perth, Melbourne, Sydney and 
Canberra and from 3 October 2005 in Brisbane)5 is shown in table 2.2. The volume of 
water supplied decreased between 10 and 16 per cent for capitals in south-eastern 
Australia, by 6.6 per cent in Brisbane and by 3.8 per cent in Perth. Water supplied in 
Darwin increased. 
Table 2.2 Water supplied to mainland capitals by type of user and 
average residential consumption per property 
Average 2000-01/2001-02 and 2004-05/2005-06 
 Of which (%):  Volume 
supplied 
(GL)a  Residential  Commercial & 
industrial 
 Other  
Average 
residential 
consumption 
(kL/property) 
 2000-
02 
2004-
06 
 2000-
02 
2004-
06 
 2000-
02 
2004-
06 
 2000-
02 
2004-
06 
 2000-
02 
2004-
06
Melbourne 483 434  60.7 61.9  27.3 27.2  12.1 11.0  226 190
Sydney 625 527  60.1 61.6  18.2 23.7  21.7 14.6  253 207
Brisbane 167 155  58.2 55.9  28.5 29.8  13.3 14.2  271 225
Adelaide 184 165  63.4 66.4  20.7 21.0  15.9 12.5  262 234
Canberra 52 50  64.5 64.9  25.7 26.5  9.8 8.6  320 251
Perth 237 228  70.1 69.4  16.2 21.3  13.7 9.3  312 273
Darwin 33 35  49.7 48.9  31.3 38.0  19.0 13.3  487 444
a Excludes environmental flows and bulk water exports. 
Source: WSAA and NWC (2007). 
For capitals other than Brisbane and Darwin, residential water use was between 60 and 
70 per cent of water supplied. The capitals are listed in order of average residential water 
consumption per property in July 2004–June 2006 — Melbourne is lowest and Darwin 
highest. In all capitals, residential use per property fell between July 2000–June 2002 and 
July 2004–June 2006, the falls ranging from 28 kilolitres in Adelaide to 69 kilolitres in 
Canberra.  
                                                 
5 Water restrictions commenced in Adelaide on 23 October 2006. Darwin does not have water 
restrictions. 
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The ABS Water Account showed that outdoor use amounted to 44 per cent of national 
household water use in 2000-01 (ABS 2004). Households in Queensland, South Australia, 
Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory reported using more than 
50 per cent of water outdoors. In Victoria 35 per cent of household water was used 
outdoors, and in New South Wales 25 per cent. These differences reflect many factors, 
including differences in the nature of housing, block sizes, number of occupants per 
dwelling and climate.  
ABS’s subsequent Water Account (ABS 2006), which reports water use in 2004-05, does 
not provide information on outside use of water by households. It would be expected that 
the water restrictions would have caused outside water use to fall proportionately more 
than total household water use. If three-quarters of the fall in Australia’s household water 
use between 2000-01 and 2004-05 was in outside water use, the share of outside water use 
would have fallen from 44 per cent to 41 per cent, and if all of the reduction in national 
household water use was in outside water the outside share would have fallen to 
38.5 per cent.6  
In managing the water scarcity experienced by mainland capitals and many other 
population centres since early in this century, reliance has been placed mainly on 
prescriptive non-price restrictions. Notwithstanding that the need to recognise the real 
value of water has been a theme in government communication with water users, relatively 
little use has been made of price increases as a demand management measure. In some 
instances, governments have even reduced water prices to many users as they introduced 
packages of measures intended to conserve water.7  
The packages of measures used to reduce water use in urban centres have included: 
• prohibitions on some outside water uses and restrictions on others for households and 
other water users8 
• mandating water-saving items (for example, low-flow shower heads in new houses) 
• education (for example, on physical water-efficiency of different plumbing fixtures, 
appliances and garden practices)  
                                                 
6 An estimate of water for ‘seasonal’ uses — gardens, swimming pools, spas and evaporative 
coolers — by households supplied by Yarra Valley Water, Melbourne’s largest water retailer, put 
seasonal water use at 25.4 per cent of annual water use by households in 2004 (Roberts 2005). 
7 For example, with the introduction of an IBT in Melbourne in October 2004, the price to 
households for the first 40 kL of water used per quarter was reduced from $0.79 to $0.75 per kL. 
8 Many cities have targets for reducing water use. Usually, there is no requirement that individual 
households reduce their use, though the net result of the demand management measures is to 
reduce use by most households. In south-east Queensland, however, households using more than 
800 litres per day (1 000 litres for households with five or more occupants) without a legitimate 
reason for high water use are subject to penalties, including fines up to $1 050, a ban on outdoor 
watering and restriction of their supplies (QWC 2008). 
   
 OBJECTIVES AND 
THEIR ACHIEVEMENT
25
 
• moral suasion (for example, reduce shower times in the community’s interest). 
Although non-price measures have been the main demand management armoury of urban 
water authorities, some use has been made of price/quasi price measures, including: 
• IBT structures, with substantially higher prices in some cities for water use above the 
‘essential’ level 
• subsidies on household water tanks, and on certain water-saving plumbing fixtures and 
gardening inputs 
• offsets arrangements permitting swimming pools and spas to be filled if equivalent 
water is saved elsewhere in households.  
Effects on economic efficiency  
In terms of economic efficiency (section 2.2), the approach to demand management for 
water in Australia’s state capitals and in Canberra has several problems: 
• the prohibitions and other restrictions on outside uses of water prevent households 
using water in the ways that are most valuable to them  
• the prohibitions on watering lawns or gardens, or restrictions on the times and means of 
watering — and the risk that existing restrictions will be tightened — induce many 
people to invest, often at high cost, in private water storage as insurance to protect their 
gardens and lawns9  
• the IBTs mean that different households pay different water prices at the margin, 
resulting in inefficient allocation of water between users, and potentially creating 
incentives for inter-user trade 
• the absence of incentives for a common marginal valuation of water across water users 
and uses prevents the equating of its marginal value everywhere with the marginal cost 
of water supply 
• in addition to these distortions, there are instances of perverse incentives. For example, 
Crase and Dollery (2005) examined subsidies paid in Melbourne on water-saving 
investments for households and found the cost per megalitre of water saved ranged 
from $770 for AAA shower roses, through $9,069 for rainwater tanks, to $33,395 for 
                                                 
9 Reporting on a study it commissioned by consultants Marsden Jacob Associates of the costs of 
rainwater tanks, the NWC Chairman Ken Matthews said: ‘In every case, the cost per kilolitre of 
tank water is greater than the price charged by water utilities’ (NWC 2007b). The distortion of 
the market for rainwater tanks by the water restrictions, the subsidies on tanks and the misleading 
information put about on their cost-effectiveness is reflected in waiting periods of several months 
for delivery of tanks. 
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AAA dishwashers10. Another example is incentives for deliberate excessive use of 
drinking-quality water through showers, baths and water tanks to generate additional 
‘greywater’ for use on lawns and gardens  
The limited use of price in rationing scarce urban water is inconsistent with economic 
efficiency and has been criticised widely (for example, Business Council of Australia 
2006; Byrnes, Crase and Dollery 2006; Freebairn 2005a; Grafton and Kompas 2006a; Ng 
1987; Sibly 2006; Young et al. 2006). Edwards’ (2006) conclusion about demand 
management for water in Melbourne applies also to the other mainland capitals:  
Melbourne’s demand management regime for water therefore does not allow the 
maximum potential value to be obtained from the available water unless the state’s 
implicit valuations are accepted as overriding private valuations in a way that would 
not generally be contemplated for private goods. (Edwards 2006, p. S62) 
Empirical estimates of the economic costs of water restrictions on households in three 
Australian cities are provided in box 2.2. Methodological and other differences between 
the studies pose difficulties in comparing the costs of the restrictions between cities. 
Economic costs increase with the severity of restrictions and with the opportunity cost and 
the disutility cost of the extra time spent watering using the labour-intensive methods 
allowed under the restriction regimes. 
                                                 
10 In early 2005 the variable usage charge (price) of water to Melbourne households was 
equivalent to $750, $880 and $1,300 per megalitre, respectively, for water in blocks 1, 2 and 3. 
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Box 2.2 Estimates of costs of water restrictions for households 
Sydney: Using a Marshallian consumer surplus approach, Grafton and Ward (2007) 
estimated the welfare cost per Sydney household in 2005 at about $150 above the 
cost of achieving the same level of water use with higher water prices. This reflects the 
effect of prescriptive water restrictions in preventing households using a given volume 
of water for the purposes they value most highly.  
Perth: Assuming typical preferences for ‘greenness’ and valuing time spent holding 
hoses at its opportunity cost, Brennan, Tapsuwan and Ingram (2007) estimated the 
annual costs of water restrictions at $67 per household for restrictions that allow 
watering twice a week using sprinklers, and $347 (opportunity cost of time equal to 33 
per cent of mean wage) to $870 (opportunity cost equal to mean wage) for bans on the 
use of sprinklers. The costs were lower for people who placed a lower value on 
greenness, and higher for those who valued it more highly. The baseline is no water 
restrictions and the same water price (and hence higher water use) as with restrictions. 
Canberra: Hensher, Shore and Train (2006) used choice experiments to estimate 
Canberra households’ willingness to pay to avoid water restrictions. They found 
respondents were unwilling to pay to avoid low-level restrictions, including restrictions 
that allowed watering only on alternative days. To have stage 1 or 2 restrictions rather 
than stage 3, 4 or 5 restrictions, respondents were willing to pay an average amount of 
$109, $130 and $268 per year, respectively, given that restrictions were applied once 
in every ten years.  
Sources: Brennan, Tapsuwan and Ingram (2007); Grafton and Ward (2007); Hensher, Shore and Train 
(2006).  
 
The costs of water restrictions captured by the estimates presented in box 2.2 differ 
between cities, but none of the estimates includes all the costs. The impacts of the water 
restrictions are made clearer by the following listing of some of the costs people 
experience in their everyday lives. Some of those costs are experienced by many people, 
others by few. They include:  
• the deterioration of lawns and gardens 
• purchasing and installing new watering systems as changes occur in allowed methods 
of watering 
• the need to adopt labour-intensive methods of watering when watering is permitted — a 
tax in kind on watering 
• loss of sleep and/or leisure as a result of setting alarms to arise and water gardens in 
permitted time periods 
• having to water in the dark 
• cancelling or rearranging other activities in order to water gardens at permitted times 
• inability of children to play under garden sprinklers and to use water toys 
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• carrying ‘greywater’ in buckets from showers to outdoor plants 
• the need to drive cars to a car wash to clean them 
• increased damage to buildings, other structures and pipes through cracking 
(Archicentre 2006). 
The aggregate cost to Australian urban households of the water restrictions can be 
approximated by taking costs for particular cities and applying them to the entire urban 
population subject to restrictions. If the estimate of $150 per household for the extra cost of 
using water restrictions rather than price increases to ration water use in Sydney in 2005 is 
applied to the approximately 80 per cent of Australia's households then subject to 
restrictions, the corresponding estimate of the national cost is around $900 million. Given 
the likelihood that costs excluded from the Sydney estimate (for example, the costs of 
rearranging gardens and installing watering systems that are allowed under the 
restrictions11, the costs — including reduced leisure and/or sleep — of time spent watering 
gardens in permitted labour-intensive ways, the deterioration in gardens and lawns) 
dominate the costs included in the estimate, the annual cost of the water restrictions to 
Australian households is probably a multi-billion dollar figure under recent high-level 
restrictions.  
Water restrictions impact on people beyond their homes. They experience loss of amenity 
from unwatered council parks — or they pay through their rates for high-cost recycled 
water to keep them green. Community sporting facilities have been adversely affected. For 
example, some football and cricket competitions have been cancelled or their start delayed 
because of the state of water-deprived sports grounds (see, for example, 
SaveFooty.com 2007). Impacts of the water restrictions on tennis clubs in Melbourne are 
outlined in box 2.3.  
Households and businesses in urban centres are affected also in less obvious ways by the 
water restrictions. For example, water restrictions have resulted in reductions in output 
from water-dependent, coal-fired electricity generators. This has exacerbated the 
reductions in hydro-generation output due to water shortages. These influences have led to 
higher wholesale electricity prices. 
                                                 
11 Grafton and Ward (2007) include an allowance for the welfare cost of household water tanks 
(compared with relying on price to ration water demand) but not for other changes to watering 
systems such as dripper hoses and greywater systems. 
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Box 2.3 Costs experienced by tennis clubs due to the water 
restrictions 
Until late 2007, the stage 3A water restrictions in force in Melbourne, where water-
requiring en-tout-cas (clay) surfaces are the norm, allowed tennis clubs to water only 
half their courts. Rotation of the courts watered was not permitted. The restriction on 
watering limited the use that could be made of courts. Should level 4 restrictions have 
been introduced, no watering from mains supplies would have been permitted. Many 
tennis clubs would have been forced to shut down unless they could arrange for water 
from alternative sources.  
To ensure their continuing operation, some tennis clubs decided to spend in excess of 
$20 000 per court to replace the en-tout-cas surfaces with synthetic surfaces. In doing 
that they expected to save approximately 200 kilolitres of water per court each year. 
Burwood Tennis Club, which obtained a council-guaranteed loan to replace its five clay 
courts at a cost in excess of $110 000, saving an estimated one megalitre of water a 
year, is an example. (That cost does not include any value for the hundreds of hours of 
club members’ time in investigating options, planning the project, obtaining permits, 
and raising funds.) At current block-three water prices in Melbourne, the saved water 
has an annual value of approximately $300 per court.  
Investing more than $20 000 to save $300 per year would usually be considered 
financially irresponsible. For tennis clubs — and other community sporting 
organisations — that course may have been their best option because of the 
constraints imposed on them by governments. If scarce water was rationed instead by 
means of price, clubs would not be put in the position of having to invest heavily in 
reducing dependence on mains water to ensure they could make full use of their courts 
and to guarantee their continued existence. With mains water available to tennis and 
other sporting clubs at prices even five times current prices, clubs would be able to 
avoid the extreme penalty costs of the ‘water only half your courts’ restriction, and they 
would have a stronger incentive than pre-restrictions to take cost-effective measures to 
save water.  
In late 2007, tennis clubs were given the option of watering all their courts if they 
treated them with calcium chloride or magnesium chloride — which improves their 
capacity to retain moisture — and achieved a 20 per cent reduction in water use 
compared with use under the stage 3A restrictions. While this is a much cheaper option 
for tennis clubs than replacing their clay courts, and one that higher water prices would 
encourage them to consider even with no water restrictions, it does not remove the 
uncertainty about their future in the event that stage 4 restrictions are introduced. 
Sources: Burwood Tennis Club (2007); Tennis Victoria (2007).  
 
Equity in demand management regimes 
Notwithstanding the costs of prescriptive urban water restrictions outlined above, some 
water utilities and governments have said that the demand management packages for their 
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largest cities have been widely accepted. This could be seen as suggesting considerable 
support for those packages — in which prescriptive water restrictions are central — over 
other approaches to reducing the use of water when it is scarce.  
One possible explanation of support for water restrictions is that, despite their experience 
with price movements for fresh food items as the balance between supply and demand 
changes, people have little conception of using prices to manage demand for water.  
Or, perhaps many see it as equitable that, given the need to save water, everyone shares the 
loss from bans and other restrictions on watering lawns and gardens using fresh mains 
water. This might be construed as an implicit contract between householders and 
governments allowing unrestricted use of water at relatively low prices inside the house in 
return for accepting prescriptive restrictions on outside uses of water. This ‘contract’ may 
be seen as fairer than alternative approaches relying on higher water prices to reduce 
demand.  
There are, however, questions about the equity of particular characteristics of the demand 
management regimes. One example that directly challenges the notion of an implicit 
contract is the treatment of households that in the absence of water restrictions use little 
water inside and substantial amounts outside — two-minute shower, large European 
garden households — vis-à-vis households of the same size and composition that are high 
users inside and small users outside — ‘water wallies’ inside, whose native vegetation 
makes do with whatever rain falls. Households in the second category may be scarcely 
affected by the water restrictions used in Australia’s cities, while the first group 
experiences high costs. Another example is the equity of denying children the experience 
of playing under sprinklers on the lawn while the children of pool owners can continue to 
swim. 
There are also important higher-order questions. Have all options been considered? Would 
equity be enhanced by restricting the water use of each household — and other customers 
— to the ‘acceptable’ level, while leaving them the freedom to choose how to use it? 
Would the provision of a base level of water at a low or zero price — canvassed above 
under ‘entitlements to water’ and addressed in chapter 3 — with scarcity pricing for water 
above the base level, provide a better balance between government regulation and 
individual freedom, and between equity and efficiency, than the current approach? 
Alternatively, consistent with the approach taken to most essential goods and services, 
everyone could face a uniform price for all the water they use, with non-distorting income 
supplements targeted to low-income households.  
The association representing the water supply industry has offered the following 
assessment of the water restrictions:  
Experience over the last several summers indicates that ongoing harsh water 
restrictions will not be accepted by the community and the challenge is to develop 
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reliable supplies of water for our growing cities in a sustainable manner. 
(WSAA 2007, p. 2) 
Many households bear costs from the water restrictions not only in summer, but throughout 
the year. Those costs could be removed in the short run by alternative approaches to 
allocating water when it is scarce. In the longer term, investment in new water supplies and 
their efficient integration into urban water systems, could even make the prescriptive 
demand management regimes for water — and their inequities — an historical curiosity.  
2.4 Principles in augmenting urban water supplies 
Recent decisions announced by the governments of all mainland states will mean that the 
traditional supplies of capital cities from dams will be supplemented by water from three 
new sources. Australia’s first desalination plant serving an urban centre commenced 
operations in Perth in November 2006, and all other mainland states have plans to 
manufacture potable water in desalination plants. Victoria, South Australia and Western 
Australia have also committed to sourcing water for their capital — and in some cases for 
other urban centres — by transfers from the rural sector. The third new source of water is 
recycled water. Already making a small contribution to non-potable water supplies in 
many urban centres, recycled water is planned to supplement the potable water supplies of 
south east Queensland from 2009 (QWC 2007a). 
In Queensland and Victoria the water infrastructure investments include the construction of 
water grids that will allow water to be moved to where it is needed within the most 
populous part of those states.  
Implementation of the recent decisions on water augmentation will cause fundamental 
changes in urban water systems. In traditional systems, much of the work of capturing and 
transporting urban water is done by gravity. In future, urban water systems will be more 
energy-and capital-intensive. Cities that rely predominantly on natural water from their 
own catchments will in future have multiple sources of water. The diversification of 
sources will reduce the uncertainty about system-level available water supplies. This is 
most obvious in the case of desalinated water and recycled water whose availability is 
independent of rainfall.  
Another change, albeit limited thus far, is the movement towards integration of rural and 
urban water systems. Agriculture accounted for 65 per cent of the 18 767 gigalitres of 
water extracted from the environment in 2004-05 (ABS 2006). Because urban water use is 
small relative to rural use, integration, like the introduction of manufactured water, reduces 
the uncertainty about urban water supplies. Integration could facilitate the introduction of a 
competitive, market-driven element to urban water systems. More generally, integration of 
rural and urban water systems is essential for efficiency in national water allocation — just 
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as efficiency in labour and capital markets requires integration of the rural and urban 
components of those markets. 
Integrating new manufactured water and rural water efficiently into urban water systems 
poses challenges, including dealing with any external costs, that are addressed in 
chapters 4-6. Here, some principles that can provide guidance in assessing the 
augmentation of urban water are outlined. These principles emerge from the consideration 
of the urban water objectives of economic efficiency and equity in section 2.2.  
In considering the supplementation of a city’s water supplies there are important decisions 
at the investment and operational stages. For assessing how well investment in new water 
performs on economic efficiency, key criteria are: 
• the marginal value of the extra water in relation to the costs of providing it 
• the cost-effectiveness of the extra water supplies. 
A positive benefit-cost outcome for a water augmentation option does not give an 
economic imprimatur to the option if there is an alternative that would yield equivalent 
benefits at a lower cost. 
After investments have been made, there are choices about how much water to obtain from 
each source in each period. Making these decisions will in future require decisions about 
when to operate desalination plants and when to transfer water from the rural sector to 
urban centres.  
Cost-effective sourcing of water  
A basic principle in considering the supplementation of urban water supplies is to consider 
all the options. The NWC has emphasised that  
 … where certain options are ruled out even before evaluation, there cannot be a 
transparent debate about the alternatives, and communities may be saddled with less 
cost effective options. (NWC 2006, p. 12) 
Commitments by governments to no new dams and to opposing direct trade between rural 
and urban water systems are striking instances of the NWC’s point.  
It is cost-effective and economically efficient to source as much water as possible from the 
lowest-cost source, and then, in turn, as much water as possible from the second-lowest 
cost source, and so on until water requirements are met.12 However, setting up institutional 
                                                 
12 If that requires different costs for treating the water from different sources to meet health and 
safety standards, those differences must be allowed for in comparing water sources. 
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arrangements and incentives that are consistent with sourcing an urban centre’s water 
needs in the lowest-cost way is a major challenge.  
The principle of least-cost sourcing applies in the short run in deciding how much water to 
draw from each existing source, as well as to longer-run decisions on investing in new 
water sources.  
Pricing water to users when supplies come from multiple sources with 
different marginal costs 
Meeting the efficiency condition that user prices for water are at least equal to its marginal 
social cost requires a marginal cost approach to pricing, as distinct from pricing based on 
average costs (or an average of marginal costs) for water from different sources. There are, 
however, alternative interpretations of marginal cost pricing of water to customers when 
water comes from two or more sources at different marginal costs. The merits of each from 
the view of economic efficiency and other criteria, within the existing institutional 
framework, are considered in chapter 3. With the introduction of competition to urban 
water systems, competitively determined market prices could potentially replace 
administered prices — see chapters 3–6.  
Decisions on operating sunk infrastructure 
For economic efficiency, decisions to invest in adding to urban water supplies need to be 
informed by comparing total benefits and total costs from the investment. Once the 
investment, in a rural–urban pipeline or a desalination plant, say, has been made, decisions 
need to be made on when to use the pipeline and when to run the desalination plant.  
When traditional urban catchment water is in short supply, the key efficiency test will 
likely be ‘is the marginal value of urban water greater than the short-run marginal cost of 
rural water transported through the pipeline or the marginal operating costs of desalinated 
water’? Short-run marginal costs will typically be much less than long-run marginal costs 
— the latter is crucial for efficient decisions on investing in water infrastructure. That is, 
the test of whether it is efficient to operate an existing piece of infrastructure is easier to 
meet than the test of whether it is efficient to make the investment. 
When urban catchment water is in plentiful supply, the marginal value of new water to 
urban users is likely to be less than the short-run marginal cost of providing it. It would 
then be inefficient to draw on the new water supplies to meet urban demand.  
With urban own-catchment water in demand for environmental purposes as well as to meet 
demand in cities and towns, would there be circumstances in which it would be efficient to 
call on desalinated or rural water for urban use in order to make extra urban catchment 
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water available for environmental uses? There could be. In a world of certainty, the 
presence of those circumstances would suggest a failure to allocate urban-catchment water 
efficiently between city demand and environmental purposes, equating marginal social 
valuations for water in each. In an uncertain and dynamic world, however, the vagaries of 
nature and changes in environmental preferences could work to make marginal valuations 
of environmental water greater sometimes than those for urban water, even with efficient 
processes for allocating water between the two. Economic efficiency might then be 
enhanced by using piped rural water or desalinated water to replace urban water that is 
transferred to environmental uses. 
The principle that short-run marginal cost determines whether to use water supply 
infrastructure or allow it to sit idle need not be inconsistent with the concept of full-cost 
recovery in the presence of other ways of recovering capital costs. For example, ‘water 
supply insurance’ charges that were independent of water use could be applied to 
households and other customers.13  
Roles for governments and customers in providing water security 
Governments, and the urban water utilities they own, make decisions on investment in 
water supplies and on demand management measures when water is in scarce supply. 
These decisions — along with runoff into urban water storages — are the main 
determinant of the water security faced by most water customers. Customers can, however, 
supplement their water supplies and reduce the risks of being denied access to the water 
they want by investing in own-source water — by installing rainwater tanks, bores or 
greywater systems, for example. Potentially, private firms also have a role in enhancing 
urban water supplies and security — see chapters 4–6. 
Is it efficient for government water suppliers to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach in their 
urban water policies? Would it be better to give customers choice between service 
packages offering lower water charges with lower water security — greater chance of 
restrictions — and packages providing higher water charges with higher water security? 
This choice could be provided within traditional urban water systems depending mainly on 
own-catchment water, and the case for doing it is arguably strengthened in the presence of 
low-risk, high-cost desalinated water — for which, given a choice, many may happily pay 
while many others may decline it in favour of lower water bills and a higher probability of 
restrictions. (The number of options need not be limited to two — there could be a 
                                                 
13 With compulsory insurance charges for all households, say, some may be forced to pay a 
significant sum for extra water security on which they place a low value. ‘Water products’ 
differentiated by their ‘security/charges tradeoff’ would be a way of ensuring that only those who 
were willing to pay for extra water security bear the (volume-independent) insurance charge, and 
allowing the efficiency gains from making decisions on operating existing infrastructure on the 
basis of short-run marginal costs — see under immediately following heading.  
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continuum of products allowing each household to choose its mix of low-security and 
high-security water.) 
Allowing each household — and potentially other customers, also — to ‘buy’ their 
preferred level of water security from their mains water suppliers would provide them with 
extra options. It would allow water users to compare the costs of investing in rainwater 
tanks and greywater systems as insurance against garden-threatening watering restrictions 
with the costs of a high-security supply of mains water.  
If the idea of more than one water security/water charges product for urban households is 
opposed on the equity argument that it would create ‘first-class and second-class 
households’, the equity and efficiency consequences of compelling many households to 
pay for a ‘higher quality product’ than they would prefer, and many others a lower-security 
water service than they would choose, need to be addressed.  
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3 Pricing urban water 
Key points 
• State-owned urban water utilities operate administrative pricing systems that are 
regulated with the aim of ensuring revenue equals that required for cost recovery. 
• Two-part water tariffs apply in most urban areas, with a fixed access charge and a 
variable volumetric charge (or price). 
• The volumetric charges are generally set with an inclining block tariff (IBT) structure. 
This means that an initial quantity of water is charged at a relatively low price and 
the price increases for additional water consumed. 
• IBTs result in an inefficient allocation of water across households. They are 
purported to have favourable equity characteristics but it is not clear that this is so.  
– There is a case for replacing IBTs with a single volumetric charge (for a given 
level of reliability), or at least to simplify them to reduce efficiency losses. 
• Generally prices are too low to balance supply and demand during extended 
periods of low rainfall. Other measures — such as prescriptive water restrictions — 
are used to achieve that balance. 
• Administrative pricing could be improved by introducing some form of 
scarcity-based pricing to partly or wholly replace water restrictions. This could allow 
water to be managed in a way that was more closely aligned with individual and 
community preferences and improve signals about when to invest in new supplies. 
– Constraints, such as single metering for multiple tenancies and landlord billing, 
would need to be addressed to maximise the efficacy of this pricing reform. 
• Other potential improvements to pricing arrangements should also be investigated, 
including adjusting prices to encourage better environmental outcomes.  
• Competitively-determined prices (where possible) could potentially deliver even 
greater benefits than those available from modifying administered pricing 
arrangements. There are, however, practical costs and difficulties that need closer 
investigation prior to embarking on such fundamental changes.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the potential for water pricing reforms to achieve better outcomes 
for the community by providing: 
• an improved means of managing water scarcity when it arises 
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• more options for the way people manage their water use 
• clearer signals of the need for investment in water infrastructure, helping to avoid both 
future scarcity and unnecessary investment. 
The need to examine departures from the status quo is increased by the likelihood that 
developments in the water sector will make the current pricing arrangements increasingly 
problematic. These developments include the advent of new sources of supply (for 
example, rural-urban transfers, desalination and recycling), increased uncertainty over 
future climatic conditions, and increasing demand for water for environmental, household 
and industrial use resulting from ongoing population and income growth. 
The simplest way that pricing reform could be achieved is through modifying practices 
within existing institutional arrangements — that is, to adopt better administered pricing 
systems for water provided by government-owned water monopolies. More far-reaching 
change could be achieved through broader institutional and structural reform promoting 
competition in the sector. This could result in administered prices being replaced, at least 
in part, by prices determined by the market. Both approaches are considered in this 
chapter. 
3.2 Current arrangements 
Urban water users obtain their water from state-owned water utilities. Historically, 
users were charged a single fixed access charge, although this has changed over the 
past few decades with the introduction of variable volumetric charges, mirroring 
trends in many other countries (OECD 1999). Volumetric water charges were 
accompanied by an increasing focus on cost recovery, also in common with global 
trends (for example, EU 2000). 
Urban water utilities in Australia operate administered pricing systems. This means 
that they have some discretion in setting water charges but that this is limited by 
price caps and other constraints imposed by state regulatory bodies. 
Characteristics of the current pricing arrangements 
While there is some variation across jurisdictions, arrangements for pricing urban water to 
consumers generally involve: 
• a two-part tariff, comprising a fixed access charge and a variable volumetric charge 
• an inclining block tariff (IBT) structure for the variable component. 
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In addition, developer charges are received by water utilities for the infrastructure costs 
associated with new residential and industrial developments. 
These pricing arrangements (in combination with supply augmentation decisions) have led 
to excess demand in times of low rainfall, which has been dealt with through non-price 
demand management tools, such as water restrictions. Non-price demand management is 
discussed below as a component of the current arrangements. 
The two-part tariff system and cost recovery 
The vast majority of water utilities charge for water using a two-part tariff. The variable 
charges typically are set in accord with an estimate of the long-run marginal cost of 
harvesting, storing, treating and delivering water to users (NWISGWC 2007). Where price 
equals long-run marginal cost, this indicates to consumers the expected cost of bringing 
forward an extra unit of water supply in the long run, including the associated capital 
expenditure for water infrastructure (box 3.1). Pricing at long-run marginal cost creates an 
incentive for people to consume an extra unit of water if, and only if, the value they place 
on that consumption is at least as high as the expected cost of providing it in the long run. 
The fixed access charge is then set as a residual to try to ensure that water utilities receive 
sufficient revenue to service demand. The objective is for them to receive revenue that 
covers, but does not exceed, the sum of operating costs, capital costs and an appropriate 
return on assets. Assessing a return on assets requires assets to be valued, and in most 
jurisdictions the stated intention is to do this in a manner consistent with the cost of 
replacing them. Revenue requirements are forecast in advance by a price regulator, and 
caps placed on both variable and fixed charges. Without such caps there would be the 
potential for monopoly water utilities to achieve revenues in excess of their costs.  
The approach that regulators take to estimating revenue requirements for cost recovery in 
the urban water sector is known as the Building Block Methodology (BBM). The BBM is 
also used in Australia to regulate prices set in other sectors with network infrastructure, 
such as telecommunication services and electricity and gas transmission and distribution. 
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Box 3.1 Estimating long-run marginal cost for price setting 
Long-run marginal cost is a measure of the cost required to service demand reflecting 
a forward-looking estimation of the efficient pattern of investment, as well as meeting 
the operating costs of supply. 
In practice, estimating long-run marginal cost is complex. It requires a great deal of 
information to estimate future demand and supply conditions, in order to plot the 
efficient path for investment. 
Long-run marginal cost essentially has two components: operating and capital costs. 
While estimating operating costs is relatively straight-forward, a variety of methods are 
used to estimate the capital cost. The two most commonly used approaches in 
Australia are outlined below.  
The perturbation approach 
Under the perturbation approach, long-run marginal capital cost is estimated by 
examining how the present value of future expenditure would vary if forecast water 
demand were incrementally increased (or decreased). 
An advantage of this approach is that different forms of expenditure — for example 
those specifically associated with environmental, health or quality obligations — need 
not be separated from general capital expenditure. However, it can be highly sensitive 
to the forecast levels of demand. 
This approach is favoured by the Economic Regulation Authority (Western Australia) 
and the Essential Services Commission (Victoria). 
The average incremental cost (AIC) approach 
The AIC approach estimates long-run marginal capital cost by dividing the present 
value of the expenditure associated with supply augmentation by the expected 
increase in supply needed to meet the forecast demand. 
It measures the cost that must be charged for an incremental increase in future output 
to ensure that the extra capacity meets expected changes in supply and demand. 
Future expenditure on capital augmentation has to be separable from other forms of 
expenditure, which can be quite difficult to achieve. 
This is the favoured approach of the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 
(New South Wales) and the Queensland Competition Authority. 
Source: ESC (2005).  
 
Inclining block tariffs 
The variable component of the charges faced by households in most cities is set as an IBT. 
IBTs impose progressively higher prices for successive blocks of water. An initial quantity 
of water is charged at a relatively low price and the price increases for additional water 
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consumed. The main rationale for IBTs is that they are a ‘fair’ way to provide ‘essential 
water’ at an affordable price, while encouraging conservation through the more expensive 
blocks (ESC 2007b). The number of blocks, and the volume and price associated with each 
block, varies across Australia. The relationship between the various tiers and estimates of 
long-run marginal cost also varies (box 3.2). 
 
Box 3.2 Inclining block tariffs in Australia’s capital cities 
In all capital cities there is a fixed access charge for water. Capitals other than Hobart 
(which generally is unmetered) also have a variable charge, and, with the exception of 
Darwin, this takes the form of an inclining block tariff for residential customers. 
The number of blocks in the tariff structure varies between urban centres. For example, 
Perth has a 5-tier arrangement (which is shortly to be reduced to three), Melbourne has 
a 3-tier system, while Adelaide has a 2-tier system. Most other urban water utilities 
offer a 3-block system. The period over which the IBTs are charged also varies 
between utilities. Additionally, there are large differences in the level of charges. Water 
utilities do not apply the same volumes to each of their blocks, and therefore, the level 
at which different rates are triggered varies. 
Under the IBT for Melbourne’s largest water retailer, the first 440 litres per day are 
charged at the rate of $0.85 per kilolitre, the next 440 at $1.00 per kilolitre, rising to 
$1.48 per kilolitre beyond that (ESC 2007a). 
Melbourne’s inclining block tariff structure 
0.00
0.40
0.80
1.20
0 500 1000 1500
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The relationship between the tiers of the IBTs and estimates of LRMC varies between 
cities. Generally, the higher tiers of IBTs exceed LRMC, and the lowest tier (or one of 
the lower tiers) is set at the LRMC level. 
Source: ESC (2007a).  
 
Separate tariff structures apply to non-residential (such as industrial and commercial) users 
of water in most jurisdictions. These tariff structures vary widely across States and 
Territories (and even within States and Territories). While the larger water utilities in New 
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South Wales and Victoria have a single variable charge for non-residential customers, the 
use of IBTs is common in most other jurisdictions (NWISGWC 2007). 
Developer charges 
Developer charges are up-front payments made by developers to water utilities to provide 
the infrastructure for new developments (IPART 2007). Developer charges vary by 
location, based on the cost of the infrastructure required. Households then pay these 
charges through the price of housing (in the case of existing infrastructure), or through 
rates (where new development is required). Most commonly, infrastructure is installed at 
the outset, and thus the developer charge is reflected in house and land prices. 
Infrastructure costs are a substantial component of development and construction costs, 
and can differ markedly based on location (PC 2004). 
Demand management 
Setting prices at long-run marginal cost results in demand exceeding supply in times of 
short-term scarcity. In order to cover this gap, governments have instituted non-price 
demand management measures (chapter 2). The most significant of these are water 
restrictions, but information campaigns, financial incentives for the use of water efficient 
appliances in households, and strategies encouraging the use of water efficient 
technologies in industry are also used. Water restrictions serve to reduce demand for water 
by controlling what consumers are, and are not, allowed to do with water (Byrnes, Crase 
and Dollery 2006). The form in which restrictions are implemented varies across cities.  
Strengths and weaknesses of the current pricing arrangements 
A strength of the current arrangements is that they include a two-part tariff, with fixed and 
variable charges. This has the potential to create more appropriate incentives for water use 
and conservation than having only a fixed charge, as was generally the case in Australia 
until the 1980s. It has been demonstrated that the introduction of variable charges has had a 
significant influence on consumption. For example, it has been estimated that the 
introduction of variable charges in the ACT resulted in a reduction in water use of up to 
40 per cent (Giurietto, Graham and Letcher 2002). 
Whether the variable charges are being set at appropriate levels is another question. Pricing 
at long-run marginal cost communicates the expected cost of consuming an additional unit 
of water. If the expectations underpinning the calculation of long-run marginal cost are 
accurate, then the incentives created for water use and conservation will be efficient. 
However, given uncertainty about future demand, the efficient investment path, and 
particularly supply from rainfall-dependent water sources, these expectations will almost 
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certainly not be accurate. Periods of short-run scarcity are likely, and during these times 
long-run marginal cost pricing will fail to represent accurately the increases in the 
opportunity cost of water stemming from that scarcity. Australia has unpredictable patterns 
of rainfall. It has been suggested that long-run marginal cost is a more fitting pricing 
methodology when supply is more secure (Sibly 2006). 
As noted in chapter  2, due to the gap between demand for and supply of water in times of 
scarcity, non-price demand management measures, particularly water restrictions, are used. 
Prescriptive water restrictions impose substantial costs on society.  
Another weakness of the current arrangements, from a social welfare perspective, is the 
IBT structure of variable charges. By charging different prices to different households 
based solely on the volume of use, the relationship between the price people pay and the 
cost of supply is severed. This is inconsistent with the principle that ‘customers should face 
the incremental costs of their actions, unless the service provided is attended by different 
costs’ (Crase, O’Keefe, Burston 2007, p. 71). Non-residential users should also face the 
same price as residential users, provided the marginal cost of supplying the water is the 
same. At present, non-residential users pay prices that are often different from those faced 
by residential users (NWISGWC 2007). 
Under an IBT, a household facing the highest tier price has a stronger incentive to 
economise on water use than a household on the lowest tier. Consequently, it may be that 
the first household saves water by forgoing consumption that it would have valued quite 
highly, while the second household uses some water in ways that it puts a low value on. 
The result is an inefficient allocation of water across households, as the cost of supplying 
the water does not usually depend on which household it goes to. To achieve efficiency, 
each user should face the same price unless there are differences in the costs of supplying 
them. 
IBTs are purported to be an equitable means of encouraging low levels of 
consumption. However, their equity consequences are unclear. While they are said 
to reward households that use water without waste, they actually reward low levels 
of consumption. They can serve to reward small ‘wasteful’ households while 
punishing larger households, which by necessity require more water (Sibly 2006). 
Without discrimination based on the number of residents, this negative equity 
consequence is an inevitable outcome of IBTs. 
Finally, investment is occurring in new types of supply augmentation, such as desalination 
plants, that have very different cost structures and supply characteristics to traditional 
sources of supply. While it is not yet clear how these developments will be accommodated 
within water pricing arrangements, it is apparent that the task of designing efficient and 
equitable pricing arrangements is becoming more complex. The advent of these new 
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supply augmentations provides an additional motivation for considering whether 
improvements can be made to existing pricing arrangements. 
3.3 Improving administered pricing 
The pricing of urban water within the existing institutional arrangements can be improved 
in several ways, including by: 
• removing or modifying IBTs to improve signals for water consumption 
• adjusting prices to reflect the value of water during times of scarcity 
• making other changes to improve pricing signals, such as taking account of 
environmental externalities and varying charges by region. 
This section examines the general case for these and other reforms. There would need to be 
further detailed work to determine exactly how such reforms should be implemented. In 
some cases, such as charging prices that vary by region, further work is required to 
ascertain the circumstances under which the benefits of the reform outweigh the costs. 
These suggested improvements are predicated on the notion that people’s use of water is 
influenced by its price — demand for water is, at least to some extent, price-elastic. 
International and Australian studies suggest that this assumption is valid overall, even 
though a certain quantity of water needed for essential purposes, such as health and 
hygiene, is likely to be fairly price-inelastic (box 3.3). 
Removing or modifying IBTs 
The key problem with IBTs is that different users face different incentives for conserving 
water, while the value to the system of conserving a unit of water does not normally vary 
by user. The more users that face a price for their next unit of water different from the 
marginal cost of supplying it, and the greater the discrepancy, the greater the efficiency 
losses. Community welfare could be improved by ensuring that all water users paid the 
same price (unless there are differences in the costs of supplying them). Therefore, a case 
can be made for replacing IBTs with a single volumetric charge at least for a given level of 
supply security.1  
The main argument against removing IBTs is that no one should be placed under financial 
strain to obtain the volume of water that is essential for their health and hygiene. As noted 
                                                 
1 In principle, individual users could negotiate specific water security contracts with water utilities. 
If transactions costs made such an approach infeasible, an alternative might be for utilities to 
offer a more general higher security product priced above the ‘normal’ volumetric charge.  
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in chapter 2, such equity concerns are sometimes overstated and, in any case, can be 
addressed through broader social welfare measures. However, if it is deemed desirable for 
‘essential’ water to be provided at a low price, there are ways this can be achieved while 
limiting associated efficiency losses. 
A simple improvement over current arrangements would be to have just two price blocks, 
with the volume of block-one set sufficiently low that nearly all users pay the block-two 
price at the margin (Edwards 2006). Alternatively, the fixed access charge could include an 
‘essential’ allocation of water, and all other water use could be charged at the going rate. 
This would ensure that the value attached to the final unit of water consumed was the same 
across most users, while providing all users with an allocation of water at a low price to 
cover ‘essential’, or non-discretionary, uses. Under this approach the volume of water 
allocated to the first block would be substantially lower than the allocation made under the 
first block of most current IBTs. Quiggin (2007) has suggested that the basic water 
requirement for drinking, washing and other daily requirements would be around 50 litres 
per person per day, while in most regions the bottom block of the IBT is between 200 to 
400 litres per day (NWISGWC 2007). An Australian study suggests that having a lower 
block-one allocation is also consistent with community perceptions of how much water is 
required for non-discretionary water use (Crase, O’Keefe and Burston 2007). 
A difficulty in deciding the amount of water that represents essential use is the fact some 
households comprise one person, while others have five or more people. If all households 
are given the same allocation this will be more generous for smaller households. To 
address this equity problem, consideration could be given to varying the allocation of 
‘essential’ water according to household size (Quiggin 2007; Crase, O’Keefe and Burston 
2007). This would, however, introduce administrative complexity and cost, as well as 
potentially being open to manipulation through false reporting. These factors would need 
to be taken into account in assessing whether this approach should be adopted. 
Some water utilities in Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the ACT apply 
IBTs not only to residential users, but also to non-residential water customers (primarily 
commercial and industrial firms) (NWISGWC 2007). The Victorian Government has also 
expressed interest in exploring this option (ESC 2006).  
A case can be made that the essentials of life should be within all individuals’ financial 
means, and that IBTs are one way of achieving this (although, as argued, perhaps not the 
best way). In contrast, the argument that firms have a right to the production inputs they 
need (including water) at prices that guarantee their viability, is untenable in an economy 
like Australia’s. Accordingly, the equity argument for IBTs does not apply to commercial 
and industrial firms.  
In addition, the quantity of water that firms use depends on a range of factors, including 
size, outputs and production processes. The IBTs that have been applied to firms do not 
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take these factors into account, meaning that the higher prices for second and subsequent 
tiers are applied in a manner that bears little relationship to discretionary or wasteful water 
use. Varying the structure of an IBT to cater for the individual circumstances of firms 
would be difficult and costly, and for practical purposes, infeasible. For these reasons, 
there appears to be no valid rationale for adopting IBTs for non-residential water users.  
The application of IBTs to non-residential users suggests that the intention could be to 
simply reduce water demand to ease water security concerns. That is, IBTs are being used 
as a form of scarcity-based pricing. As will be discussed, the key feature of scarcity-based 
pricing is that prices rise when the security of supply falls (not when individual customers 
use water in excess of some threshold) and so IBTs are poorly cast in this role. 
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Box 3.3 The price elasticity of demand for urban water 
The efficacy of allowing greater recourse to price to reduce the reliance on water 
restrictions depends on the responsiveness of demand for urban water to price. The 
responsiveness (elasticity) of demand determines the price increase necessary to 
achieve reductions in water consumption equivalent to those from water restrictions. 
The price elasticity of demand measures the percentage change in quantity demanded 
that would result from a given percentage increase in the price. For example, if the 
elasticity was -0.3, a 10 per cent increase in the price of water would bring about a 
3 per cent decline in the consumption of water, other things being equal. 
Elasticities are likely to be higher in the long run than in the short run. As consumers 
become more aware of price changes, and greater opportunities to utilise water 
alternatives are exercised (for example, installing water-efficient appliances), there will 
be a greater quantity response. Also, as price rises and water consumes a larger share 
of the total budget, the price elasticity typically increases. 
The international literature reveals a high degree of variation in estimates of price 
elasticities of demand for urban water. Some estimates suggest that water is very price 
inelastic (-0.07 to -0.21, Jones and Morris 1984) while others approach unitary 
elasticity (-0.34 to -0.96, Kulreshtha 1996). These differences may reflect actual 
differences between urban centres and/or differences in estimation methodology and 
accuracy. Given the wide range, it seems likely that the latter influence is significant. 
A study of Sydney (Grafton and Kompas 2006b), estimated the own-price elasticity for 
household water demand to be -0.35. Hoffman, Worthington and Higgs (2006) 
estimated the elasticity in Brisbane to be approximately -0.51. These recent Australian 
studies suggest that relatively modest price increases could have a significant impact 
on consumption in these cities. As noted previously, the introduction of variable 
charges in the ACT was estimated to have caused a reduction in consumption of up to 
40 per cent (Giurietto, Graham and Letcher 2002). 
While elasticity estimates vary significantly, they tend to indicate that there is scope to 
use prices to significantly affect the demand for water in urban regions. Further work in 
this area would help to narrow the degree of uncertainty over the relationship between 
price and demand. Improved knowledge could be gained through experience in using 
prices for demand management purposes. Also, removing barriers that impede pricing 
information from reaching consumers — such as improving metering and billing 
arrangements — can increase elasticities, enhancing the ability of price to influence 
consumption.   
 
Adjusting prices to reflect the scarcity value of water 
Pricing at long-run marginal cost smooths prices over time, and does not reflect short-run 
changes in the marginal cost caused by variable rainfall and runoff. During extended dry 
periods this tends to lead to demand for water (at the prevailing price) that is in excess of 
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the supply that can be prudently made available, given the need to ensure supplies into the 
future. Demand must then be reduced by non-price means, such as water restrictions. 
The problems with using prescriptive water restrictions to manage demand were discussed 
in chapter 2. Essentially, they prevent people from using water for particular purposes, or 
in particular ways, even when they place a high value on them. At the same time, water 
uses that may have a relatively low value are not constrained. This approach to demand 
management is inefficient. 
Introducing scarcity-based pricing has the potential to manage demand for water in a way 
that is more closely aligned with individual and community preferences. Balancing 
demand and supply using price allows people to make their own water use decisions. 
Increasing prices during times of scarcity creates incentives for people to reduce water use 
in whatever ways they find convenient or least costly. Also, while restrictions result in 
irrecoverable time and inconvenience costs, using higher prices in times of scarcity results 
in financial costs to water users that are transfers to water utilities or governments (Hughes 
et al. 2008). That is, the costs are recovered and can be used in ways that benefit the 
community.  
Introducing and administering scarcity-based pricing within existing institutional 
arrangements would be a complex task and there are different approaches that could be 
taken (box 3.4). The basic idea of scarcity-based pricing, however, is simple — prices 
should increase as dam levels decrease and the threat to water security increases. This 
would cause prices to be less stable than they currently are. During a long drought, prices 
might increase fairly gradually over a number of years and then might drop quite sharply 
during a season or two of high rainfall. 
One approach would be to simply substitute higher prices for water restrictions. That is, 
pricing arrangements could continue as normal except during periods when concerns over 
water security arose. Then, instead of introducing water restrictions as has traditionally 
been done, the volumetric charge for water would be increased to achieve an equivalent 
fall in water use.  
Other approaches involve a more substantial shift away from current practices. For 
example, some analysts have argued that it can be inefficient to price at long-run marginal 
cost at times when water is in plentiful supply, although with Australia’s recent 
experiences with prolonged drought, concern over such inefficiencies is not widespread 
(ACIL Tasman 2007a).  
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Box 3.4 Possible approaches to scarcity-based pricing 
Short-run marginal cost pricing 
Short-run marginal cost (SRMC) is the cost of meeting an incremental increase in 
demand for water in the short term. When water supplies are plentiful it will relate to the 
operational costs of supplying the next unit of water (this might include, for example, 
water treatment costs) plus any externalities. As water becomes scarce, SRMC pricing 
will depend on the highest value use to which a unit of water could be put. This might 
be the value of forgone consumption, or the value of keeping the water in storage to 
ameliorate future scarcity. 
Pricing at SRMC results in a balance between supply and demand (that is, the market 
is cleared) without the need for water restrictions. To illustrate, Grafton and 
Kompas (2006a) estimate that water prices in Sydney would need to be in excess of 
$1.80 per kilolitre (more than 50 per cent higher than prevailing prices during the study 
period) to balance supply and demand when water storage levels are low.  
To set prices at SRMC, information is required on the variable costs of water supply 
and the highest value uses at different levels of scarcity. The former can be obtained 
from water utilities, while the latter relies on estimates of the price elasticity of demand 
for water. In practice, prices would need to be set for defined periods (for example, 
three months), taking account of factors such as dam levels, forecasts of inflows and 
possibly time of year.  
One short coming of SRMC is that it can fail to recover the cost of long run investment 
decisions. In order to ensure full cost recovery of assets, SRMC pricing could be 
combined with a fixed charge. The fixed charge could then be calibrated with SRMC to 
ensure that utilities recover the cost of fixed assets as well as the cost of providing the 
water (the total cost of supply). 
Proposals to move to pricing based on SRMC have been made by Ng (1987), Sibly 
(2006), Crase and Dollery (2006), Grafton and Kompas (2006b) and others.  
Hybrid of short-run and long-run marginal cost pricing 
Another option is to price water at the higher of SRMC and LRMC. This would address 
what is perhaps the main problem with the current arrangements — the deficiencies of 
using non-price demand management to address scarcity. This approach might have 
advantages compared to always pricing at SRMC as it would result in somewhat more 
stable prices and avoid low prices. Low prices could give confusing signals about the 
value of conserving water and might lead to people paying too little attention to the 
amount of water used by the long-lived products they buy (such as washing machines) 
and the gardens they establish.  
(Continued next page) 
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Box 3.4 (continued) 
Scarcity pricing as an options strategy 
Scarcity pricing could be based on the opportunity cost to the water utility of using 
water now and, therefore, not having it available to alleviate future scarcity. From a 
water utility’s perspective, when dams are below full capacity a marginal increase in 
consumption brings forward the expected date on which it will need to commit to 
investing in supply augmentation. Given the highly variable rainfall in many parts of 
Australia, this can have significant cost implications, particularly when dam levels are 
low. For example, it can result in a billion dollar investment being made, when, if the 
decision could have been safely deferred for just a few months, the investment might 
not have been required for a decade or more due to subsequently favourable rainfall. 
Accordingly, the opportunity cost of using water now can be high because, in some 
circumstances, it closes off the option of deferring a major investment for what could 
turn out to be a considerable period. As ACIL Tasman (2007a) explains: 
In an options world, in which a readiness option has been identified and the trigger point for 
commitment to substantial investment is approaching, any consumption of water brings 
forward the trigger point and increases the probability of needing to trigger the investment 
before, for example, a drought breaks. In these circumstances (as in the extreme peak 
market setting in electricity), the true cost imposed on the system by consumption can rise 
rapidly as system storage (or other measure of capacity to meet demand) drops. 
(ACIL Tasman 2007a, p. 54) 
Scarcity pricing of this type can be understood as an evolution of the current LRMC 
approach to recognise the option values associated with investing in water 
infrastructure in an uncertain environment.  
 
To illustrate, consider the case where a city’s dams are full to the point of overflowing, 
with the spilled water being discharged to the ocean. Pricing at long-run marginal cost here 
will cause people to forgo some water consumption that they would have valued. Because 
of this, the forgone consumption imposes a cost on society, but for what benefit? The 
forgone consumption cannot be used to supply others or be saved for later use. There 
would be some saving on the operating costs of water utilities, but this could be small 
compared to costs to water users. For this reason, these analysts’ proposals for 
scarcity-based pricing involve prices being set below long-run marginal cost (as typically 
calculated) in times of plenty.  
Scarcity-based pricing is concerned with opportunity costs of using water. Using water for 
a particular purpose now means that it is not available either for other uses now, or for 
keeping in storage to bolster the security of future supply. At times when dams are 
overflowing the opportunity cost of water is likely to be low because using an extra 
kilolitre does not detract from other uses or future supply security (there may be costs 
associated with forgone environmental flows). As dam levels drop, however, the 
opportunity cost of water will tend to rise, particularly if continuing low dam inflows are 
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likely. Scarcity-based pricing seeks to reflect this variation in opportunity cost, in full or in 
part, in the price of water. This tends to improve outcomes for the community as it 
discourages people from using water for low-value uses at times when this necessitates 
forgoing more valuable opportunities, such as keeping it in storage to bolster supply 
security.  
Another advantage of using prices to balance supply and demand is that it potentially 
provides better signals as to the value of increasing the supply and security of water. This 
is because more information is gained on how highly water users value being able to 
maintain consistent consumption patterns as water scarcity increases. This could assist 
water utilities to better plan supply augmentation. It could also facilitate a greater role for 
the private sector in providing water during times of scarcity. For example, higher prices 
would be likely to increase commercial opportunities for the supply of recycled water. 
As discussed previously, volumetric charges are currently set first and then the fixed access 
charge determined such that total expected revenue to the water utility equates to that 
required for full cost recovery. Under scarcity-based pricing this arrangement could 
continue (although there would be some added complexity as there would almost certainly 
be more volatile prices). This means that when the volumetric charge increased in response 
to increased water scarcity, the access charge would need to decline. A point might be 
reached where the access charge dropped to zero, meaning any further increases in the 
volumetric charge would result in revenue being in excess of that required for cost 
recovery (assuming that the access charge was not permitted to become negative, which, 
while theoretically possible, might cause practical difficulties).2 Such increases would 
need to be permitted if the full efficiency benefits of scarcity-based pricing were to be 
achieved. Any excess revenue collected should be passed through to the government, 
rather than being retained by water utilities (chapter 2). This would mean that, while the 
community would be bearing higher water charges, the excess revenue could be used to 
reduce taxes and/or pay for services to benefit the community. 
There are potential difficulties and disadvantages associated with introducing 
scarcity-based pricing. However, these appear to be fairly minor compared to the 
advantages: 
• It can be difficult to estimate accurately the appropriate scarcity charge (Byrnes, Crase 
and Dollery 2006). However, any move in the right direction will have efficiency 
advantages and so precision is not essential. 
                                                 
2 Some analysts have pointed out that employing IBTs reduces the potential for excess revenue 
because a low volumetric charge is applied to a proportion of water consumed (for example, 
Quiggin 2007). While this can be seen as an advantage of IBTs it does not appear to be a 
particularly important one, as excess revenue need not cause efficiency losses if properly 
managed. 
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• Scarcity-based pricing can introduce perverse incentives for water utilities, depending 
on the cause of the scarcity. If scarcity is a reflection of investment constraints that 
prevent appropriate supply augmentation, scarcity charges might simply provide excess 
revenues to water utilities (Dwyer 2006). Therefore, in the presence of inappropriate 
investment constraints scarcity prices can, in fact, be inefficient. If scarcity-based 
pricing was introduced, close attention would need to be given to institutional and 
regulatory arrangements to reduce the potential for this to occur.  
• There are likely to be equity concerns regarding low-income households facing higher 
water prices in times of scarcity. To address this, price changes related to scarcity could 
be confined to the higher tier of a two-tier IBT. Alternatively, or in addition, these 
concerns could be addressed outside the water pricing system, through broader social 
welfare measures (Edwards 2006). 
• Price volatility would increase and many water users may find this undesirable 
(Grafton 2006). In addition, people who take only the current price of water into 
account when buying water-using goods, such as washing machines, would tend to 
make less appropriate decisions when water prices are less stable. For these reasons, 
greater price volatility may be regarded as a disadvantage of scarcity-based pricing. 
However, the consequent reduction in the use of water restrictions (and/or lower 
average water bills) would be an advantage to water users. There are pros and cons to 
consider. In addition, new contract arrangements could be introduced to allow 
individual water users who dislike price uncertainty to pay a premium for a more stable 
price over time. Providing this option would involve departing from the 
‘one-product-for-all-customers’ model that currently exists (chapter 2). 
• For scarcity-based pricing to be successful, price signals need to be effectively 
transmitted to water users (ERA 2007). Current metering and billing arrangements, 
such as aggregate metering of multi-resident premises, can mute price signals. This 
issue, which is relevant to all volumetric charging for water, is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Introducing some form of scarcity-based pricing need not be approached as an ‘all or 
nothing’ decision. For example, it may be considered that, on equity grounds, limits should 
be placed on how high volumetric charges are allowed to go. If this were done, 
scarcity-based pricing would narrow the gap between water demand and supply, but in 
times of severe scarcity emergency water restrictions could still be required. The greater 
the reflection of scarcity in urban pricing structures, the lower the likelihood of needing 
water restrictions and other non-price demand management measures. 
Introducing scarcity-based pricing should also not be seen in isolation from other reforms. 
Complementary reforms, such as integrating rural and urban water systems, could serve to 
constrain price increases in times of scarcity by making extra water supplies available, 
where the cost of providing those extra supplies is below the current scarcity price. 
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Other areas for improvement 
Some other aspects of urban water pricing that appear to warrant further investigation are 
considered below. 
Reflecting environmental and other externalities in prices 
Using water for urban consumption can result in externalities — positive or negative 
effects on parties not directly involved in the supply or consumption of the water. 
Externalities can arise from water harvest, storage, manufacture and use. For example: 
• Harvesting and storage can redirect water away from environmental flows, leading to a 
reduction in environmental amenity. 
• Manufacturing water (through desalination and recycling) requires energy, that if 
sourced from burning fossil fuels, results in greenhouse gas emissions (that are 
implicated in climate change). 
• Water use can have detrimental effects on the environment where it results in 
discharges of polluted wastewater. 
• Storing water in dams can benefit tourism and flood mitigation (these are positive 
externalities).  
A reform that could be considered is to include some measure of these external costs and 
benefits in the price of urban water. This has the potential to enhance the welfare of society 
by ensuring third-party effects are reflected in the level of consumption. For example, 
adding a component to water prices to reflect negative environmental externalities would 
tend to reduce water consumption and improve environmental outcomes (with the benefits 
of the latter outweighing the costs of the former, provided the price adjustment accurately 
reflected the externality).  
Dealing with externalities by adjustments to administered water prices is one option and it 
should be assessed against others on a case-by-case basis. Requiring water utilities to meet 
certain environmental objectives as a community service obligation is one alternative 
approach that may be appropriate in some cases. For environmental flows, enabling 
environmental service providers to compete for water is another option (chapter 4). For 
some externalities, more directly targeted policy instruments may be available. For 
example, an emissions trading scheme would generate a price for greenhouse gas 
emissions, incorporating that externality into the operating costs of manufactured water. 
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Varying prices by location 
Water utilities generally apply charges that do not vary on the basis of location — this is 
known as ‘postage stamp’ pricing. The result is that any cost differences associated with 
supplying water across locations are not reflected in charges. The potential for such cost 
differences to be significant depends, among other things, on the size of the area to which 
uniform charges are applied. In Australia, this varies considerably. For example, each of 
Melbourne’s three major water retailers has their own water charges, while a single set of 
charges is applied across the entirety of South Australia (NWISGWC 2007). 
Postage stamp pricing does not create incentives for efficient water use and conservation 
where there are significant differences in the cost of supplying different regions. It can also 
create problems for the introduction of competition to the urban water sector (section 3.4). 
Accordingly, there are likely to be some benefits from introducing prices that vary by 
location. There would, however, be administrative costs and so empirical assessment 
would be required to ascertain whether this reform would be worthwhile in individual 
cases. 
As discussed previously, developer charges are one aspect of the current arrangements that 
do vary according to location. Any evaluation of whether water prices that vary by location 
should be introduced would need to consider the relative merits of employing developer 
charges, location-based water pricing or a combination of the two. 
Modifications to accommodate supply augmentation 
The advent of new types of supply augmentation present new challenges to the design of 
pricing arrangements. For example, some approaches, such as LRMC pricing using the 
average incremental cost method, produce prices that reflect the average cost of different 
supply sources. This might not seriously compromise economic efficiency when the 
different sources have similar cost structures, as might have been the case in the past when 
augmentation predominately involved increasing dam capacity. However, where there are 
large difference in costs, as could be the case where investment in both a desalination plant 
and a new dam are planned, it is important that prices reflect the unit cost of the highest 
cost source.  
Further issues relating to water pricing and the operation of desalination plants are 
considered in chapter 5.  
Improving the effectiveness of price signals through metering and billing 
An important limitation of the existing arrangements is that many water users do not 
receive a bill that has a volumetric charge for their own water use. In many states body 
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corporates may have only one water meter, often covering twenty or more different 
households. Renters often do not face the individual cost consequences of their own 
consumption, as water charges are paid by the owner of the property. This mutes price 
signals to a significant segment of the community. Addressing this shortcoming is 
important, and would become even more so if scarcity-based pricing were to be 
introduced. However, while it is desirable that as many households as possible face a 
volumetric charge for their own water consumption, it is not costless to achieve this. The 
extent to which action is warranted is an empirical question. 
In addition, the frequency of water billing varies between cities. Infrequent billing reduces 
people’s awareness of price and can result in large bills that are difficult for low-income 
households to pay. For water users to respond to changes in price, they need to be able to 
see a clear link between their consumption behaviour and the size of their bills. This link 
would be clearer if billing was more frequent and/or there were more effective public 
announcements of water prices. 
Improving cost recovery frameworks 
As discussed previously, the current arrangements are designed to achieve full cost 
recovery by urban water utilities. While this is appropriate, it is necessary to examine the 
detail of how full cost recovery is applied to see whether improvements are possible in 
particular jurisdictions. This has not been done for the current study, but work by Marsden 
Jacob Associates (2006) suggests that further investigation could be warranted. 
Full cost recovery includes an appropriate return on assets, and to calculate this the value 
of assets needs to be determined. In considering the asset values used in regulating water 
charges, Marsden Jacob Associates reported: 
The regulatory asset value of water businesses is typically well below the efficient 
replacement cost of infrastructure. In contrast, the regulatory asset value for setting 
regulated prices for other utility sectors [such as gas and telecommunications] is set 
precisely at the level of efficient replacement cost. (Marsden Jacob Associates 2006, 
p. 46) 
This raises the question of whether the regulatory asset values used in the urban water 
sector should be calculated in a similar manner to those applied in other utility sectors. If 
this were done, Marsden Jacob Associates (2006) estimate that, on average, water charges 
in Australian capital cities would need to have been 33 per cent higher in 2005 to achieve 
100 per cent cost recovery3. 
Another issue is that the rural water sector is generally further away from achieving full 
cost recovery than the urban water sector (NWISGWC 2007). While urban water utilities 
                                                 
3 This estimate was not independently assessed for the current study. 
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are required to recover ‘upper bound’ costs, rural water utilities are only required to 
meet the lower bound level of cost recovery.4 Further movement towards full cost 
recovery in the rural sector, as envisaged by the National Water Initiative, would be a 
positive development in its own right and could also assist in achieving greater consistency 
across the sectors. Greater consistency in cost recovery frameworks would have the benefit 
of reducing distortions in the allocation of water between rural and urban water users in the 
event that integration between the sectors was pursued (chapter 4). 
Pricing wastewater removal and treatment 
In addition to paying for deliveries of water, users pay for the removal of wastewater 
(sewerage and trade wastes) and stormwater. Households typically pay a fixed charge (or 
charges), while firms pay a fixed charge, that often varies according to the size of the 
connection, and may also pay a volumetric charge. While these arrangements have not 
been examined in detail for this study, it is noted that Freebairn (2008) has suggested that it 
may be feasible and desirable for charges to vary according to the pollution load — and 
hence the external costs — of wastewater. 
3.4 Broader institutional and structural reform to 
improve pricing 
The preceding section dealt with improvements that could be made to water pricing within 
the existing institutional arrangements. Options for reforming these arrangements, 
including by introducing competition, are discussed in chapter 6. While full discussion of 
the costs and benefits of such reform is left to that chapter, it is important to appreciate the 
implications for pricing. These include that: 
• there are likely to be benefits in reforming administered pricing prior to the 
introduction of competition 
• competition reform could decrease the need for administered pricing 
• competitively determined prices could potentially deliver greater benefits than those 
available from modifying administered pricing arrangements. 
Reforming administered pricing prior to competition 
Competition reform is likely to be more successful if preceded by reforms to administered 
pricing. Having prices that better reflect consumer preferences and scarcity, while sending 
                                                 
4 Upper bound cost recovery includes all the elements from lower bound — namely, operating 
maintenance, administration costs, tax and interest — as well as a rate of return on assets.  
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appropriate signals for new investment and supply augmentation will facilitate the 
transition to a competitive setting. For example, a scarcity-reflective price can provide 
signals for new entrants, encouraging them to offer new forms of supply. By allowing 
administered prices to more closely bring equilibrium between supply and demand (to the 
limit of the information available to decision makers), the adjustment to a more 
market-based approach would be less extreme. 
Some institutional reform options involve vertical separation of elements of the supply 
chain to produce discrete business units for activities such as bulk water supply, treatment, 
distribution and retailing (chapter 6). If this were done the reform of administrative pricing 
arrangements would need to encompass the setting of prices for each of the elements.5 
Achieving cost-reflective prices for each element would be important to create commercial 
disciplines on each business unit, so as to encourage improved performance. 
Cost-reflective prices would also be important for creating the right incentives for the entry 
of competing private firms. 
The need for administered pricing in a more competitive setting 
The progressive introduction of competition in urban water provision would reduce the 
need for administered water prices. Markets for urban water could allow competitive 
pressures to determine water prices. These competitive prices would allow consumers to 
express their preferences in how water is used, while permitting suppliers to communicate 
costs.  
In practice, there would probably be a continuing need for some price regulation as there 
are elements of urban water systems that are natural monopolies and this constrains the 
extent to which competition can be usefully employed. For example, water distribution is 
usually a natural monopoly as it would be inefficient to duplicate the network of pipes and 
other infrastructure needed to distribute water. Firms with a natural monopoly may charge 
excessive prices, giving rise to the potential for price regulation to increase efficiency. 
Chapter 6 provides a broader discussion of the implications of natural monopoly for urban 
water reform.  
Benefits from competitively determined prices 
In many cases the reforms to administrative pricing discussed earlier seek to mimic the 
prices that would emerge in a fully competitive urban water system. Generally they can 
only ever do this approximately as the diverse sources of information characteristic of 
                                                 
5 In some jurisdictions pricing of the outputs of some of the individual elements of the supply 
chain is a feature of the current arrangements. For example, Melbourne Water sells bulk water to 
three retail businesses that then sell delivered water to water users.  
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competitive markets are absent. Because of this, the benefits to the community from 
reforming administrative pricing may be less than those available from moving to 
competitively determined prices where this is possible. Moreover, competitive prices could 
yield additional benefits by providing signals for dynamic efficiency.  
As discussed, a fully competitive sector is not likely to be achievable, given the existence 
of natural monopoly elements in the supply chain. Nonetheless, moving to competitively 
determined prices in those elements of the supply chain that are potentially contestable — 
such as bulk supply and retail — could yield benefits beyond those available from 
reforming administrative pricing. This is one of several reasons for exploring competition 
reform, as discussed in chapter 6. 
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4 Integrating rural and urban water 
resources 
 
Key points 
• In many cases, a small proportion of the water used in rural areas would provide a 
significant increase in supply to connected urban areas.   
• Opportunities exist for greater use of rural–urban water transfers to alleviate 
localised scarcity: 
– A handful of rural–urban water transfers have already occurred and more could 
occur without need for major infrastructure investment.  
– In addition, there are several proposals to connect rural and urban sources 
through pipes.  
• There are several ways to facilitate rural–urban water transfers, including through 
water markets, regulation and indirect purchases. Each approach has different 
implications for economic efficiency, transparency and equity. 
– Indirect purchase, such as funding infrastructure upgrades in irrigation districts in 
return for water, is often a high-cost way to transfer water between uses. 
– Markets will often be the most efficient, transparent and equitable mode of 
exchange, creating benefits for both the buyer and seller. 
• Different levels of water market integration are possible. Ultimately, there is a trade 
off between involving as wide a range of buyers and sellers as possible to capture 
gains from trade and the workability of the scheme. 
– An intermediate level of integration, involving large urban and rural water users, 
would appear to capture many of the available gains from rural–urban trade and 
would expose urban water users to competitive market prices.  
• Facilitating rural–urban trade would involve a number of implementation issues, 
such as managing third-party effects (including effects on environmental flows).   
 
4.1 Introduction 
The Australian and State and Territory Governments have agreed to manage water 
resources for rural and urban use in a way that optimises economic, social and 
environmental outcomes. Specific commitments are to facilitate water markets where 
water systems are physically shared or hydrologic connections and water supply 
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considerations will permit water trade, and to facilitate water trading between and within 
the urban and rural sectors (COAG 2004).  
Although several State and Territory Governments have taken steps to facilitate rural–
urban water transfers, such transfers (particularly through water markets) remain relatively 
rare. A major reason for this stems from the historical approach to water management in 
Australia. Until the past decade or so, governments adopted a ‘silo’ approach that treated 
urban and rural water as separate resources. Many of the institutions and policies 
governing water provision still reflect this approach. As a result, existing systems poorly 
accommodate rural–urban water transfers.  
This chapter explores options for further integrating urban and rural water resources to 
improve water allocation and investment decisions across Australia. It discusses: 
• the main differences in urban and rural water provision and how these affect water 
users’ abilities to reveal the value they place on water  
• the rationale for rural–urban integration through water transfers  
• potential modes of exchange 
• opportunities for further connection between urban and rural water systems  
• institutional approaches to facilitate water transfers among rural and urban users 
• implementation issues, such as managing third-party effects.  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a general discussion of different conceptual 
approaches to establishing integrated rural–urban water markets. Detailed analysis, 
including economic modelling, would be required to determine the appropriate approach in 
specific cases.  
Urban and rural water  
In rural areas, irrigators access water by holding an entitlement (or property right) to a 
share of water from a specified water source, such as a river, catchment or aquifer. The 
volume of water allocated to an entitlement each irrigation season depends on the total 
amount of water available from the water source.1  
Property rights for water in rural areas enable irrigators to trade water with one another 
and, in doing so, reveal the (marginal) benefit from consuming an additional unit of water 
in rural areas. There are well-established markets for seasonal allocations and entitlements, 
                                                 
1 Definitions for water (access) entitlement differ between jurisdictions. Differences include the 
parameter defining the size of entitlement (nominal volume or share); the extent to which 
entitlements are classified by priority or reliability (high or low); and ownership structure (for 
example, individual or company) (NWCWGCR 2006). 
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particularly in the southern Murray–Darling Basin (PC 2006b). Prices for seasonal 
allocations rise and fall with water availability and with demand variations, while 
entitlement prices reflect the discounted stream of expected prices of future water 
allocations (Freebairn 2005b). Derivative products, such as leases and contracts, can add 
flexibility to water trade in entitlements and seasonal allocations. 
Urban water users do not own property rights to water and therefore cannot individually 
interact in markets to buy and sell water. Without a market for urban water, it is not 
possible to observe the marginal benefit of water use in urban areas directly. Urban charges 
reflect the cost of providing water; they do not reveal useful information about the 
marginal benefit of using water in urban areas subject to supply constraints (scarcity) 
(chapter 3).  
Rationale for rural–urban transfers 
The main argument for rural–urban transfers relates to economic efficiency. Efficiently 
allocating water involves equating marginal social benefits across alternative (urban, rural 
and environmental) uses and users of water.2 When marginal social benefits are not equal, 
there is scope to improve society’s welfare by transferring water from uses with a 
relatively low marginal value to uses with a higher marginal value. Urban water users 
facing severe water scarcity, for example, may be willing to pay more for a marginal unit 
of water than the return primary producers in a neighbouring region can earn on that water 
in a given year. Allowing the primary producers to sell water to urban users can make both 
better off and improve overall benefits to society. 
Modes of water exchange  
Water transfers among alternative water uses and users can occur in a variety of ways. 
Different modes of exchange have different implications for economic efficiency, 
transparency and equity. Non-price mechanisms include regulation (through planning 
processes), borrowing water and indirect or market-like purchases (such as funding 
infrastructure upgrades in irrigation districts in exchange for water) (box 4.1). 
Alternatively, transfers can occur through voluntary exchange at prices determined in 
electronic exchanges or through private negotiation.  
                                                 
2 Marginal social benefit is ‘gross benefit less the marginal social costs of water treatment, delivery 
and disposal, and less any marginal external costs of water use. In the absence of external 
benefits and costs, the marginal private benefit is equal to the marginal social benefit’ 
(Freebairn 2005b, p. 6).  
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Box 4.1 Non-price mechanisms for transferring water  
A variety of non-price mechanisms is available to secure urban water supplies from 
sources currently considered ‘rural’. For example: 
Regulation: Administratively (re)allocating water among rural, urban and 
environmental water users. Examples include: 
• planning processes that reallocate water among competing water users based on 
subjective (sometimes ‘expert’) judgments about relative water needs 
• drought contingency provisions that reduce water available for environmental uses 
to secure urban and/or rural water supplies. 
Indirect purchases: Indirect purchases include i) funding infrastructure upgrades in 
irrigation districts in exchange for water, and ii) buying land, stripping it of water 
entitlements and then reselling it. For example: 
• The Victorian Government has announced a plan to fund system upgrades in the 
Goulburn Murray irrigation district and transfer one third or 75 gigalitres of the 
annual water savings to Melbourne. 
Borrowing water: Borrowing water held in storage and paying it back later. A credit 
and debit system monitors exchanges. Examples include: 
• The manager of the Barmah–Millewa Forest Environmental Water Allocation can 
carry over water in storage for several years to flood wetlands. Under certain 
conditions, irrigators are able to borrow water from Environmental Water Allocations 
during drought periods (when it is unlikely that the forest would have naturally been 
flooded) and repay the loan in subsequent years.  
• In 2003, the NSW Government announced a plan to allow irrigators in the 
Macquarie Valley to borrow 60 of the 170 gigalitres of water that was usually set 
aside for town and stock and domestic supplies. 
Sources: ABC News (2003); ACF (2006); Barmah Millewa Forum (nd); Victorian Government (2007a). 
 
 
Markets will often offer the most transparent, equitable and economically efficient 
approach for transferring water among alternative uses and users (table 4.1). Markets 
reveal the values different water users place on a marginal unit of water and therefore 
provide a comparable and transparent basis for allocating water resources. In contrast, 
regulation does not directly compare the marginal benefits across alternative uses but relies 
on determinations that are more subjective.  
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Table 4.1 Modes of water exchange between rural and urban water users 
Mode of 
exchange 
Efficiency Transparency Equity 
Regulation  • Does not explicitly reveal 
or compare marginal 
benefits across uses. 
• Planning processes can 
play an important part in 
reallocating water to 
environmental flows, 
particularly where no water 
market exists to source 
additional water.  
• Infrequent and often costly 
negotiation to achieve 
changes. 
• Relies on subjective 
determination about 
marginal benefits of 
water in alternative 
uses. 
• May involve mandatory 
transfers, creating 
winners and losers. 
Borrowing 
water 
• Where there is no 
opportunity for trade, 
enabling voluntary 
borrowing and lending 
within the regulatory 
system may improve 
efficiency by making both 
sides better off. 
• Does not reveal 
marginal benefits of 
water in alternative 
uses. 
• Can favour water users 
who borrow water during 
a drought, when the 
market price of water is 
high, and pay water back 
in wet years, when the 
market price of water is 
low. 
Indirect 
purchases 
(water 
savings) 
• May be more cost-effective 
than water supply options 
in urban areas. 
• Not likely to be optimal as 
per megalitre cost of water 
savings in rural areas is 
generally much greater 
than prices in water 
markets.  
• Real water savings 
(that is, those that do 
not reduce water 
supply in other parts 
of the system) can be 
hard to measure and 
verify. Deals to secure 
water are often 
complex with several 
different components. 
• Can negatively affect 
water availability to other 
water users where water 
savings are illusory (for 
example, when water 
savings result in reduced 
groundwater availability). 
 
Water 
markets (for 
water 
entitlements, 
seasonal 
allocations 
and 
derivative 
products) 
• Markets can facilitate a 
socially optimal allocation 
of water given there are 
measures in place to deal 
with differences in water 
delivery, treatment and 
external costs, and 
environmental flows. 
• Often, there is a trade-off 
in market design between 
realising available gains 
from trade and transaction 
costs.  
• Dynamically reallocate 
water in response to 
changing circumstances 
over time, most of which 
cannot be easily or 
accurately forecast.  
• Revealed prices 
reflect marginal 
private benefit across 
different uses.  
• Involves voluntary 
exchanges between 
buyers and sellers and 
will only occur when 
mutual benefits are 
expected.  
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Markets give water users the opportunity, but not obligation, to engage in 
mutually-beneficial transfers with other water users, whereas other modes of exchange can 
mandate transfers without compensation reflecting the marginal benefit of water removed. 
In this sense, markets are a more equitable approach for reallocating water than other 
modes of exchange.  
Prices revealed in well-functioning and integrated water markets provide a coordinating 
role to achieve an efficient allocation of water. They also provide signals to private sector 
investors about water investment choices such as building a desalination plant, recycling 
water and investing in water saving technology (Freebairn 2005b). Other forms of 
exchange, such as indirect purchases, can lead to inefficiencies by resorting to high-cost 
alternatives to source water. For example, past efforts by governments to source water for 
environmental purposes through infrastructure upgrades have, in several cases, seen them 
pay many times the market price for water (PC 2006b). 
Despite their drawbacks, non-market approaches to transferring water will be important 
where no water market exists and the transaction costs from establishing a market are high 
relative to the expected benefits. Further, indirect purchases of water sometimes have 
positive external benefits, such as salinity mitigation and enhanced service delivery to 
irrigators. In many cases, market approaches can operate together with non-market 
approaches. For example, governments use a mix of regulatory controls, indirect purchases 
and market purchases to provide water for environmental purposes.  
Water transfers, and in particular water markets, could prove useful in providing flexibility 
to the management of urban water supplies (box 4.2). Chapter 5 discusses water supply 
planning in more detail.  
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Box 4.2 Rural water markets as part of the urban water supply portfolio 
Water utilities and water users are increasingly looking at opportunities to balance 
supply security and costs by developing a portfolio of options with different supply 
characteristics. Water purchases from rural areas could prove useful in this regard. For 
example: 
• there is scope to ramp up or down the scale of water purchases at short notice (for 
example, through seasonal purchases)  
• purchasing water from connected systems involves few sunk investments (for 
example, water can be traded back to rural water users if it turns out that it is not 
needed in urban centres) 
• a mix of water ‘products’ can help balance supply security and cost (for example, 
entitlements and long–term contracts could help meet base level water demand 
whereas opportunistic purchases on spot markets could help manage more variable 
demand)  
• purchases expand supply sources and therefore provide greater supply security  
• transfers help diversify supply risk if inflows into urban and rural dams are weakly 
correlated 
• prices of direct purchases in rural markets create a benchmark for assessing the 
cost-effectiveness of water saving investments 
• water market design is flexible and government can roll markets out incrementally.  
 
Gaining insights from rural water reforms 
Reforms to the rural water sector have seen a move toward establishing tradeable property 
rights to water that are separate from infrastructure access rights and water-use licence 
conditions (PC 2006b). This has provided increased flexibility to address specific water 
management issues such as water trade, infrastructure provision and external effects from 
water use. 
A key issue for policymakers is determining the extent to which urban reforms should 
replicate recent rural water reforms. Differences in the nature of urban and rural water 
markets, such as the number, proximity and consumption of water users, will make some 
rural reforms less transferable to an urban context than others. There may also be lessons 
from implementing rural reforms that highlight areas for improvement.  
Rural–urban trade is not contingent on replicating rural property right reforms in an urban 
setting. By undertaking institutional reforms that facilitate competition in urban water 
supply generally (chapter 6) and ensuring that policies preventing rural–urban transfers are 
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retained only if supported by sound cost–benefit analysis, governments could provide 
scope for supply agreements or spot markets to emerge.  
Opportunities for further integration of urban and rural water  
Melbourne and Adelaide already access water from river systems that have water markets 
and there are no physical constraints preventing them purchasing at least some water from 
irrigators. Adelaide draws water from the River Murray, where irrigator water entitlements 
(in South Australia and upstream states) exceed 4000 gigalitres (Hamstead 2006). 
Melbourne shares the Thomson Dam with Southern Rural Water, which has a bulk 
entitlement providing a 45-gigalitre share of storage capacity and a 6 per cent share of its 
inflows (Melbourne Water 2006b).3  
Perth accesses its water supply from the Integrated Water Supply Scheme, which connects 
with multiple groundwater and surface water sources in south–west Western Australia. 
Perth’s water supplier, Water Corporation, has negotiated to transfer 17 gigalitres in water 
entitlements from rural supplier Harvey Water, based on the recovery of system losses by 
replacing open channels with pipelines (Water Corporation 2006). Opportunities for 
further water trade include from Harvey Irrigation Area, Wellington Dam and the 
Gnangara Mound (Thomas 2007).  
There are opportunities to establish or expand physical connections between urban and 
rural water sources. The costs of different projects vary substantially (chapter 5). The most 
economically feasible opportunities are in Adelaide, Melbourne and Canberra, which are 
close to major irrigation districts. Sydney and Brisbane have more costly opportunities 
(Hamstead 2006) (box 4.3). 
The capacities of existing and planned rural–urban connections are often small relative to 
overall water use in rural areas. For example, the 100 gigalitre annual capacity of the 
Sugarloaf (Goulburn River–Melbourne) pipeline is only approximately 5 per cent of 
annual water entitlements under Goulburn Murray Water, before taking into account 
planned water savings (DSE 2007a; GMW 2006).4 An exception is the Thomson dam in 
Victoria, which has a much higher share of storage dedicated to urban supplies than 
irrigator entitlements.  
                                                 
3 There is also an environmental bulk entitlement in the Thomson dam. The entitlement defines a 
minimum flow schedule and provides 10 gigalitres of annual inflows. Releases of the 10-gigalitre 
share are at times that achieve optimal river health. Melbourne Water (2006b) notes releases for 
environmental and irrigation purposes have been minimal since October 1997 due to the drought. 
4 In practice, transfers may be limited to 75 gigalitres per year. The Victorian Government has 
noted that the treatment plant at Sugarloaf Reservoir cannot handle any more than 75 gigalitres 
per annum above its current volume. 
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Box 4.3 Examples of opportunities to increase physical connection 
between urban and rural water markets 
Opportunities to increase physical connection between urban and rural water markets 
vary across capital cities:  
• In 2004, the SA Government (2004, p.2) identified purchasing water from irrigators 
in the River Murray as ‘the most economical means of providing large volumes of 
additional water to Adelaide’. Three different scenarios were proposed, two of which 
would require upgrades to pump stations and interconnection between the northern 
and southern systems of Adelaide. Projects ranged from smaller scale transfers of 
up to 25 gigalitres at up to $33 million in capital costs to transfers of 40 to 
80 gigalitres at up to $230 million in capital costs. 
• The Victorian Government recently announced plans to construct a 70-kilometre 
pipeline connecting the Goulburn River with Melbourne’s Sugarloaf dam with 
pumping capacity of 100 gigalitres per year. Previous proposals to connect 
Melbourne to the Goulburn system include Black River–Thomson pipe (70 gigalitres 
per year) and Big River–Upper Yarra pipe (80 gigalitres per year). The Victorian 
Government has estimated the Sugarloaf pipeline will have a capital cost of 
$750 million. The Victorian Government also plans to construct pipelines connecting 
Melbourne with Geelong (16 gigalitres per year) and the proposed desalination plant 
in Wonthaggi (200 gigalitres per year). There are also plans to reconnect Tarago 
Reservoir in Gippsland (15 gigalitres) to Melbourne’s water supply system.  
• Canberra’s water supplier ACTEW has investigated several options to purchase up 
to 50 gigalitres of irrigators’ water entitlements held in Tantangarra dam on the 
Murrumbidgee (NSW) and piping it to Canberra’s storages. One option involves 
building a $70 million pipeline at Angle Crossing (linking the Murrumbidgee and 
Googong Dam) that could transfer up to 20 gigalitres of water per year.  
• In addition to the existing option to transfer water from the Shoalhaven, Sydney 
could potentially access water from the Hunter River and the Murrumbidgee. 
However, little information exists on the feasibility or cost of these projects.  
• Perth’s water supplier, Water Corporation, outlined plans for a 100-kilometre 
pipeline to transfer 45 gigalitres annually from the South–West Yarragadee Aquifer. 
These plans pre-dated the decision to proceed with the southern seawater 
desalination project as Perth’s next major water resource.  
• Brisbane could potentially access water from irrigators in Bundaberg, which is 
located in the Burnett River area. However, the limited amounts of water available 
and the cost of the 300 kilometre pipeline to Brisbane from Bundaberg would likely 
be prohibitive. The Queensland Government has commenced construction of a 
water grid comprising a network of pipelines connecting major bulk water sources in 
south east Queensland. 
Sources: ABC News (2007c); ACTEW (2005); Hamstead (2006); Marsden Jacob Associates (2006); 
QWC (2007c); South Australian Government (2004); Victorian Government (2007a); Water Corporation 
(2005a); WRSCMA (2001).  
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In contrast, the capacities of existing and planned rural–urban connections are generally 
large relative to water use in urban areas. The Goulburn River–Melbourne pipeline would 
provide the equivalent of 23 per cent of Melbourne’s recent annual supply (431 gigalitres) 
if run at its full capacity of 100 gigalitres per year (NWC 2007a).  
Hydrologic constraints will influence the timing and volume of rural–urban water transfers. 
For example, transmission losses, which are influenced by the water users’ proximity to 
water storages, climatic conditions and the type of conveyance system used (that is, rivers 
or pipes), could make some rural–urban transfers either very costly or infeasible.  
4.2 Exploring alternative institutional models of 
integration 
There is a range of institutional approaches to integrating urban and rural water markets. 
Limited integration is a basic model of trade with a small number of market participants, 
namely urban and rural water utilities. Intermediate and full integration build on that model 
with progressively more complex trading arrangements, involving more market 
participants (irrigators, large urban water users, households) and expanded trading 
possibilities.  
Limited integration 
A simple approach to establishing integrated urban and rural water markets is to enable 
only water utilities to trade water (figure 4.1). Examples of potential trades under a limited 
trading approach include: 
• an urban water utility could purchase water savings from a rural utility to refill urban 
dams over a number of years 
• a rural water utility could purchase water on a seasonal basis from an urban water 
utility during very dry years. 
Some ad hoc water trades between water utilities have already occurred. In 1997, for 
example, Melbourne Water transferred 49 500 megalitres from Thomson Dam to Southern 
Rural Water when rights in the Macalister Irrigation District were otherwise in danger of 
not being fully met (DNRE 2001).  
Water available for rural water utilities to sell to urban water utilities may be limited. In 
Victoria, for example, although bulk water entitlements are tradeable, rural water utilities 
are obliged to meet irrigators’ water entitlements, which, in reality, are what constitute the 
tradeable right. Consequently, often the only part of the bulk entitlement that the rural 
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utility can trade is the allowance for distribution losses. If a water utility can reduce 
distribution losses, it can claim the water savings as a tradeable entitlement (DNRE 2001).  
Figure 4.1 Limited tradea 
Rural water 
utility
Urban water 
utility (fully 
integrated) 
Large urban 
water users
Small urban 
water usersIrrigators
 
a Unbroken lines indicate either party could be a buyer or seller of water. Dashed lines represent purchases 
by the final water users. If the urban and rural water suppliers draw on a common dam, the transfer of water 
from an irrigator to a large urban user may only involve an administrative amendment to the water register.  
In some cases, rural water utilities also have (or have had) access to unallocated water that 
they could trade. In Queensland, rural water utilities have been able to auction unallocated 
water to irrigators (ACIL 2003). In Victoria, the Government converted ‘sales’ water 
within the Goulburn Murray Water Irrigation Area to legally-recognised entitlements and 
allocated 20 per cent (an average 120 gigalitres per year) to environmental flows. In 
consideration of the agreement with farmers to release a 20 per cent share of sales water, 
the Government agreed to a $93 million funding package that included system upgrades 
(DSE 2007b).5 In the latter example, assigning or re-classifying ‘sales’ water to achieve 
environmental objectives may limit (rightly or wrongly) scope for future trades between 
urban and rural water utilities. 
The ability of urban utilities to trade water to the rural sector is subject to similar 
constraints. Although urban bulk entitlements do not represent a collection of individual 
water entitlements, urban water utilities are obliged to satisfy supply security targets. 
However, assuming a connection exists and the urban water utility can demonstrate that it 
would be able to meet its supply obligations, there may be scope to trade water to rural 
users. 
A risk associated with this limited integration approach is that it could heavily focus on 
water saving projects at the expense of market transactions in a similar way to recent 
environmental water sourcing programs. The per megalitre costs of several infrastructure 
                                                 
5 The package was also to recognise the recovery of an additional 25 gigalitres of high reliability 
water from reconfiguration of irrigation water supply infrastructure (DSE 2007b). 
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projects for the Living Murray Initiative, for example, were well above market prices of 
water (PC 2006b).  
Intermediate integration 
Another option for integrating urban and rural markets is to enable trade among urban and 
rural water utilities and large water users, such as irrigators, industry and environment 
service providers (figure 4.2). Examples of trading opportunities under ‘intermediate 
integration’ include:  
• a willing rural seller and a willing urban buyer could enter a once-off deal 
• an urban water utility could allow large water users (such as parks and sports facilities) 
exemptions from water restrictions in return for purchasing rural entitlements as an 
offset  
• an urban water utility could enter into option contracts with irrigators allowing the 
urban utility to exercise the right to purchase water according to a pre-arranged trigger. 
Some states have taken steps toward intermediate integration. For example: 
• SA Water purchased approximately 18.4 gigalitres of water from dairy farmers in the 
Lower Murray Swamps for metropolitan water supplies6 (SA Water 2005)  
• the Queensland Water Commission (QWC 2007c) has foreshadowed arrangements in 
south east Queensland to provide the opportunity to allow trading between the new 
water grid manager and rural users  
• regional urban water utility, Coliban Water, has constructed a pipeline to transfer up to 
20 gigalitres of water per year from willing sellers in the Goulburn irrigation system to 
Bendigo and other urban centres (Coliban Water 2007). 
A means of facilitating water trade between rural and large urban water users is through 
trade in entitlements. This could involve establishing a new urban entitlement system, 
whereby all large urban water users receive a share of a specific water source, which they 
can trade with each other and rural water users. A more modest (and probably less costly) 
approach would be enabling ad hoc entitlement purchases by large urban water users in 
rural markets to meet their supplementary water needs. 
                                                 
6 SA Water’s purchase, while very similar to a limited model, constitutes a move away from 
limited trade among only water utilities. In 2003, a group of dairy farmers on the lower reaches 
of the River Murray approached the South Australian Government, through SA Water, to sell 
their water allocations and land. SA Water committed to purchase 18.4 gigalitres of entitlements 
and about 300 hectares of associated land for almost $27 million. SA Water purchased these 
allocations on ‘a commercial basis on the open market’ (SA Water 2005, p. 14). 
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Figure 4.2 Intermediate integrationa  
Rural water 
utility
Integrated urban 
water utility or 
separate water 
retailer(s)
Large urban 
water users
Small urban 
water usersIrrigators
 
a Unbroken lines indicate either party could be a buyer or seller of water. Dashed lines represent purchases 
by the final water users. If the urban and rural water suppliers draw on a common dam, the transfer of water 
from an irrigator to a large urban user may only involve an administrative transaction to the water register. 
The Victorian Government and Melbourne water utilities are investigating the feasibility of 
establishing a market among large urban water users (Dunckley 2007; Farrier Swier 
Consulting 2007). The Victorian Government has flagged that a system replicating key 
aspects of the existing markets for farmers could be in place by 2010 (Hughes 2007). If it 
proceeds, it may be possible to extend the framework to rural–urban trade. 
If large urban water users receive tradeable entitlements, they would be able to earn 
scarcity rents. (This contrasts with the limited model in which the entitlement and scarcity 
rents reside with the water utility.) Therefore, the method of apportioning entitlements 
would have equity or ‘distributional’ implications. Some important issues include:  
• the approach to apportioning rights (such as grandfathering based on history of use, 
uniformly distributing rights by user class or auctioning entitlements)  
• the definition of urban water rights (including allocation of supply risk).  
Enabling large urban water users to trade entitlements would also call for establishing a 
water register to monitor holdings and transfers. According to the National Water 
Commission (NWC) Working Group on Compatible Registers (NWCWGCR 2005), the 
National Water Initiative mandates compatible, publicly accessible, and reliable water 
registers covering all water access entitlements and trades. The NWC Working Group 
interprets compatibility as applying in a ‘direct sense … within and between States and 
Territories, where water systems are physically shared or hydrologic connections and water 
supply considerations will permit water trading’, as well as in a broader sense of providing 
‘more confidence for those investing in the water industry through better and more 
compatible registry arrangements’ (NWCWGCR 2005, p. 3).  
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Alternatively, large urban water users could access water from rural water users through 
supply contracts, without the need to establish urban water entitlements (box 4.4). For 
example, a contract could stipulate that the rural entitlement holder will supply a certain 
volume or share of their water each year, at an agreed price.  
Enabling private water traders to trade into and out of urban markets would require 
granting access to water infrastructure. There are currently several impediments to third 
party access in the urban water sector, such as infrastructure pricing and health and safety 
issues. These impediments are relevant to all private sector competitors seeking to enter the 
urban water sector, such as desalination and recycling plant operators, not just those 
wanting to trade water under existing entitlements. Chapter 6 discusses these issues further 
in terms of encouraging competition in the urban water sector.  
An intermediate model could capture much of the available gains from rural–urban trade 
by better aligning the marginal benefit of water across different uses. It would expose large 
urban water users and urban water utilities to competitive prices in rural markets. If 
variable water charges to urban households reflected the marginal cost of water purchases, 
these price signals could potentially pass through to urban households. Over time, rural and 
urban market prices could converge closer toward a price that is aligned with a social 
optimal allocation of water.7  
If urban water users were able to purchase water from irrigators directly, and vice versa, 
the trading opportunities of irrigators would expand. It is likely more trade would occur 
than under a limited approach that relied predominantly on trading water savings.  
                                                 
7 Some regional variation in prices is likely to occur due to transport losses — though there will be 
a tendency to equality of prices net of losses — and hydrologic constraints. 
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Box 4.4 Urban entitlements versus supply contracts 
Establishing an urban water entitlement system is likely to impose significant 
transactions costs, which may be large relative to the expected gains from rural–urban 
water trade. However, some rural–urban transfers could occur without an urban 
entitlement system. Urban water users, for example, could potentially access water on 
a temporary basis from rural water suppliers and manage supply security through 
supply contracts. Like trade in entitlements, supply contracts could involve different 
levels of the water supply chain including wholesalers, retailers and end users.  
Supply contracts could be a substitute for trade in entitlements for achieving more 
efficient water use. Some important considerations would be: 
• the tenure of contracts relative to entitlements 
• the legal status and obligations of contracts relative to entitlements 
• transferability of contracts 
• the transaction costs associated with negotiating contracts.  
Ongoing supply contracts, combined with one-off purchases of seasonal allocations, 
could also be an interim measure before committing to a water trading system involving 
tradeable urban entitlements with large upfront costs. Supply contracts would offer an 
opportunity to gain experience with rural–urban water transfers and provide flexibility 
by postponing the large (sunk) investment associated with establishing a more 
complex trading framework.  
Other factors influencing the efficiency of supply contracts, which equally apply to trade 
in entitlements, include: 
• who can participate in trade (industrial users, retailers, brokers, households) 
• where the trade involves an intermediary water supplier, how the water supplier 
passes on the costs to consumers (average cost, marginal cost). 
A report on the feasibility of establishing a large water user market in Melbourne 
recommended against establishing urban delivery entitlements, and instead suggested 
that a possible end point for reform is a physical spot market with a forward contract 
market (Farrier Swier Consulting 2007). Among other things, the report argued that the 
alternative model would enable large water uses to better manage risks and control 
transaction costs by allowing them to choose their level of participation in the market.   
 
Full integration  
If the limited model represents one end of the market integration spectrum, the other 
extreme would involve enabling urban households or residents to trade water. This could 
occur through a comprehensive property right system for urban water users or through 
supply contracts with rural suppliers.  
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Many different approaches to introducing household trade are possible. For example, 
households could interact with the rural market through private brokers or directly trade in 
electronic spot markets (figure 4.3). Regardless of the approach, the main aim of household 
water trade would be to facilitate efficient consumption and investment decisions by 
establishing prices that reflect the value for water in urban areas in times of scarcity.  
Figure 4.3 Full integrationa 
Rural water 
utility
Integrated urban 
water utility or 
separate  water 
retailer(s)
Large urban 
water users
Small urban 
water usersIrrigators
Urban household market
 
a  The unbroken lines indicate either party could be a buyer or seller of water. The dashed lines represent 
purchases by the final water users. If the urban and rural water suppliers draw on a common dam, the transfer 
of water from an irrigator to a large urban user may only involve an administrative amendment to the water 
register. This diagram represents the situation where urban households are supplied though supply contracts 
and do not have tradeable entitlements. 
Household entitlements 
Most work on tradeable household entitlements has been within the context of a discrete 
urban water market without rural participants (Young, McColl and Fisher 2007) 
(chapter 6). There has been little, if any, detailed investigation into the merits of enabling 
urban households to trade with rural water users.  
Support for urban household entitlements within a discrete urban market has so far been 
lukewarm. Arguments against household entitlements in a discrete urban market include:  
• the cost of establishing and administering entitlements for small customers would be 
prohibitively high (Allen Consulting Group 2007)  
• it is unclear whether household water entitlements would deliver sufficient benefits 
above those provided by a centrally set scarcity price to justify the likely higher set up 
and administrative costs  
• households’ incentives to trade water may be small given water’s small share of overall 
household expenditure (chapter 2).  
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As with intermediate integration, introducing household entitlements would have equity 
implications. For example, allocating rights on a per household basis would discriminate 
against households with more residents. On the other hand, there are likely to be practical 
difficulties in allocating rights at the resident level, such as metering and tracking changes 
in tenancy (chapter 3).  
Household supply contracts 
Theoretically, urban households could purchase water from a rural supplier, such as a rural 
water utility, through supply contracts. To minimise transaction costs, the water supplier 
could offer standardised contracts to households. Supply contracts between rural suppliers 
and urban households may be more feasible than entitlement trade, particularly if 
governments adopt a competitive model to urban water supply more generally (chapter 6).  
In practice, the transaction costs associated with coordinating trades between rural 
suppliers and urban households are likely to be high, even with innovations that reduce 
these cost, such as electronic exchanges. The incremental benefits over intermediate 
integration (that is, an urban water retailer purchasing water from rural suppliers and 
passing the cost on to urban households through water charges) are less certain and may be 
relatively modest. 
Summary of advantages and disadvantages of alternative approaches 
The three alternative approaches to integrating urban and rural water markets (limited, 
intermediate and full) embody varying complexity, transaction costs and administrative 
requirements. There may also be equity implications in situations where water users 
receive rights to water. Policymakers need to consider these factors against the incremental 
gains from expanding the range of buyers and sellers in the market. Ultimately, selecting 
the most appropriate model involves balancing additional gains from trade and workability 
(BDA Group 2006).  
Table 4.2 presents potential advantages and disadvantages of the limited, intermediate and 
full integration models. In addition to observing the broad advantages and disadvantages of 
different types of market integration, it is important to recognise that the limited, 
intermediate and full integration approaches could occur through different modes of 
exchange. Each mode of exchange has different implications for economic efficiency, 
transparency and equity.  
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Table 4.2 Preliminary appraisal of three models for market integration 
Model Advantages Disadvantages Example 
Limited  • Feasible within existing 
institutional arrangements.  
• More cost effective than 
several other water supply 
options for cities.  
• Likely to rely on water 
savings, which (assuming 
water savings are ‘true’ 
savings and can be 
accurately measured) can 
have smaller third-party 
effects than direct trading.a  
 
• Protracted bilateral 
negotiations would result in 
high transaction costs.  
• Transfers are less 
transparent than in 
competitive water markets. 
• Likely to rely on water 
savings, which can have a 
high cost per megalitre 
relative to the market price 
for water entitlements and 
can have third-party effects 
by reducing water available 
elsewhere in the system 
(that is, the purported water 
savings are 
illusory)(table 4.1). 
• Urban water 
utility (or 
government) 
investing in water 
savings and 
transferring part 
of saved water to 
cities. (For 
example, 
Modernising 
Victoria’s Food 
Bowl 2007 ). 
Intermediate • Feasible within existing 
institutional arrangements. 
• Exposes large urban water 
users to competitive market 
prices in rural areas. 
• If variable urban water 
charges reflected the 
marginal cost of purchasing 
rural water, an intermediate 
model could enable more 
efficient consumption 
signals to urban 
households.  
• Potential adjustment 
pressures if urban 
purchasers are large relative 
to rural markets. 
 
• Purchasing 
entitlements from 
irrigators in water 
markets (for 
example, 
Murray–Darling 
Basin 
Commission 
environmental 
water purchases 
to meet Living 
Murray target). 
Full • Establishes a scarcity value 
in urban areas, which can 
inform more efficient supply 
augmentation, water 
consumption and investment 
decisions. 
• May involve major 
institutional changes.  
• Trade based on household 
entitlements is likely to 
involve high transaction 
costs due to complexity. For 
example, a large number of 
market participants would 
make managing a water 
register more 
cumbersome.b,c 
• There would be practical 
difficulties in allocating rights 
and metering per person or 
per business.b 
• Potential equity issues at 
household level depending 
on how allocations are set.b 
• na 
a Assuming there is no intervention or reforms to property rights that reduce third-party effects from direct 
trade.b Less relevant to supply contracts.c Using brokers could reduce transaction costs. na Not available. 
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4.3 Facilitating efficient rural–urban water trades 
Facilitating rural–urban water markets would involve a number of implementation issues. 
Some would apply even under limited forms of rural–urban trade. Others, although 
relevant to limited forms of trade, would likely become more pressing if rural–urban trade 
expanded and governments introduced further reforms to promote the development of 
competitive market structures. 
Cost–benefit analysis of government policies that restrict trade 
An initial step for facilitating rural–urban trade would be to make policies (or decisions) 
that restrict rural–urban transfers more transparent and subject to cost–benefit analysis. 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2006) noted that identifying the extent to which restrictions 
have curtailed rural–urban transfers is difficult because there are generally few legislative 
restrictions to such trade and governments do not extensively document their policy 
positions on the issue. Nevertheless, water service providers and others have 
acknowledged political reticence to take advantage of rural–urban transfers as a source of 
urban water supplies and some policymakers appear to discourage it (Marsden Jacob 
Associates 2006, Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006).  
A suggested motive for opposing rural–urban transfers is a desire to ensure water remains 
in agriculture, thereby protecting rural areas from further structural adjustment 
(Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006). These arguments sometimes overlook the fact that 
introducing new urban customers for water in rural storages enhances the property rights of 
irrigators and increases the value of their assets.  
To enable efficient trade, restrictions should be subject to rigorous and transparent cost–
benefit analysis and regular review. This would imply clearly articulating, and where 
possible quantifying, the economic, social and environmental benefits and costs from 
maintaining restrictions. 
Addressing potential distortions to rural–urban water trade  
Several factors could distort market outcomes. These include: 
• third-party effects on supply reliability 
• environmental externalities  
• differences in infrastructure charges between trading regions 
• differences in levels of cost recovery between trading regions. 
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The significance of these factors, and appropriate management responses, will vary from 
case to case.  
Third-party effects on supply reliability  
Rural–urban trade could have third-party effects on supply reliability and environmental 
flows due to the incomplete specification of water entitlements. For example, return flows 
— the water that returns to the river system through run-off and seepage from the farm — 
can be an important factor influencing water availability (and quality) downstream. 
Because the specification of water entitlements is often in terms of gross water use rather 
than net water use, however, it does not account for changes in return flows due to water 
trade and land use change. Therefore, it would not account for a reduction in return flows, 
and consequent third-party effects, from rural–urban trade.  
The extent of third-party effects from reduced return flows will depend partly on where 
rural–urban transfers occur. Adelaide, for example, is located at the end of the southern 
Murray–Darling system so there is probably less scope for third-party effects from reduced 
return flows downstream. Melbourne, on the other hand, would divert water from the upper 
reaches of the southern Murray–Darling system. Hence, all else equal, there is more scope 
for water transfers to have third-party effects on downstream water users through reduced 
return flows. (In reality, other considerations, such as changes in conveyance losses 
because of trade, will also affect supply reliability to third parties — see below).  
The amount of additional water cities are likely to source from rural areas is also important 
in determining the extent of third-party effects from reduced return flows. Adelaide and 
Melbourne, for example, would probably each source less than the equivalent of 5 per cent 
of total water entitlements in the southern Murray–Darling Basin. Capacity constraints 
would likely limit the quantities much above this amount in the short term. If transfers to 
Melbourne and Adelaide are highly secure, however, water sourced for urban supplies as a 
proportion of water available from rural sources in southern Murray–Darling Basin may be 
considerably larger than 5 per cent in drier years.  
Indirect purchases of water savings could potentially exacerbate the third-party effects 
from rural–urban transfers. One of the purported benefits of water saving investment over 
market purchase is that it avoids reductions in rural water use by creating ‘new’ water. 
However, water ‘savings’ associated with indirect purchases can be illusory. That is, 
measures to reduce system losses actually divert water from other beneficial uses, 
elsewhere in the system, that rely on return flows (PC 2006b). For example, total channel 
control is a water delivery technology that uses automated control gates to reduce irrigation 
district outfalls and improve service quality. However, district outfalls often supply 
downstream water users. Transferring entitlements out of the system based on illusory 
water savings can therefore ‘double up’ losses in return flows. 
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In some instances, water saving investments will result in ‘true’ water savings. That is, 
they will reduce water losses to evaporation or accessions to saline groundwater. If there is 
a way of accurately measuring these water savings, transferring entitlements based on true 
water savings may actually have smaller third-party effects than transferring existing 
entitlements. However, these water savings are likely to be far less cost effective than 
direct purchases. Many water saving projects, for example, have a per megalitre cost 
several times the market price for entitlements (PC 2006b).  
There are a number of ways to address these third-party effects from return flows. 
Approaches that are more complex include defining all entitlements on a net water use 
basis or imposing charges on all water transfers to reflect changes in downstream water 
availability. Alternatively, government might opt for some sort of compensation. The 
Victorian Government, for example, is planning to transfer 75 gigalitres per year of water 
savings from the Goulburn region to Melbourne. At the same time, it will provide another 
75 gigalitres each to rural and environmental uses.  
It is important to keep the effects that rural–urban water trade has on return flows in 
perspective. Water transfers are not the only urban water supply option that will have third-
party effects on other water users. New dams, for example, will likely have far larger and 
more concentrated effects on inflows into downstream storages than water trade.  
Trade in water entitlements that define supply at the point of delivery rather than the 
source of extraction can also create third-party effects to supply reliability. Instances where 
third-party effects might arise include:  
• where trade in entitlements does not recognise differences in supply reliability 
specifications between sources  
• water users with entitlements from the same source share the conveyance losses or 
gains resulting from trade (Heaney and Beare 2001).  
Heaney et al. (2006) have analysed different policy response for dealing with these issues.  
Environmental and other externalities  
In addition to addressing third-party effects on supply reliability, efficient allocation of 
water may also involve addressing other externalities associated with water storage, use 
and supply, such as salinity and nutrient discharge. Available options include regulatory 
measures (such as conditions in water-use licences) as well as market-based mechanisms 
(such as tradeable permits). For general discussion of environmental externalities and 
market mechanisms, see PC (2006b). Dwyer et al. (2006) explore issues surrounding 
charges for water-related externalities in a rural (irrigation) context. 
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Differences in structure of infrastructure charges between trading regions 
Studies of rural water markets have shown that the level and form of water delivery 
charges levied by water utilities can affect outcomes from interregional water trade. This is 
because incentives for trade can arise from differences in the marginal value of water and 
variable delivery charges between regions (Heaney et al. 2004). In other words, the net 
marginal value of water beyond variable delivery costs drives water users’ incentives to 
trade.  
In some cases, differences in variable water delivery charges may reflect differences in the 
nature of supply systems. Urban and rural infrastructures, for example, have vastly 
different cost structures. Similarly, delivering water in a gravity-fed irrigation system will 
be less expensive than in a pressurised system (Heaney et al. 2004). Differences in delivery 
charges that reflect true variable costs do not distort trade.  
If variable delivery charges do not reflect true variable delivery costs, however, they may 
distort trade. For example, setting variable delivery charges at average cost in one region 
could distort water use and trade incentives in that region relative to other regions that set 
delivery charges at marginal cost, and result in a less efficient allocation of water. Further, 
if a water utility recovers fixed costs through variable delivery charges, it may risk 
stranding its assets (Heaney et al. 2004).8  
Differences in infrastructure charges may also affect rural–urban and urban water trades. 
Many urban water utilities, for example, set variable charges with reference to long run 
marginal cost (LRMC) (chapter 3). Melbourne Water (2006a) noted:  
… if [long run marginal cost] is calculated on a significantly different basis between 
authorities, then this could result in inefficient trading decisions; produce worse 
environmental outcomes; and result in inefficient investment in infrastructure (such as 
pipelines, water storage and sewage treatment facilities). (p.3) 
Melbourne Water (2006a) therefore argued for consistency for calculation of LRMC where 
it affects decision making on water trading. 
                                                 
8 Stranded assets can occur where there is net trade in entitlements out of an area and the remaining 
water users must meet the fixed costs of maintaining and replacing the water delivery 
infrastructure (Roper, Sayers and Smith 2006). These higher charges may in turn cause other 
water users to trade their entitlements out of the system. This situation may arise when an 
inappropriate charging regime is used to recover the costs of delivering water (Heaney et 
al. 2004). Several commentators have examined different options for managing stranded assets 
including long-term contracts and exit fees (for example, ACCC 2006; Goesch et al. 2006; 
PC 2006; Roper, Sayers and Smith 2006). 
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Differences in levels of cost recovery between trading regions 
Differences in levels of cost recovery for water infrastructure can affect trade in 
entitlements. This is because water users’ willingness to pay for entitlements will be 
influenced by the expected net present value of the present and future water allocations 
under entitlement less the expected present and future costs of infrastructure charges 
(Roper, Sayers and Smith 2006). Therefore, a water user who faces water charges that are 
below the full cost of the water infrastructure will have an (artificial) competitive 
advantage over a water user who pays the full cost of infrastructure. 
Although rural–urban trade may be susceptible to distortions from differences in levels of 
cost recovery across regions, it is likely nevertheless that allowing such trade will improve 
efficiency. In particular, government policies that require rural water utilities to achieve a 
lower-bound cost recovery, as opposed to an upper-bound cost recovery that applies to 
urban water utilities, suggest that any distortion would tend to limit rural–urban trade by 
increasing rural water users’ willingness to pay for entitlements compared with urban 
water users.9 Therefore, while rural–urban entitlement trade may allocate less water to 
urban water users than is economically efficient when there are differences in levels of cost 
recovery, it will facilitate a more efficient allocation than under no rural–urban trade.  
Having said this, movement towards consistency in cost recovery among urban and rural 
water utilities will be beneficial in its own right, as it will enable further efficiency gains 
over time.  
 
Water for environmental purposes 
The purpose of integrating water markets is to improve the allocation of water among 
different water uses. To achieve this, it is important that markets are open to all water 
users, including groups wanting to secure water for environment purposes.  
Many of the environmental uses of water have public good properties (Freebairn 2005b). 
Hence, it is desirable that governments take steps to allocate sufficient water to 
environmental services to reflect their value to society. Identifying the social marginal 
benefit of increasing or decreasing environmental flows is complex. Environmental values 
are subject to uncertainty and further work is required in ecological assessments and non-
market valuation of these services. That said, allowing environmental water users to 
participate in water markets has an important advantage in that it provides a mechanism for 
                                                 
9 Assuming trade is mostly from rural water users to urban water users rather than the other way 
around. 
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ensuring future modifications to water allocated to the environment are as explicit and as 
transparent as feasible (Freebairn 2005b). 
Enabling environmental service providers to compete for water on an equal footing with 
rural and urban water users would have benefits for water allocation and investment. First, 
it would reduce waste by enabling environmental service providers to source water more 
cost-effectively. Second, by entering the water markets, environmental service providers 
would tend to increase market prices to better reflect water’s social marginal value.  
Adjustment pressures 
Depending on the relative size of urban and rural water markets, there may be adjustment 
pressures associated with market integration. Dwyer et al. (2005), for example, 
demonstrated that when regions with relatively low levels of water consumption (such as 
Adelaide and Canberra) face shortfalls in water availability and trade with regions that use 
large volumes of water (such as irrigators in the southern Murray–Darling Basin), they 
have little effect on traded prices and quantities. The opposite is true, however, when large 
water users experience shortages and trade with small users. For perspective, adjustment 
pressures resulting from other factors, such as technology change and movements in 
markets for rural commodities and inputs other than water, will often be more important 
than the pressure associated with sales of water. 
Water trade can be an effective tool for managing risk and easing adjustment in rural areas. 
A recent study on the economic and social impacts of water trade in rural water markets, 
for example, noted that water trading increases the parties’ capacity to react to changes in 
circumstances. The report noted further that water trading is a catalyst for change that 
would in any case have happened because of drought, variation in commodity markets and 
rural adjustment (Frontier 2007). 
Where adjustment pressures are significant, there should be consideration of whether 
general programs of support will be sufficient or if there is a need for more targeted 
adjustment assistance. Attention to the design and implementation of market reforms can 
also help minimise adjustment costs (PC 2001).  
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5 New water supplies 
  
Key points 
• Enduring water restrictions in most Australian capital cities have highlighted 
potential weaknesses in water supply planning and investment. Areas of concern 
include apparent failures to: 
– adopt the most cost-effective supply strategies 
– deal adequately with climate variability and uncertainty. 
• Debate about the relative merits of different supply options suggests there is a need 
to develop robust frameworks for assessing supply augmentation, incorporating 
factors such as external effects and options value.  
• Some water planners and/or utilities have adopted measures to better address 
climate variability and uncertainty in water planning (such as scenario-based 
planning) and investment strategies (such as diversification of supply sources). 
• Greater interconnection between, and the introduction of new, water sources and 
the desire to facilitate greater competition in bulk water supply have implications for 
governance arrangements for supply planning and operational coordination of water 
sources.  
• Greater competition in supply to end users would have implications for water 
utilities’ role in managing urban supply security. Access to other water suppliers 
could give urban water users greater flexibility to manage their own supply security. 
• Some governments have committed to large-scale seawater desalination. 
– Desalination generally constitutes a large irreversible investment in supply 
capacity and is subject to considerable uncertainty. 
– Desalination can reduce the supply risk associated with reduced rainfall. 
However, early commitment to desalination can result in loss of flexibility to 
respond to new information, such as rainfall patterns and changes in technology, 
and result in substantially higher supply costs.   
 
5.1 Introduction 
While water transfers from rural water systems enable water users to increase benefits 
from existing resources, in some cities increasing demands on available water (including 
from population growth) will necessitate investing in new water supplies. Like water 
transfers, however, investment in new supplies can be controversial. Balancing the gains in 
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supply security and the costs, including potential environmental and social effects, is 
challenging.  
This chapter discusses investments in new water supplies undertaken by governments, 
water utilities, businesses and households. It describes the different types of new water 
supply, the current approach to water supply investment in Australia, and some key issues 
for ensuring efficient investment. It then discusses these issues with respect to desalination 
investment, which many of Australia’s major cities have either already committed to or are 
contemplating.  
Types of new water supply  
There are several ways to categorise new water supplies. These include: 
• Major augmentation versus micro-solutions — investments range from large-scale 
investments (such as desalination plants) to small-scale investments (such as household 
rainwater tanks) (figure 5.1).  
• Rainfall-dependent versus manufactured water supplies — most existing sources (such 
as dams) are highly dependent on rainfall, whereas manufactured water supplies (such 
as desalination) have little or no reliance on rainfall.  
• Potable supplies and non-potable supplies — some new supplies would augment 
potable water supplies, while others would substitute for potable supplies in particular 
uses, such as watering gardens or industrial processes.  
Although all supply options contribute to overall supply security, each has different supply 
characteristics in terms of: how much, when and where water is available; potential uses; 
infrastructure requirements; and external benefits and costs. For example, stormwater is a 
diffuse source supply that is most plentiful in periods of high rainfall. It is generally for 
non-potable uses and is usually more cost-effective in purpose-built greenfield sites that do 
not require retrofitting (Marsden Jacob Associates 2006). Harvesting stormwater can have 
external effects, such as reducing the amount of (polluted) runoff entering streams and 
rivers. The availability of suitable storage for large-scale stormwater harvest, such as 
aquifers, varies among cities. 
Some forms of supply management do not involve investment in new infrastructure. For 
example, forest thinning in catchments can increase runoff and dam inflows. Further, 
bushfire management can reduce risks to water availability. 
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Figure 5.1 Options for new water suppliesa 
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aDotted lines indicate sources outside shared potable water system. b’Micro-solutions’ describes the physical 
size of specific water technologies or investments rather than their overall importance to total water supply. 
cReducing losses in one part of the water delivery system can sometimes reduce water availability to water 
users elsewhere in the system, particularly in natural conveyance systems, such as rivers. dAlthough the 
purpose of interconnection is often to reallocate existing water rather than create new water, it can increase 
supply capacity to a specific area or city. 
Relationship between new water supplies and water transfers 
In general, water transfers (chapter 4) reallocate Australia’s existing water resources 
among different water users (rural, urban and environmental), whereas new supply 
investment (such as in manufactured water) adds to Australia’s total supply capacity. This 
distinction, however, can sometimes be blurred. For example:  
• Some water transfers involve investing in infrastructure to establish or expand 
interconnection between different water storages, thereby increasing the supply 
capacity to a given region or city.  
• Some forms of supply investment (such as dams) can actually reduce water available 
elsewhere in the system, making them more akin to a reallocation of water than a new 
supply.  
• Some modes of facilitating rural-urban transfers, such as indirect purchase of water 
savings, can increase supply by reducing evaporation or accessions to saline 
groundwater (PC 2006b). 
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Current approach to investing in new water supplies for cities 
As explained in chapter 1, in Australia, urban water users generally rely on state-owned 
water utilities to invest in new water supplies on their behalf. Water utilities implement 
long-term capital programs (and measures for demand management) to balance water 
supply and demand. Investment in new water supplies, as with other forms of 
infrastructure investment, is often ‘lumpy’ in that investments are infrequent, involve a 
large expansion of capacity and require large upfront costs.  
Centralised planning processes guide water utilities’ capital programs. Water supply plans 
typically involve collaboration between State government and water utilities. Plans 
commonly aim to manage demand and supply with reference to objectives relating to the 
frequency, severity and duration of restrictions (Marsden Jacob Associates 2006). The 
decision on how much to invest in new supplies depends in part on the assessment of 
public willingness to accept supply restrictions (for example, aiming to limit restrictions to 
1 in 100 years and 1 in 20 years would generate vastly different investment profiles). 
Planners often use project unit costs, or dollars per megalitre, to prioritise the roll out of 
future supply investments. 
Businesses and households sometimes undertake additional investments to supplement 
water supplied by the water utility — particularly where supplies from the water utility are 
subject to restrictions. Investments typically involve small-scale technologies, such as 
rainwater tanks and recycling systems for non-potable uses. In the longer term, businesses 
and households may also respond to increases in water scarcity by investing in 
technologies or appliances that require less water.  
Governments also provide funding and direct investment in the Australian water industry 
to achieve economic, social and environmental objectives. Activities include providing 
subsidies to households to adopt particular technologies as well as funding, or co-funding 
with water utilities, large-scale investments that affect whole regions (chapter 6).  
5.2 Facilitating efficient investment in new water 
supplies 
Recent dry conditions and water restrictions in many of Australia’s major cities have 
highlighted potential weaknesses in water supply planning and investment. Key areas of 
concern include an apparent failure to adopt the most cost-effective supply strategy by 
exploiting all available supply options and the inability to deal adequately with climate 
variability and uncertainty. With regard to the latter, the National Water Commission has 
noted: 
 … the [National Water] Commission is concerned about disappointing performance 
across most Australian jurisdictions in urban water planning. Urban water shortages in 
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the current drought and the rush to invest in new urban water infrastructure are 
evidence of planning failure. The fundamental NWI outcome of reliable urban water 
supplies has not been delivered. (NWC 2007c, p. 4) 
Cost-benefit analysis of supply options  
Unit cost, or dollars per megalitre, is a commonly used method for assessing the cost 
effectiveness of different supply options (figure 5.2). On this basis, it would appear optimal 
to access more water from lower unit cost supplies, such as rural-urban trades, and less 
from higher unit cost supplies, such as rainwater tanks and desalination.1 In reality, 
however, often the opposite occurs. Rural-urban trades remain relatively rare, several 
major cities have invested in or have announced plans to invest in desalination, and 
governments provide subsidies for rainwater tanks.  
A potential reason why water utilities and governments adopt (or promote) seemingly 
high-cost supply options is because unit costs do not always capture wider benefits and 
costs, or supply characteristics, of different supply options. For example, some planners 
may consider it worthwhile to pay a premium for desalination because it provides 
insurance against reduced water availability from rain-dependent sources. Alternatively, 
governments may veto certain options because of concerns over adverse social or 
environmental effects. 
Another caveat associated with comparing unit costs for individual projects is that it may 
not capture fully the benefits from combining a portfolio of supply (and demand) options 
to minimise supply costs over time. For example, a supply option that provides access to 
large amounts of water at short notice can be highly valuable to a water utility because it 
allows the utility to defer investment until it is more certain the investment is required. In 
such cases, some argue, the investor should assess cost effectiveness at the portfolio level 
rather than the project level.  
To the extent that consideration of external costs and benefits, supply characteristics and 
options value could greatly affect an investment decision, it is important that cost-benefit 
analysis deal with them in a transparent and consistent manner. This is not only important 
from the viewpoint of enhancing public confidence in decision making processes for 
augmenting supply, but also because, in the case of external costs, it might reveal 
innovative solutions for reducing the cost of water supply. For example, a range of 
measures could help mitigate negative environmental effects associated with new supplies 
and rural-urban transfers. Such an approach, which explicitly identifies all relevant factors 
and, where possible, quantifies costs and benefits, contrasts with a tendency of some 
                                                 
1 The relative costs of different supply options can vary greatly depending on the location and 
situation. 
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governments and/or water utilities to preclude particular supply options from consideration 
(BCA 2007; Marsden Jacob Associates 2006; NWC 2006).  
Figure 5.2 Direct costs of water supply and demand options 
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a The study noted that it was sometimes unclear which costs had been included in the calculation of demand 
management costs. It further noted, in some cases, regulatory requirements may avoid the cost of augmenting 
water sources, but increase the cost burden to developers, appliance manufacturers or customers. To analyse 
options from the standpoint of all stakeholders, demand management costs should include the incremental 
costs to business and the community in addition to the costs to the utility. 
Source: Marsden Jacob Associates (2006). 
Dealing with climate variability and uncertainty in supply planning  
Recent studies have identified climate as a major source of risk and uncertainty for water 
supply investment (Marsden Jacob Associates 2006; NWC 2007c). Marsden Jacob 
Associates (2006, p. 18) noted that the treatment of climate risk and uncertainty in different 
planning approaches is reflected in ‘the relative capacity of water supply infrastructure and 
the levels of capital expenditure’ in Australian cities. Characteristics that distinguish 
approaches to climate uncertainty include:  
• recognition of past changes in streamflow and the reliance or rejection of long-term 
streamflows as the best indicator of future streamflow levels and variability 
• the degree to which streamflow projections incorporate CSIRO climate change 
projections  
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• level of service requirements. That is, what probabilities/frequencies, severity and 
duration of water restrictions are appropriate and acceptable (Marsden Jacob Associates 
2006, p. 16). 
In some jurisdictions, entities responsible for water supply planning have made changes in 
response to uncertainties associated with climate and demand growth. Perth’s water source 
plan, for example, includes several measures for incorporating uncertainty (Allen 
Consulting 2007; Marsden Jacob Associates 2006): 
• water planning is based on the climate and streamflow regime since 1997 — this is 
characterised by much lower rainfall than the 100-year rainfall scenario commonly 
used by water planners in other capital cities 
• water planning adopts a target of total sprinkler bans of 0.5 per cent of years (1 in 200 
years) to replace the former target of 3 per cent of years (other Australian capital cities 
commonly adopt a 1 in 25 year sprinkler ban scenario) 
• water planning includes sensitivity analysis in relation to future demand trends and the 
likelihood of meeting demand management targets. 
Although many accept the need to account for climate uncertainty in water supply 
investment, identifying the appropriate response can be problematic. Incorporating 
uncertainty into investment planning requires balancing costs with precaution. The central 
question is what constitutes a reasonable level of precaution and what is wasteful 
investment? As one commentator put it: 
Understanding risk and developing a process for determining when you proceed with 
new infrastructure is important. If you get [decisions on supply capacity] wrong, either 
way, no one will forgive you as the commentators will be equally harsh on ‘white 
elephants’ as they would be on cities not having enough water. (Anon cited in 
Marsden Jacob Associates 2006, p. 18)  
Box 5.1 presents a simplified example to illustrate the challenges that planners face when 
planning supply under uncertainty. The assumptions made in the example correspond 
approximately to the situation for Melbourne. Despite the complexities in getting water 
supply investment ‘right’, recent efforts to take better account of climate uncertainty have 
generated debate and facilitated more informed decision making. For example, the 
Economic Regulation Authority (ERA) of Western  
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Box 5.1 Illustrative example of supply planning under uncertainty 
Melbourne’s water balance (annual water supply less annual water use) after planned 
additions to water supplies and price increases is highly uncertain. The table below 
presents Melbourne’s water balance in approximately 8 to 12 years time under two 
possible scenarios and illustrates a range of possible outcomes. 
Under an optimistic scenario, Melbourne’s water balance increases to 461 gigalitres (or 
148 per cent of annual water use) owing to a large increase in supply from existing 
dams, desalination and water transfers. There is also a significant reduction in water 
consumption due to an increase in the water charge. This scenario assumes annual 
inflows return to the long-term average experienced over the past 100 years; new 
supplies from desalination (150 gigalitres) and water transfers (75 gigalitres) are 
available at full capacity; water use is highly responsive to a doubling in the water 
charge (Brumby 2007); and demand increases from population growth and removal of 
water restrictions are relatively modest.  
Under a pessimistic scenario, annual water supplies still exceed annual consumption 
— by approximately 115 gigalitres (or 24 per cent). It assumes average inflows into 
dams conform to drier conditions experienced over the past ten years; average annual 
water transfers halve because of drier conditions (no further trades occur to meet the 
shortfall); demand is less responsive to the water charge increase; and there are larger 
increases in demand from removing restrictions and from population growth.  
The example does not capture all the complexities of an urban water system. For 
example, there may be scope to vary the timing and scale of new supply augmentation 
to address any surplus or deficit in the water balance. Further, the initial amount of 
water in storage levels will influence investment decisions.  
Hypothetical annual water balance for Melbourne in approximately 8 to 12 years
Pessimistic case Optimistic case
Annual water supply
Inflows into own-catchment dams (a) 413 548
Supply from new investments (desalination and water transfers) 188 225
Total annual water supply (GL) 601 773
Annual water consumption
Consumption (baseline 2006) 446 446
Water charge increase (100 per cent)(b)                                                        -45 -178
Effect from removing water restrictions(c)                                                                     52 32
Demand growth (d)                                                                              32 12
Total annual consumption (GL)                                                                 485 312
Annual water balance (GL) 115 461
Water balance as per cent of annual water consumption 23.7 147.8
Scenario
(a) Baseline supply forecast for 2015 in Water Supply-Demand Stratgey for Melbourne includes supply increase from Tarago Reservoir.
(b) Assumes price elasticities of -0.1 to -0.4 (c) Based on 'demand bounceback' of 42 GL +/-10. Original estimate related to effect of
returning to pre-restrictions behaviour rather than effect of removing restrictions (d) Based on demand growth of 22 GL +/-10. Uncertainty
intervals for demand growth and demand 'bounceback' were added by the Commission.The Melbourne Water Supply-Demand Strategy is
based on 95 per cent supply reliability.      
Source: Estimates based on Water Supply-Demand Strategy for Melbourne 2006-2055.  
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Australia questioned some of the assumptions that underpinned water supply planning for 
Perth. In its final report on its inquiry into the Water Corporation’s tariffs, the ERA noted 
that the Water Corporation based simulation modelling to guide the timing of the South 
West Yarragadee pipeline on the assumptions that: a) average inflows of the past six years 
would continue and b) a one-in-200 year reliability. The ERA suggested that these 
assumptions might be overly cautious (ERA 2007b). 
If institutions that enable greater competition to end users were to emerge so that 
individuals could take out private insurance, the need for government to insure against 
‘worse-case’ outcomes may diminish. However, it is unclear to what extent government 
would see a need to offer some base level of ‘insurance’ that the whole community values, 
and how that could be best delivered. 
The application of ‘real options analysis’ to water supply planning has been an important 
development for dealing with investment uncertainty. Real options analysis focuses on 
maintaining investment flexibility by delaying large irreversible investments that may later 
prove to be less than ideal (ACIL Tasman 2007b) (box 5.2). For example, a real options 
approach to water supply planning might prescribe developing smaller-scale supply 
options that allow more incremental supply investment so that the water utility can gather 
new information, such as on dam inflow patterns or changes in technology, and potentially 
avoid high sunk costs in excess capacity. An important implication of real options analysis 
is that the additional flexibility from avoiding large-scale investments can be sufficiently 
valuable to justify considering augmentation and demand management options with 
relatively high unit costs (ACIL Tasman 2007b).  
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Box 5.2 Real options analysis 
Real options analysis (ROA) is a tool for understanding investments with uncertain 
outcomes. Much of the theory behind ROA originated in financial markets and has 
since extended into other areas such as capital budgeting for investments. The basic 
idea is that opportunities for investment are options — rights, but not obligations, to 
take some action in the future. The decision to undertake an irreversible investment 
essentially ‘kills off’ the option; the decision maker gives up the opportunity of waiting 
for new information that might affect the desirability or the timing of the investment. 
According to ROA, the opportunity cost of a lost option must be included as part of the 
cost of investment. Similarly, the investor should consider the value of new options 
created. The opportunity cost of exercising an option is highly sensitive to uncertainty 
over the future value of the project. 
ROA is an alternative to more conventional approaches to analysing investment 
decisions, such as net present value (NPV), and sometimes can produce significantly 
different results for the value of an investment. Whereas traditional approaches to 
investment (such as NPV) operate on the premise that irreversible investments are 
now-or-never propositions, ROA recognises that investors often can delay investments. 
A key insight from ROA is that remaining flexible can be valuable when uncertainty is 
(at least partially) resolved over time. In a dynamic setting, the question becomes one 
of optimal timing of the investment under uncertainty, or how to exploit the opportunity 
most effectively. 
ROA recognises that investments and expenditure can occur in stages or at smaller 
scale, allowing the investor to review their investment decisions based on updated 
information. In contrast, an NPV analysis might consider the investment as all or 
nothing. The approach the investor uses can influence whether or not the investment 
goes ahead. For example, unlike NPV, ROA recognises that the ability to abandon a 
project during the early stages of investment (exercise the option not to proceed with 
further investment) reduces downside risk if conditions prove unfavourable.  
ROA can operate with a portfolio of investments. For example, an investor may 
develop a number of options in parallel until an identified time in the future, recognising 
they may not exercise all of the investment options. 
ROA has many potential applications. For example, option value can give insight into 
the trade-off between economies of scale and flexibility in utility planning. Building 
large-scale plants can provide economies of scale and reduce per unit costs. However, 
more gradual investment in smaller scale plants would provide flexibility to respond to 
uncertainty in demand growth and developments in alternative technologies. 
Sources: Council of Science and Technology (2005); Dixit, A. and Pindyk, R. (2001).  
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Governance arrangements for sourcing bulk water 
Competition in the provision of bulk water is likely to be an important ingredient for 
balancing water demand and supply at least cost. Notwithstanding the extensive 
involvement of the private sector in providing services to urban water utilities (DPMC 
2006), there is scope for encouraging greater private sector participation in bulk water 
supply by addressing governance arrangements (chapter 6). Some commentators have 
pointed out that the governance arrangements that underpin decisions about which sources 
to develop, when to develop them and how to operate (or ‘dispatch’) supply sources once 
they are in place, can create risks for potential competitors and reduce private sector 
participation in bulk water provision (ERA 2007a).  
In Western Australia, the ERA has proposed the creation of an independent procurement 
entity (IPE) as a means of separating bulk water procurement from the role of the 
government and the state-owned water utility and, in doing so, reducing some of the 
potential risks faced by private sector suppliers. The ERA outlined how introducing an IPE 
could address any real or perceived conflicts of interest for the water utility as a supplier 
and seller of bulk water. These include scope for bias when selecting which sources to 
invest in or ‘dispatch’, as well as exposure to commercially sensitive information when 
approving bids. The ERA noted that the IPE model would also serve to clarify the role of 
government and reduce the risk of political interference in investment decisions:  
Government would provide a set of system security requirements that the IPE would 
then apply. Independence from government provides certainty for the private sector, 
transparency in decision making, and consistency in approach. (ERA 2007a, p. vii) 
ERA noted that governance reforms to enhance competition to supply bulk water for 
Perth’s centralised water supplies could work in tandem with a third party access regime 
that allowed competition for end users outside the formal procurement process.  
The prospect of greater interconnection of water systems and new water supplies, such as 
desalination, has influenced water providers in other states to re-examine existing 
governance arrangements for bulk water supply. For example, there have been proposals 
for a ‘water grid manager’ in south east Queensland and in Melbourne. While these water 
grid manager models (box 5.3) exhibit similarities to the IPE model (for example, in each 
case the new entity plays a key role in supply planning and operational coordination of 
sources), the institutional settings are quite different.  
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Box 5.3 Yarra Valley Water’s proposal for a ‘water grid manager’ 
Melbourne water retailer, Yarra Valley Water (2007), has proposed introducing a new 
entity responsible for the efficient allocation and supply of bulk water. It notes that 
management of bulk water supplies will have ‘the greatest impact on future [water] 
prices’ in Melbourne. Therefore, it is ‘critically important that arrangements are put in 
place that actively manage bulk water supplies in the context of a new desalination 
plant, the Sugarloaf Interconnector and the imminent creation of a Water Grid’ (p. 20). 
Proposed functions of the ‘water grid manager’ included: 
• integration and optimisation of all sources of bulk water (existing dams, 
groundwater, desalinated water and major sources of recycled water) 
• long-term planning for future water supplies 
• managing the transfer of bulk water within the water grid 
• creating the mechanisms (that is, transfer rules) for the efficient transfer of water 
between users 
• establishing storage trigger points for water restrictions with the water grid manager 
making recommendations to government on the appropriate levels of water 
restrictions 
• managing the entry of third parties 
• optimising the transfer of water to produce the lowest overall community cost of 
supplying water.  
South east Queensland has developed its own version of a water grid manager 
(chapter 6, box 6.2). 
Source: Yarra Valley Water (2007).  
 
5.3 Desalination case study 
This case study discusses some of the issues raised above with respect to desalination 
investment. Exploring ways to optimise desalination investment is particularly important 
given large-scale desalination is a relatively new form of water supply in Australia with 
unique characteristics. Further, the Australian and several state governments are planning 
to spend large amounts of public funds on desalination investment in the coming years.  
Desalination investments in Australia’s major cities  
In 2006, Perth became Australia’s first state capital to manufacture water using a 
large-scale desalination plant. Since then, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and 
Queensland have announced plans to construct desalination plants for urban water 
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supplies. Western Australia has also announced plans for a second desalination plant to 
supply Perth (table 5.1).  
Table 5.1 Desalination plants in Australia 
 Capacity per 
year 
Proportion of 
current total 
water supply a 
Capital Cost Effect on typical 
annual water 
bill 
Expected date 
of operation/ 
completion
 GL % $b $/year  
Sydney 91b 17 1.76c 100–110d 2009-2010 
Melbourne 150e 35 3.1f 300g end of 2011 
Adelaide 50 30 1.4h 194i 2012 
Perth (1) 45 17 0.4 44 current 
Perth (2) 50j – 0.95k 30  2011 
Gold Coast 46l 15m 1.2 na end of 2008 
a Total urban water supplied = residential water consumption + commercial and municipal and industrial water 
consumption + other water supplied + municipal irrigation water supplied + bulk water exports. 
Extractions/diversions for urban supplies can be substantially more than water supplied. b Maximum annual 
capacity based on daily capacity. Option to scale up to 182.5 GL/year (500 ML/day). c Total cost comprises 
plant cost ($730 million), seawater intake and outlets ($230 million), distribution pipeline ($500 million), and 
other project costs ($300 million). d Proposed (real) price increase from 2007-08 to 2011-2012. eOption to 
scale up to 200 GL/year. f Includes costs of inlet and outlet tunnels and 200 GL pipe to Melbourne. 
g Commission estimate. Victoria is implementing a suite of water infrastructure projects with a total cost of 
$4.9 billion. The Government expects the total package of measures to double Melbourne water bills (in real 
terms) by 2012. The Government estimated a water and sewerage bill for a typical Melbourne household in 
2005-06 was $473. h Cost comprises $1.1 billion desalination plant and associated infrastructure. i Increase in 
annual bill by 2011. j Option to increase to 100 GL/year capacity. k Includes $315 million required for 
integrating plant into the water supply system. l The Queensland Government has announced plans to 
increase the capacity of the existing project from 125ML/day to 170ML/day. m Plant will deliver water into 
planned south east Queensland water grid. na Not available 
Sources: ABC News (2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2007d); Carpenter (2007); GCD Alliance (2007); GHD (2007); Gold 
Coast Water (2006); Kelton, G. and Owen, M. (2007); NWC (2007a); QWC (2007b); Sydney Water (2007a, 
2007c); Victorian Government (2007b); Water Corporation (2005b, 2007a, 2007b).  
The importance of planned desalination plants (relative to current water use) differs across 
cities. Melbourne’s plant, for example, will provide the equivalent of 35 per cent of 
Melbourne’s current water use, whereas Sydney’s plant will provide the equivalent of 
17 per cent of current water use. In both cases, there is an option to increase plant capacity 
later. 
Costs and benefits of desalination 
Desalination is a highly secure source of supply that could provide large-scale supply at 
relatively short notice for most major Australian cities (Marsden Jacob Associates 2006). 
A common argument for desalination investment is that, despite being relatively high cost 
(figure 5.2), it provides ‘insurance’ against the variability of rain-dependent water sources 
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(box 5.4). Another view is that desalination is sometimes the only supply option capable of 
providing sufficient water in time to avert unacceptable risk to water security (see, for 
example, Water Corporation 2007c).  
 
Box 5.4 Is desalinated water more valuable to consumers than natural 
water? 
Once water is in storage (or the water supply system), a litre of water from a 
desalination plant has the same value as a litre of natural water. Does this imply that a 
desalination plant capable of providing 100 gigalitres (GL) per year will provide 
equivalent benefits as a dam that provides an average 100 GL per year? Under 
plausible assumptions the answer is no.  
First, if water users are risk averse, it follows that (all else equal) they will prefer a 
certain water supply to a more variable supply. Hence, they will value the certainty of 
supply from desalination over the variability of annual dam inflows.  
Second, if the marginal value of water is higher in dry years when supplies are limited 
than in wet years, then even risk-neutral water users will prefer the certain 100 GL 
supply to the variable 100 GL supply. This is because the desalination plant can supply 
more than the weather-dependent dam when water is most valued and supply less 
water when water is least valued. Hence, over time, the total value of water supplied 
from the 100 GL desalination plant will be greater than that from the 100 GL dam. 
A corollary is that it is economically sound to invest more to obtain an expected annual 
100 GL of desalination water than to collect an expected 100 GL of natural water. A 
more difficult question to answer is: how much more?   
 
A risk associated with planned desalination investment is that a large proportion of plant 
capacity will remain unused for some time. Higher rainfall would raise dam levels, make 
rainfall-dependent supplies more economical and — in the absence of institutional 
arrangements that commit to sourcing water from desalination regardless of the availability 
of rainfall-dependent supplies — reduce the demands on desalination. In the interim, 
investors in desalination (or consumers) would bear the capital and maintenance costs of 
desalination plant infrastructure. The additional cost would be akin to an insurance 
premium.  
In addition to the financial risks associated with desalination, there are also third-party 
effects to consider. Desalination is energy intensive. Using fossil fuels to power 
desalination would result in considerable greenhouse emissions. Further, desalination 
discharges brine into the marine environment.  
To date, several state governments have indicated they will invest in renewable energy 
sources to offset energy used in desalination plants. The creation of markets to price 
carbon emissions from electricity generation would be a means of internalising the 
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externality. A carbon price would raise further the variable cost of water from desalination 
relative to, say, rainfall-dependent sources.  
Because ecological effects of saline discharges on the marine environment are more 
localised than greenhouse emissions, it is likely management responses will be more 
dependent on conditions at each site. In Victoria, for example, the Environment Protection 
Authority will set an allowable salt concentration for desalination plant discharge 
(Victorian Government 2007b). 
Dealing with climate uncertainty in supply planning  
In some respects, desalination investment is a direct response to climate uncertainty. 
Desalination provides one of the main mechanisms for diversifying urban supply sources 
to include non-rainfall dependent supplies and offers insurance against further reductions 
in long-term rainfall (box 5.5). However, the method of implementing a desalination 
investment can have a substantial effect on overall costs. 
When an investor faces a decision about an irreversible investment subject to uncertainty, 
there is an incentive to delay the investment until better information comes to hand. 
Delaying the investment means the investor maintains flexibility and reduces the 
likelihood of unnecessary sunk costs. However, the longer the investor waits before 
investing, the higher the probability of other costs, such as severe water restrictions. 
Readiness strategies are a means of managing uncertainty associated with large 
investments such as desalination. Readiness strategies have short lead times that allow 
investors to defer expenditure until it is clear to them that further deferral would threaten 
security. Delaying investment can have large benefits, including reducing the opportunity 
cost of maintaining excess capacity. The desalination readiness strategy in the 
Metropolitan Water Plan for Sydney, for example, focussed on undertaking preliminary 
work to enable the desalination plant to come on-line at short notice. This meant that 
Sydney was able to defer commitment of a large portion of investment funds while 
maintaining capacity to respond quickly to continued water scarcity in the future.  
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Box 5.5 Uncertainty, investment planning and desalination  
The benefits from desalination investment are highly dependent on uncertain factors, 
such as climate. This poses challenges for water planners trying to balance supply 
security with costs. Desalination investment could perform well under a very dry 
scenario, but could be a very costly option under a ‘wetter’ scenario. The Victorian 
Government, for example, recently announced plans for 240 gigalitres of new potable 
supplies for Melbourne by 2011. The Victorian Government water plan considered 
average inflows over the past 100, 10 and 3 years, respectively. (The 3-year scenario 
coincides with recent ‘extreme’ dry conditions.) Notably, desalination will account for 
over 60 per cent of the planned addition to Melbourne’s potable supply capacity. Given 
existing investment plans, desalination would likely be necessary to avoid stage 4 
restrictions under the 3-year scenario (see figure below). Under the 100-year scenario, 
however, it is likely that cheaper sources of supply would be available.  
 
Assumptions or judgments that planners make in response to uncertainty can greatly 
influence investment decisions. For example: 
• Scenarios — Brennan (2008) has shown that changing the low-inflow scenario used 
to plan for Perth’s desalination plant (that is, 2001–2006)  to include the ‘wet year’ in 
2000 substantially reduces the expected benefit from the investment.  
• Weights or subjective probabilities — planners may attach subjective probabilities or 
weights to different scenarios. For example, the Victorian Government characterised 
the 3-year scenario as a ‘relatively unlikely scenario’ (2007a, p. 22).  
• Water security targets — supply planners have water security targets (implicit or 
explicit) that they judge to be acceptable to water users. In Perth, the Water 
Corporation noted: 
 … a restriction category that requires a total sprinkler ban is now acknowledged as 
undesirable, and the State has undertaken to develop source capacity to ensure that the 
likelihood of a total sprinkler ban is very small. For planning purposes, the Corporation has 
interpreted “very small likelihood” to mean that a total sprinkler ban will be required in 0.5% 
of years. (p. 7) 
Sources: Brennan (2008); Morris, S. (2008); Victorian Government (2007a); Water Corporation (2005a).  
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Governance arrangements and desalination  
Desalination investment typically involves installing substantial capacity with large 
upfront costs. In addition to the risk of excess capacity in the event of higher rainfall, large-
scale investment in desalination may also eliminate opportunities for competition from 
other suppliers for some time, which could have significant implications for the overall 
cost of meeting supply (ERA 2007a). For this reason, it is important that decisions about 
when to invest in (and dispatch) desalination are impartial, transparent and based on full 
consideration of alternatives. Governance arrangements, such as the ERA’s IPE model, 
could be worth further investigation in this regard.  
Pricing desalinated water supplies  
With centrally-planned water supplies, it is common for regulators (or governments) to set 
variable water charges with reference to the long run marginal cost (LRMC) of future 
water sources (NWISGWC 2007) (chapter 3). The effect that desalination investment has 
on LRMC depends on the method for calculating LRMC (chapter 3). Under the 
‘perturbation’ approach, for example, a planned desalination investment would affect 
LRMC when it becomes the next, lowest cost source of additional water in the water 
utilities’ supply schedule. Under the average incremental cost (AIC) approach, on the other 
hand, LRMC includes the present value of future supply investments (which may include 
desalination) over the planning period. Hence, LRMC under the ‘AIC’ approach distributes 
costs more evenly over the planning period. 
Developing estimates of the LRMC is not straightforward; it requires assumptions about 
when future supply (or demand) initiatives will occur and the level of water produced 
(saved) (Sydney Water 2007c). For example, water utilities may experience difficulties 
making long-term forecasts regarding the desalination plant operations and costs because 
investment outcomes will depend on a variety of factors, including the level of rainfall, 
demand and dam storage levels (Sydney Water 2007c). 
An alternative (or complement) to LRMC-based pricing is to set variable charges 
according to short run marginal cost (SRMC) (which, in times of water shortage, includes 
the scarcity value of water) (chapter 3). The benefit of SRMC pricing would be that, during 
times of scarcity, it would provide more efficient (and transparent) signals for when to 
operate the desalination plant. For example, the point at which the urban scarcity price 
(based on, say, dam levels) exceeded the desalination plant’s SRMC could act as a 
trigger for increasing production from the desalination plant. A fixed (access) 
charge could cover any revenue shortfall. 
Some regulators have noted pricing according to SRMC could result in large fluctuations 
in price and fail to send clear signals about long-term investment. However, these 
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problems are probably surmountable. For example, water suppliers could manage price 
volatility through long-term supply contracts (box 5.6). Volatile prices could be confined 
to the wholesale level, with retailers providing a price stabilisation service, for some 
customers, at a price (Freebairn 2008). 
 
Box 5.6 Markets for high-security desalinated water 
A private desalination operator could sell desalinated water to urban water users 
through long-term supply contracts. A typical customer might be an industrial water 
user, hotel or power generator willing to pay a premium for highly secure supplies to 
prevent the risk of incurring high costs from water restrictions. 
Long-term contracts for desalinated supplies would be akin to high-security 
entitlements for surface water.2 In some rural markets, high-security entitlements 
attract a premium over general-security entitlements because high-security entitlement 
holders are more likely to receive their full entitlement each year. Similarly, a 
desalination plant operator could earn a premium for a highly secure, 
weather-independent supply. 
Some rural water users participate in markets for seasonal allocations (chapter 4). The 
spot price for seasonal allocations is unaffected by whether the seller acquired the 
allocation under a high- or general-security entitlement (a megalitre of water is a 
megalitre of water). Hence, there is a single market price for water allocations. In a 
well-functioning market, this price provides a mechanism for coordinating efficient 
water use decisions (chapter 4).  
Enabling producers and customers of desalinated water supplies to interact in spot 
markets for (natural and desalinated) water would help ensure they face efficient 
signals. For example, the cost of producing the additional unit of desalinated water 
could be more than the spot price for natural water at a point in time. In this case, it 
would be more efficient for the desalination plant operator to honour a supply contract 
by purchasing seasonal allocations than increasing production. Similarly, a water user 
who has entered into a supply contract may place a lower value on an allocation than 
the prevailing spot price. Hence, it would be efficient to trade that allocation on the spot 
market. 
 
 
Further actions for promoting efficient water use and supply 
This chapter and previous chapters examine opportunities for promoting efficient water use 
and supply in the areas of pricing, water trade and investment in new supplies. As noted, 
                                                 
2 Some jurisdictions classify entitlements according to level of priority or reliability (that is, high 
or low). Priority or reliability reflects the frequency with which an entitlement holder receives a 
full water allocation. 
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several of these measures will rely on broader institutional and structural reforms. The next 
chapter examines in more detail the range of institutional and structural reforms available, 
highlighting both the potential gains and practical difficulties. 
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6 Institutional and structural reforms 
 
Key points  
• Reform in the urban water sector has focused on institutional mechanisms such as 
commercialisation, rather than structural changes to urban water monopolies. 
• Further governance reforms to the centralised monopoly model could improve 
outcomes — dividend payout policies could be more commercially based and 
water utilities given greater autonomy in making investment decisions.  
• Broader reforms could promote more efficient water use and investment, greater 
choice for users, and more transparent and accountable decision making.  
– Private involvement could be expanded through greater use, and innovative 
forms, of competitive procurement.  
– Water utilities could be disaggregated so that contestable elements (for 
example, bulk water supply) are separate from non-contestable elements (for 
example, distribution).  
• Current subsidies/grants for urban water initiatives appear to conflict with broad 
NWI policy objectives and could encourage inefficient outcomes. 
• The practical difficulties and costs associated with broader reform should not be 
underestimated.  
– Substantially more research and analysis is required before comprehensive 
changes to market structure could be introduced.  
– Changes would need to be introduced incrementally, preferably with current 
intergovernmental water institutions adapted to guide this process. 
• Governments would continue to play a key role in competition oversight and in 
meeting environmental, equity and health goals.   
 
6.1 Introduction 
The efficient provision of infrastructure services, such as gas, electricity, water and 
transport, is crucial for competitiveness, productivity and the quality of life for all 
Australians. Impelled by evidence of inefficiency and inequities in service delivery, 
governments began reforming their monopoly infrastructure services decades ago. Reforms 
focused on removing impediments to effective competition and included: disaggregating 
natural monopoly and potentially competitive elements of service provision; separating 
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regulatory and commercial functions; facilitating access; promoting competitive neutrality; 
and commercialising government businesses (NCC 1998). Various studies have identified 
significant national benefits flowing from such reforms (PC 1999a, 1999b; PC 2005a, 
2005b).  
While structural reform has long been underway for many infrastructure services, there has 
been relatively little change to the urban water sector. Although many water utilities have 
been commercialised, and some governments have restructured some supply functions, 
nearly all major urban utilities remain vertically integrated government-owned monopolies. 
Private sector involvement is focused largely on undertaking capital works and providing 
services under contract.  
That urban water has been treated differently to other infrastructure services may reflect its 
characteristics such as: the competing use of water for environmental flows; the natural 
monopoly characteristics of water and wastewater distribution; the high ‘transportation’ 
costs relative to the value of the resource; the public good aspects of ensuring community 
health through safe drinking water; the variable and uncertain supply of the resource; and 
the risks associated with ‘lumpy’ augmentation investments. Further research is required to 
ascertain the extent to which such characteristics mean that the urban water sector is less 
amenable to the types of reform that have arisen in other infrastructure services. Allied to 
this, modelling of the wholesale and retail markets for urban water is in its infancy.  
That said, it is widely accepted that competition to provide goods and services is usually 
the most effective way to deliver efficient prices and high quality services to consumers. 
Competitive pressures compel firms to: compete for customers on price and quality; 
compete for inputs, thereby directing resources to their most valued uses; and seek 
innovative ways to improve their price–product offerings. In some instances, a monopolist 
may provide services more efficiently than competing firms — for example, where there 
are large economies of scale and/or scope.1 However, productive efficiency need not mean 
that the monopolist’s product offerings accord with those sought by, or that they are 
allocated efficiently across, consumers. 
Rising concerns about the longer-term impacts of climate change on water availability and 
the impending introduction of substantial additional sources of new water add further 
impetus to questions about whether the current institutional arrangements remain the most 
appropriate (chapter 5). Structural changes have been proposed in Queensland and reviews 
are underway in other states including Western Australia (ERA 2007a, b), Tasmania 
(MWST 2006) and Victoria (VCEC 2007).  
                                                 
1 Economies of scale relate to unit costs of production decreasing as output increases. Economies 
of scope arise where one firm can provide two or more products along the supply chain more 
cheaply than for each to be provided by separate firms. 
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The potential institutional reform agenda is varied 
This chapter canvasses various approaches that could, in principle, promote improved 
community outcomes. Some could be addressed relatively quickly whereas others, if found 
to be worthwhile, would require extensive implementation strategies. All warrant further 
investigation.  
Improving the efficiency of the government monopoly model through further governance 
and commercialisation reforms could be pursued at relatively low cost (section 6.2). 
Within this centralised paradigm, there is scope to encourage a greater degree of, and more 
efficient, private sector involvement (section 6.3). This could include tendering for 
outcomes (for example, volumes of water) rather than particular technologies (for example, 
stormwater harvest).  
Moving away from the centralised approach, there is scope to progress broader reform in 
the urban water sector including: 
• retaining, but restructuring, government-owned integrated supply chains to ensure cost-
reflective pricing across the various ‘business units’  
• vertical (and horizontal) structural separation of contestable and non-contestable 
elements of the urban water supply monopolies. 
The former, by communicating (internal) price signals, could induce competitive entry to 
provide various urban water services. The latter more far-reaching approach could likewise 
induce competitive entry but also potentially create competing businesses by divesting 
contestable elements of the supply chain. Accordingly, broader reforms could catalyse 
competition in bulk water provision, retailing and wastewater recycling and encourage new 
business opportunities (section 6.4).  
Ultimately, it is possible to envisage an evolution to a fully decentralised urban water 
market involving many retailers and wholesalers offering different forms of product (for 
example, price and security). This is discussed in section 6.5. However, an important 
caveat is that such arrangements do not operate elsewhere in the world.  
Of a different ilk, but critically important, is the need to ensure that urban water policies 
are consistent and that public investments are not distortionary nor in conflict with the 
broad objectives enunciated in intergovernmental agreements (section 6.6). Finally, section 
6.7 considers issues associated with implementation, transition and adjustment. On balance 
an incremental approach offers advantages.  
   
108 TOWARDS URBAN 
WATER REFORM: A 
DISCUSSION PAPER 
 
 
6.2 Further commercialisation of water utilities  
Many government-owned water utilities have been subject to corporatisation and 
commercialisation to: clarify roles and responsibilities; encourage commercial charging; 
ensure that any subsidies are transparent; provide managerial autonomy; allow for rewards 
and sanctions for performance; and facilitate competitive neutrality (NCC 2005a). 
Nonetheless, the extent of governance reforms of water utilities has been patchy. Areas 
where further reforms could usefully be considered include the managerial autonomy of 
urban water utility boards and dividend payments to governments. 
The roles ascribed to some water utilities can appear conflicting — for example, in urban 
settings, their roles can be (i) to sell water and (ii) to not sell water (that is, discourage 
water use). This points to a need for a clear delineation between where responsibility 
resides for service provision, resource planning, augmentation, demand management, 
network coordination and environmental management. 
Governments sometimes restrict water utilities from pursuing particular supply 
augmentation options or require that they pursue specific strategies. (Grants and subsidies 
targeting specific outcomes can exacerbate this — section 6.6.) While it may be 
appropriate for governments to preside over major investment decisions that have broad 
economic, social and environmental impacts, this should not encroach unduly on the 
independence of utilities. Intervention into the management decisions of utilities can create 
a disconnect between responsibility and accountability. It also can create uncertainty for 
businesses seeking to offer contractual services if decisions are driven by considerations 
other than utilities’ stated objectives. 
Concerns have been raised that state governments have required excessive dividend 
payments from their urban water utilities2 (Dwyer 2006). Dividend payout ratios for urban 
water utilities in 2005-06 were around 70–100 per cent — for example, 73 per cent for 
Sydney Water, 95 per cent for SA Water (Metropolitan) and 76 per cent for the Water 
Corporation (Perth, Metropolitan) (PC 2006a; 2007). Large private sector utilities in the 
gas and electricity sector typically pay dividends of between 50–70 per cent of net profits 
after tax.  
Assessing if water utilities pay excessive dividends is not straightforward given the unique 
nature of their business, the lack of private sector equivalents, and differences in 
debt/equity ratios and accounting practices. Further, governments may regard water 
services — for which demand is relatively price-inelastic — as an appropriate target for 
                                                 
2 In contrast, rural and many smaller regional urban utilities do not make dividend payments. High 
dividend payments need not imply excessive profits for water utilities. If water prices were lower 
than scarcity values, sub-optimal water profits could co-exist with excessive dividends. 
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higher than usual taxation, and they may consider it socially desirable to extract economic 
rent from the water resource.  
To the extent that high dividend payouts are being made, utilities will have lower retained 
earnings to invest in maintenance and augmentation. Such utilities also would be at a 
disadvantage if competitive markets emerged.  
Ensuring utilities pay dividends based on commercial criteria could help address such 
problems. Governments may perceive that relinquishing direct control of the management 
of water utilities would result in a loss of hegemony over social, environmental or other 
policy objectives. However, they have other means to achieve such objectives — including 
through fully funded and transparent community service obligations. 
6.3 Procurement, contracting and privatisation  
Centralised procurement to harness the benefits of competition through greater private 
sector involvement includes a range of possibilities. Common approaches include water 
utilities seeking expressions of interest to supply projects (for example, infrastructure such 
as a desalination facility) and/or services (for example, maintenance).  
Some public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been undertaken and include ‘Build Own 
Operate’ and ‘Build Own Operate Transfer’ projects. Examples include the Virginia 
recycled water scheme (South Australia) operated by Earthtech, and Yan Yean treatment 
plant (Melbourne) operated by United Water. Recent analysis indicates that PPPs perform 
better than traditional procurement approaches in terms of construction delays and cost 
over-runs (Allen Consulting Group 2007b).3 These advantages must be weighed against 
the transaction and financing costs of PPPs.  
Centralised procurement can include auctioning licences to supply services to an entire 
market — for example, all water and wastewater services (Demsetz 1968). In addition to 
seeking operational efficiencies, governments could specify contractual conditions that 
extract monopoly profits up front. And, operators that overcharged or delivered poor 
services would risk being replaced by a rival at the expiration of the contract. Such 
contracts are extensively used in France (Renzetti and Dupont 2003). The SA Government 
has franchised the operation of Adelaide’s water system to the private sector, including 
managing water and wastewater treatment and undertaking billing.  
Typically, centralised procurement involves specific projects or services rather than 
outcomes. An outcomes-based approach, however has much to commend it. Rather than 
                                                 
3 Traditional procurement includes private involvement through ‘Design and Build’ and ‘Design 
and Construct’. The differentiating factor for PPPs is that they involve private capital.  
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specify a technology to provide additional water, the alternative would be to tender for a 
volume of water. This would enable different proposals to be ranked and, in the absence of 
policy bans on particular options, least cost augmentation options selected — whether from 
a dam, aquifer, catchment thinning, desalination, recycling, stormwater harvest or purchase 
of rural water entitlements. In its draft report on competition in the water and wastewater 
services, the Economic Regulation Authority (ERA) of Western Australia proposed 
establishing an independent procurement entity (IPE). In essence, rather than having the 
state Water Corporation determine source options, the IPE would procure a portfolio of 
‘call options’ with differing volumes, lead times and durations of supply. The portfolio of 
available options would enable cost-effective supply (ERA 2007b). 
Privatisation of water assets could encourage investors to seek efficiencies to generate 
higher returns and also liberate funds for other public expenditures. Privatisation without 
effective competition, however, risks replacing a public monopoly with a private one with 
potentially worse outcomes for users. For example, the initial experience with water sector 
privatisation in the United Kingdom was poor (Buckland and Fraser 2000; Lobina and 
Hall 2001). However, outcomes improved notably from the mid-1990s after effective 
regulation of pricing, quality and third party access was introduced (Buckland and 
Fraser 2000; Renzetti and Dupont 2003). 
A related, albeit more modest, means to use competition to achieve more efficient 
outcomes in a regulated monopoly environment is through incentive regulation whereby 
the performance of similar businesses are compared and better performing businesses 
permitted to retain part of their cost reductions. This approach has been adopted in parts of 
England and Wales (ERA 2007a). The structure being developed in Queensland (box 6.1) 
and the model adopted in Melbourne, with three retailers, could underpin this approach. (A 
weaker form, ‘benchmark’ or ‘yardstick’ competition, compares businesses to identify 
relative strengths and weaknesses.) 
Issues associated with private involvement in the market  
Expanding the private sector’s financing and ownership of water assets could provide 
additional funding for infrastructure investment, more opportunity for risk sharing (for 
example, for investment, operations and delivery risks) and possibly more productive 
management and work practices. Inconsistent contracting rules, however, can increase the 
costs of private involvement — a recent Australian Government report suggested 
developing national guidelines for contracting to assist in risk allocation in public-private 
partnerships (DPMC 2006). 
A key aspect of managing arrangements with the private sector to undertake infrastructure 
investments is apportioning risk between the government, private operators and water users 
(box 6.1). Several factors bear on the appropriate apportionment of risk. The model of 
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private sector involvement — ranging from full private ownership to full public ownership 
with management or service contracts — implies a continuum of risk-sharing 
arrangements. Further, case-specific factors influence the ultimate risk allocation on any 
project. For example, contractual agreements regarding service commitments, 
maintenance, coverage, financial obligations and certain other considerations bear on the 
allocation of risk (OECD 2007).  
 
Box 6.1 Risk sharing and desalination 
Investments in desalination generally involve private sector involvement — although 
the details for some planned desalination plants are unresolved. The NSW 
Government contracted the design, construction, operation and maintenance of 
Sydney’s desalination plant to private operators. Ownership and funding of the project 
will reside with Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd (SDP), a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
state-owned Sydney Water.  
The risk-sharing model adopted means Sydney Water will maintain a high degree of 
control over how much water the plant produces, which provides flexibility to shut down 
the plant or reduce production when cheaper supplies are available or storages are 
sufficiently full. Sydney Water (2007c, p. 87) has noted ‘it is anticipated the plant will 
not operate when major dams are spilling; it will instead operate when dams fall below 
pre-determined levels’. This flexibility comes at a cost. For example, Sydney Water 
(through SDP) is obliged to pay an ongoing ‘fixed’ fee to the desalination plant 
operator, which is, in a sense, the ‘insurance’ value attached to having desalinated 
water available.4 SDP, for example, must compensate the plant operator for fixed 
labour and other costs and, under certain conditions, the costs associated with shutting 
down, maintaining on standby, and restarting the desalination plant. 
Sources: Sydney Water (2007a, 2007b, 2007c).  
 
It is efficient for the contractual party that is best able to assess and control a particular risk 
to bear that risk. For example, generally the private partner should bear risk associated with 
operational efficiency because it is in a position to mitigate that risk. The public partner, on 
the other hand, is better placed to bear risk of a public-interest nature (for example, pursuit 
of non-commercial objectives) (OECD 2007). 
Social cost-benefit analysis should be the basis for determining the model for private 
infrastructure provision and the associated allocation of risk. In practice, the public must 
balance the incentive to shift as much risk as possible onto the private sector, with the cost 
of compensation to the private partners for assuming additional risk (OECD 2007). In 
                                                 
4 The proposed approach is for Sydney Water to collect revenue associated with the desalination 
project (Sydney Water and SDP required revenue) through customer bills. Sydney Water will pay 
SDP an availability charge (for providing the plant) and a volumetric charge for the water. The 
SDP revenue is used to pay operation/maintenance costs, debt repayment, electricity, contract 
management and administration costs, and a return on capital (Sydney Water 2007, p. 46). 
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some cases, governments must make tradeoffs between costs and flexibility. Material 
adverse effects clauses to protect private operators from sovereign risk, for example, could 
ameliorate risk and uncertainty to the private sector, but reduce flexibility (Hepburn et al. 
1997). 
6.4 Toward decentralised competition — unlocking the 
supply chain 
Retaining the features of the urban water monopoly supply model, ‘administrative 
restructuring’ could create discrete business units within the organisation with cost-
reflective pricing across the chain. Armed with transparent information about costs and 
prices, particularly for using distribution services, potential entrants could identify 
opportunities where services could be delivered more efficiently or new services 
introduced. This information could also be used to benchmark the performance of water 
businesses — indeed, clarifying roles, of itself, could engender better alignment of 
functions with resources.  
Recent proposals to reform the south east Queensland water sector are consistent with this 
approach — bulk water supply and treatment, and retailing services are to be provided by 
separate entities; transport and distribution managed by regulated monopolies; and 
planning functions coordinated by a grid manager (box 6.2).  
Administrative restructuring could be implemented as a precursor to the more formal 
structural separation that has occurred in the gas, electricity and telecommunications 
sectors. In these instances, former government monopolies have given way to competing 
businesses accessing regulated distribution networks. Applied to urban water, structural 
separation could entail disaggregating utilities vertically (and horizontally) to enable 
competition in the contestable parts of the water–wastewater supply chain (figure 6.1).  
Potentially contestable segments are likely to include retailing, bulk water supply, storage, 
and water and wastewater treatment services. In contrast, distribution and reticulation 
infrastructures display natural monopoly characteristics and are unlikely to be provided 
more efficiently by multiple providers. That said, parts of the cost of distribution networks 
could be avoided by locating a new water source closer to urban centres. In some cases a 
reticulation network could be avoided by proximity — say recycled or desalinated water 
for an industrial customer. 
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Box 6.2 Reforms to south east Queensland’s water industry  
The Queensland Water Commission (QWC) recommended a restructure of the south 
east region’s water delivery services. The main elements include: vertical 
disaggregation of functions, including separation of contestable elements of water 
provision from natural monopoly elements (bulk transport and distribution); 
rationalisation of bulk water suppliers and retailers; and creation of a water grid. 
There is also a possibility of introducing third-party access to the distribution network to 
allow competition between retailers, including new entrants. The reforms are expected 
to improve accountability, strengthen maintenance incentives, achieve economies of 
scale in regional water management, and increase water security. Key features are: 
• The State Government being responsible for major infrastructure associated with 
the water grid, including bulk water assets, bulk water pipes and treatment plants. 
Three state-owned statutory authorities would provide bulk water. Two would own 
dams, weirs and other water sources (currently owned by 12 different entities), 
based on catchment areas, and associated treatment plants. The third would control 
Tugun’s desalination plant and the Western Corridor Recycled Water Project. 
• A water grid manager would be established as a non-profit statutory authority to 
control the sharing of water and set fair and consistent prices for bulk water. 
• Local councils would jointly own all regional domestic distribution assets and three 
new water retailers (created by merging the current 17 retailers). 
• The Queensland Competition Authority would oversee water prices.  
Proposed structure of south east Queensland’s water industry: 
 
In response to the QWC report, the Queensland Government opted for a Bulk 1 entity. 
Source: QWC (2007c).  
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Figure 6.1 Alternative structures for the urban water sector 
 
aStylised representation. Desalinated water can be treated at source and injected into the network and 
recycled water, rather than going to a water treatment plant, would typically be diluted in a dam.  
The illustration of the potential differences between an integrated and a disaggregated 
urban water structure (figure 6.1) conveys high level possibilities. In addition, treatment 
services could be contestable for potable water and almost certainly for other grades of 
water. Indeed, under the disaggregated model, there would be greater scope for wastewater 
treatment and retailing (figure 6.2).  
Potential costs of structural reform could include any diminution of economies of scale and 
scope, or other benefits such as administrative and operational synergies. The counter to 
any joint management and administrative economies is that greater accountability of each 
separate business to ‘pay its way’ and minimise internal cross-subsidies could sharpen 
incentives for efficiencies within the supply chain.  
The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) of New South Wales (2007) 
found some evidence of economies of scale in water services, but few insights on their 
magnitude. It noted that Sydney Water was approaching a size at which water utilities in 
other jurisdictions have experienced diseconomies of scale (IPART 2005). According to 
IPART (2007) a comprehensive study of economies of scope in water services — relating 
to the industry in the United Kingdom — identified economies from the integration of 
water production and distribution (Stone and Webster Consultants 2004).  
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Figure 6.2 Possible ‘injections’ and ‘off-takes’ into urban water systems  
 
Source: Allen Consulting Group (2007a).  
The ERA’s draft report on competition in water and wastewater indicates that the 
minimum efficient scale for water businesses has been estimated by various studies to lie 
in the range between 125 000 and 1 million connections, and around 100 000 connections 
for wastewater services (ERA 2007b). It further noted that there appears to be little benefit 
from combining water with wastewater services and that horizontal separation of 
network/retail businesses may lead to increased dynamic efficiency through competition 
that could offset the loss of economies of scale.  
Importantly, the ERA (2007b) posited that: 
The key issue here is whether some modifications to the arrangements that reduce the 
size or scope of individual operations would involve costs that might exceed the 
potential gains from greater competition and wider incentives for innovation and 
customer focus. The evidence suggests that sustained cost increases from such a 
restructure could, if real, be quite modest – provided that the transition and legacy costs 
are not excessive. (p. 70)  
Facilitating third-party access 
A necessary condition for stimulating competition in the urban water sector would be the 
capacity for new entrants to access monopoly distribution services on reasonable terms and 
conditions. 
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Administrative restructuring, of itself, is unlikely to mitigate incentives for integrated 
incumbents to engage in anti-competitive conduct to maximise the value of the business as 
a whole. Such conduct could include outright denial of access to networks or the setting of 
charges and/or conditions that deter access. Water utilities may have an incentive to 
impede competition in order to discourage ‘cherry picking’ by competitors that could 
threaten cross-subsidised system costs and/or dividend streams. In contrast, under 
structural (as opposed to administrative) separation, independent distributors would have a 
commercial incentive to provide services to all comers — although there would still be 
potential for them to seek to extract monopoly rents.  
Without appropriate access regimes or other regulations to manage the market power of 
bottleneck infrastructure, cost savings from increased competition in the urban water sector 
could be captured by distributors. Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cwth.) 
provides a right for third parties to share the use of essential infrastructure facilities on 
reasonable terms and conditions by having such facilities ‘declared’ (NCC 2002a, 2007b). 
State governments may also create their own access arrangements and have them certified 
under Part IIIA.  
Applied appropriately, access regimes can: promote efficient use of infrastructure; 
encourage new firms to compete in upstream and downstream markets; promote efficient 
investment in those markets; and improve outcomes for consumers (PC 2002). Poorly 
developed access regimes and/or inappropriate regulation (for example, arbitrated 
outcomes that set access prices too low) can deter investment and detract from efficient 
outcomes. Access arrangements aim to promote voluntary agreement (negotiation), but 
regulatory provisions (arbitration) provide a means to break impasses. Experience from the 
telecommunications sector highlights that access regulation can be problematic where the 
regulated facility owner also has upstream or downstream interests (that is, it is vertically 
integrated). A structurally separate network overcomes much of the potential for disputes 
and strategic gaming.  
Two Part IIIA coverage cases involving access to services provided by water and 
wastewater infrastructure have arisen to date (NCC 2004, 2005b). One involving an 
application to access the waste transport services provided by Sydney Water’s sewers has 
resulted in the NSW Government introducing a state-based water access regime (NSW 
Cabinet Office 2006). That there have been so few access declarations is not surprising 
given the low price of water and wastewater services, and the sovereign risk associated 
with entering the market and competing with dominant, vertically integrated government-
owned water utilities. The ERA (2007b) has recommended that a state-based access regime 
should be implemented in Western Australia. 
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6.5 Prospects for a decentralised market 
Effective third party access arrangements may not, of themselves, promote robust 
competition. Without price signals that reflect the opportunity cost of water resources, the 
incentive to provide competing or new services may remain muted.  
In theory, competition in water supply ultimately could deliver efficient market prices 
without the complexity attached to administered pricing (chapter 3). That said, improved 
administered pricing may be a necessary evolution — the transitional costs of removing all 
restraints and allowing competitive prices simply to ‘emerge’ would be large.  
Figure 6.3 Potential outcomes from structural reform 
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How competitive structures might evolve is stylised in figure 6.3 which depicts two routes 
for increasing competition — competition for water users, and competition for bulk water 
resources. A critical dimension is whether supply augmentation occurs within existing 
monopoly structures or whether competitive augmentation is permitted. The following 
discussion, which abstracts from any inherent market failures in urban water provision and 
likely transitional and adjustment costs, is far from being policy prescriptive. It aims only 
to ‘tease out’ some salient issues. 
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Competition for customers 
There is scope for more than one retailer to compete for customers on billing and payment 
options, metering, advisory services, and product and pricing packages, including cross-
product offers. Without competitive supply augmentation, the potential benefits of retail 
competition — with retailers competing on service delivery (not resource costs) through 
operational efficiencies — would be modest, particularly given the probable dominance of 
reticulation costs faced by all retailers. 
If retailers could access multiple water supplies with different characteristics, their ability 
to compete on product mix would be expanded. (Retailers might also compete to work 
with wastewater managers and councils to access and redistribute water from these 
sources.) Further, if prices were allowed to rise when supply was short, users would find it 
worthwhile to compare retailers’ services relative to domestic water saving options.  
Retail competition on price could improve the allocation of water by allowing users who 
value water highly to communicate this through their willingness to pay. This could reduce 
the reliance on non-price demand management.  
The potential advantages of retail competition include: 
• more product choice in terms of supply reliability and billing/payment options and 
enhanced opportunity for more flexible pricing 
• stronger incentives for productivity improvements in retailing functions 
• pressure on bulk suppliers in relation to the cost and reliability of water supply. 
Benefits from retail competition would likely be greater for large users than for 
households, suggesting that competition could be introduced to the former first. This 
staggered approach was used to introduce retail competition for electricity.  
Limited retail competition for water occurs in parts of England and Wales via licence 
conditions that allow non-incumbent businesses to service large customers. Scotland is 
introducing retail competition for water and wastewater services by separating retail 
functions from networks (ERA 2007a). In general, however, comprehensive retail 
competition is not prevalent. Insights can, nonetheless, be gained from other sectors. The 
Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC 2007), for example, reported that 
competition in electricity and gas retailing in Victoria is effective. It found that customers 
exhibited a willingness to switch retailers, with neither brand loyalty nor switching costs 
significant deterrents, and that margins appeared sufficient to encourage entry and allow 
retailers to offer incentives. Similar benefits have been identified in the United Kingdom 
(Menezes 2005).  
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However, as noted in section 6.1, there could be important differences between electricity 
and water, so further investigation is desirable.  
Competition for the water resource 
The bulk supply of water by government monopolies originated when water was supplied 
from a few sources and used once. Today, physical systems are being augmented with 
manufactured water considered in terms of fitness for purpose — with potable and 
different grades of non-potable water. The supply system is therefore more complex and 
new prospects for competition are emerging. 
Competition in bulk water supply could be promoted by: 
• maintaining institutional arrangements for existing supplies, but allowing new entrants 
to provide augmented water 
• divesting bulk suppliers into competing businesses and allowing new entry. (However, 
dams in the same catchment might be managed better by one entity.) 
Under the former approach, existing entities could compete with new suppliers who could, 
for example, operate and manage desalination and/or have agreements to supply water 
from rural water suppliers. The second approach is akin to that undertaken for the 
Victorian electricity reforms where base load generation units of the State Electricity 
Commission were structurally separated (BCA 2006). Competition also could be fostered 
where there is a single bulk water asset. For example, a dam’s capacity could be divided 
into entitlements and auctioned.  
Competition to provide bulk water in the presence of supply augmentation options offers 
the prospect of an improved communication of the value of water which could in turn 
signal when new investment was appropriate. Businesses could manage a portfolio of 
water supply and storage assets, and offer different products in terms of reliability. 
Suppliers of desalinated water, for example, might offer a high reliability product at higher 
cost.  
The potential benefits of competition in bulk water supply include: 
• greater incentives for the efficient operation of water sourcing and storage assets 
• incentives to draw on low-cost sources of water first  
• incentives for investment in the most efficient supply source — whether expanding 
yields of existing operations or investing in new facilities/pipelines. 
On the other side of the ledger, there could be increased costs — for instance, greater 
monitoring of a commercially focussed catchment manager that might pay less attention to 
the long-term health of a catchment if doing so did not coincide with maximum yields. 
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Governments would need also to be careful not to advantage one water source over another 
— unless there are policy-relevant market failures that meant such discrimination 
generated a net public benefit. 
Decentralised competition — scope to move beyond theory 
In theory, the greatest potential gain could arise by allowing competition for bulk supply in 
tandem with retail competition so that prices could reflect costs — including the scarcity 
value of water — and signal investment needs to suppliers. Suppliers and users could 
negotiate on water prices and make their own assessments about the value of supply 
security.  
Approaches to facilitate trade could include contracts and market exchange or spot 
markets. Under contracting, participants — including bulk suppliers, retailers and large 
users — could negotiate contracts to supply water. Alternatively, a centralised exchange or 
pool, rather like the National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) 
arrangements for electricity could operate (box 6.3). Bulk water suppliers could sell water 
to an exchange wholesaler (possibly a grid manager) who could determine a price based on 
suppliers’ offers and bids from retailers or large users. Derivative products, such as options 
and forward contracts, could emerge if participants considered them valuable and 
transactions costs were not too high. Other innovative proposals include tradeable 
household entitlements (box 6.3).  
Of course, unlike the eastern seaboard national electricity market arrangements, water 
markets are city-specific or regional rather than national. Hence, if similar arrangements 
were contemplated for urban water, there would be a need for substantial analysis 
cognisant of specific circumstances. As noted by Swier (2007): 
No jurisdiction internationally has seriously considered or implemented a competitive 
urban water-trading market. There is no widely-accepted body of theory and research 
as to how urban water markets might work — arguably, however, the development of 
the necessary theory and concepts is not ‘rocket science’. The market-design concepts 
are able to be based on well-established techniques developed in the operations 
research literature. … While Australia drew heavily on ideas developed in the US and 
UK to underpin the development of its electricity reforms, a similar body of research 
does not exist internationally for urban water trading. (p. 9) 
Much more analysis is needed to determine the extent to which a decentralised competitive 
model could deliver net benefits, let alone rigorous analyses of the more complex 
proposals to establish property rights and foster competition.  
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Box 6.3 Facilitating trade — property rights and market exchanges  
A potential model for virtual water suppliers 
Sibly and Tooth (2007) propose creating virtual water suppliers (VWSs) who are 
allocated, via competitive auction, virtual portions of a dam’s water stock. The VWSs, 
which buy and trade in limited water rights, have a water account and a financial 
account but no physical access to the water. Under the proposal, the market would be 
supported by a non-profit operator, similar to the NEMMCO, which would determine 
spot prices. Suppliers would submit bids to supply and the operator would set a market 
clearing price. The proposal includes a catchment manager (which could be private). 
 
Markets for household water 
According to Young, McColl and Fisher (2006), one way to introduce household trading 
would be to give each household a 200-kilolitre annual allocation, which was tradeable, 
and control water use above 200 kilolitres using either a scarcity price or a volume cap. 
Under the scarcity pricing approach, water charges would rise gradually as dam levels 
fall. As the scarcity price increased, low water users would have an incentive to sell 
part of their 200-kilolitre allocation to large users. A cap and trade variant would involve 
placing a limit on water available for consumption above 200 kilolitres. Water users 
could then bid for a share of the available pool using a tender process. Young, McColl 
and Fisher suggest market design could include features to address equity concerns, 
such as making the first 100-kilolitre entitlement non-tradeable to protect people under 
financial pressure from selling their entire entitlement. 
Sources: Sibly and Tooth (2007) and forthcoming; Young, McColl and Fisher (2006).  
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6.6 Policies that distort urban water objectives 
The two major impediments to competition in the urban water sector include the setting of 
water prices below the cost of additional supply (chapter 2) and restrictions on augmenting 
urban supply with water from rural areas (chapter 3).  
In addition, intervention in water investment at all levels of government raises questions 
about the transparency, consistency and effectiveness of the overall approach to water 
investment in Australia. These include:  
• the degree of state government influence over supply investment decisions 
• the effects of sovereign risk on private investment in water supplies 
• the consistency of government subsidies with  
– generating efficient water technology and augmentation choices 
– cost recovery requirements for water utilities 
• the extent to which current institutional and regulatory arrangements affect water 
utilities’ capacities to fund investments (Marsden Jacob Associates 2006).  
The provision of grants and subsidies for various large-scale projects and for micro-
solutions (for example, rainwater tanks) raises two salient questions. 
1. Are grants and subsidies consistent with the cost recovery objectives for urban water 
outlined in the National Water Initiative? Subsidisation can frustrate cost recovery 
objectives and deter appropriate investments. There is little reason why urban (and 
rural) water investments should not ‘pay their own way’. Subsidised water supply 
projects can reduce the costs of water and exacerbate the inefficient price signals 
already received by users — that is, signalling that there is no imperative to pay the full 
cost of water delivery, or more for the water resource when it is scarce.  
2. Have supported projects been properly assessed in terms of some benchmark such as 
dollars per kilolitre saved or augmented? If not, there is potential for inefficient and 
high cost solutions to be adopted. For example, one rebate scheme for water-efficient 
dishwashers has been estimated to have saved water at a cost of over $30 per kilolitre 
— this can be compared to costs of $0.15–$3.00 per kilolitre for supplying dam water 
and $3.00–$9.00 per kilolitre for rainwater tanks (Crase and Dollery 2005; Marsden 
Jacob Associates 2006). Such benchmarks should not be the only decision criterion — 
reliability, security and flexibility also are important. Real options analysis, for 
instance, might favour small, but relatively expensive, water solutions to buy time prior 
to committing to a large augmentation — allowing, say, climatic conditions and 
technological developments to be more fully assessed (chapter 5). That aside, indicative 
benchmarks add to transparency and provide a safeguard against well-meaning but 
inefficient expenditures.  
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Provision of subsidies/grants for urban water initiatives should be assessed carefully to 
ensure that they do not impede broad policy objectives or detract from efficiency. In the 
absence of a particular need to address policy-relevant market failures, the case for grants 
and subsidies for urban water projects appears weak. 
In relation to this, sometimes grants and subsidies appear to be provided for solutions in 
the presence of ‘policy bans’ on lower-cost augmentation options. The Chairman of the 
National Water Commission (NWC) has observed:  
It is really important that … all [options] be on the table, they should go through a 
process of analysis, logic and evidence. To have a policy ban at the outset is, in my 
view, indefensible. (cited in Wahlquist 2007) 
Any comprehensive strategy for an urban water reform agenda would ideally address such 
policy distortions in an integrated framework encompassing governance, institutions, 
planning, pricing and regulation. The Council of Australian Government’s (COAG) 
National Water Initiative (NWI) provides the key elements of such a framework (section 
6.7).  
6.7 Implementation, transition and adjustment 
Placing urban water utilities on a more commercial basis would be relatively low-cost. 
More substantial reforms, such as structural disaggregation and providing for competition 
in supply and retailing, offer the (theoretical) prospect of transforming urban water 
outcomes for the better. However, with the greater potential benefits come greater risks of 
failure and higher implementation costs (table 6.1). 
Improving the allocation of water and price signals for investment could deliver benefits 
for many water users. Householders who have had little choice but to conform to 
restrictions on use or risk penalties could instead choose how and where to use and 
conserve water. Industrial users could benefit from a greater capacity to enter into contracts 
and other innovative undertakings with competitive water providers to acquire certainty on 
water availability. This could assist major water-using businesses to make long-term 
investment decisions, reduce operational risk, and, in some cases, avoid costly re-fitting or 
relocation. In essence, water use could be ‘democratised’.  
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Table 6.1 Some potential advantages and disadvantages of reforms 
Type of reform Potential advantages Potential disadvantages 
Further 
commercialisation 
• Improve accountabilities 
• Greater focus on efficient service 
delivery and efficient investment 
• Capacity for utilities to focus on 
core business 
• Reduce sovereign risk 
• Diminution of government control to 
achieve non-commercial objectives 
Competition through 
centralised 
procurement 
approaches 
• Improve incentives for efficiency 
• Improve cost-service quality 
offerings 
• Capacity to extract monopoly 
profits ex ante via tender 
• Release public funds for other 
government objectives 
• Expectation of government as 
supplier of last resort to rectify 
failures 
• Establishment, administrative and 
enforcement costs 
Structural and other 
competition reforms 
• Efficient incentives for supply 
augmentation and for drawing 
on, and investing in, low cost 
sources of water first 
• Encourage new investment and 
more diversified water sources 
• More focused roles and 
accountabilities throughout the 
supply chain 
• Continuing competitive pressures 
to innovate  
• Greater product choice and 
customer service models 
• Loss of economies of scale/scope  
• Potential loss of system-wide 
planning and integration 
• Possible higher costs in ensuring 
environmental and safety objectives  
• Weaken capacity to maintain non-
transparent cross-subsidiesa 
• Strategic behaviour by service 
providers and access seekers under 
third party access regulation 
• Transitional, administrative and 
compliance costs 
Addressing policy 
distortions 
• More efficient allocation of 
resources (for example, pursuit 
of least cost augmentation) 
• Reduce scope for inconsistent 
policy signals 
• Reduce sovereign risk  
• Reduce scope to respond with some 
‘populist’ interventionsb 
a This is a disadvantage from the perspective of the government and of beneficiaries, but an advantage for 
current losers of any cross-subsidies. b This is a disadvantage from the perspective of the government and of 
beneficiaries, but potentially an advantage for the community as a whole. 
More broadly, as part of a portfolio of pro-competitive augmentation, rural–urban 
integration can be seen as an important driver of nationwide efficiency gains. As observed 
by the Secretary to the Australian Treasury: 
 … we know that the Australian economy is not allocatively efficient because we 
observe differences in water prices that cannot be explained simply by water 
transmission and purification costs. … many water charging regimes in Australia seek 
only to recover operating costs and a return on infrastructure. Typically, the water 
being supplied is assumed to have no economic cost; that is, no scarcity value. 
Unsurprisingly, if a commodity is effectively being given away, then demand will 
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exceed supply and we can have no confidence that what supply there is will be directed 
to its use of highest value-added. So it is with water. Major cities are experiencing 
water restrictions of one kind or another. Quantitative rationing is incontrovertible 
proof of the absence of an efficient market. And while we ration in the cities, we 
manage to grow highly water-intensive crops on the driest continent on the planet. 
Why? Look at the prices. (Henry 2005, p. 10)  
Consistent with meeting environmental and social goals, a more competitive urban water 
framework potentially could deliver better outcomes than central planning decisions 
muddied by multiple and potentially conflicting objectives. That said, much more work is 
required to provide a clearer picture of the economywide impacts of various reform 
options. 
Indeed, restructuring the urban water sector and increasing competition are highly complex 
matters that require deeper analysis than is possible in this paper. Issues for investigation 
include the following:  
• Sequencing of reforms — A critical implementation issue is the ordering of any 
structural changes, particularly in conjunction with pricing reforms (chapter 3) and 
reforms to integrate rural and urban water resources (chapter 4).  
• Full extent of market orientation — The need for, and direction of, urban water reform 
is clear. However, the degree to which a market-oriented focus could ultimately be 
pursued may depend on whether urban water has unique properties.  
– If integrated system-wide planning is necessary for efficient outcomes, to what 
extent might the discrete project specific nature of private investment be 
(in)compatible with the inter-linkages in urban water (and potentially rural water) 
systems?  
– If climate-related uncertainty engenders a much sharper focus on providing greater 
water security services, would a competitive market outcome accord with a socially 
optimum level of water security?  
• Adjustment — Expanding competition, while potentially benefiting many, would 
impose costs on those who had gained from a restricted market. There are also issues 
related to movements of water and capital between urban and rural areas. Structural 
reform would involve adjustment costs that need to be assessed.  
• Regional variations — Urban centres have different features such as access to water 
catchments, rivers and ground water, and the feasibility of interconnection with rural 
water markets. Desalination may be an option for coastal cities, whereas recycling 
might be more prominent for inland centres. This means that a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach would have limited application. 
A comprehensive framework to guide reform has much to commend it. Reform initiatives 
would have to work within, or drive changes to, the multiple objectives that governments 
   
126 TOWARDS URBAN 
WATER REFORM: A 
DISCUSSION PAPER 
 
 
pursue: environmental management, health, supply security, equity, revenue/dividend 
targets and market power. This underscores the importance of inter-jurisdictional structures 
like the COAG’s NWI to ensure that jurisdictional boundaries do not impede the efficient 
management of water resources.  
A modified NWI, especially if linked to rewards and sanctions (for example incentive 
payments), could provide the ‘glue’ to assist governments to overcome, what some may 
consider to be, intractable political difficulties. A recent World Bank study on 
infrastructure services observed that: 
In many countries the political economy of water has not been highly favourable to 
reform, which partly explains why the water sector is behind electricity, 
telecommunications, and transportation in restructuring and privatisation … Water 
reform typically has high social benefits but low political benefits, especially relative to 
other utility reform … (Kessides 2004, p. 256)  
Ideally, the development of an effective reform agenda should be informed by an 
independent review. And, given the limited experience in Australia and internationally 
with structural and competition reform in the urban water sector, an incremental approach, 
starting with modest reforms, may offer advantages.  
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